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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis is about the legal challenges posed by Transborder Biometric Information Flows 
(TBIF) and its impact on personal privacy and civil liberties in two contexts, immigration 
information flow and information flow in criminal databases. The thesis considers the role of 
national and international policy and regulation for TBIF in the contexts of immigration 
control and crime prevention. The examination of privacy and civil liberties is conducted 
within the framework of a comparative four countries study of Australia, Mexico, New 
Zealand and Spain. In comparison with the extensive international civil liberties literature, 
there is a significant absence of scholarly work on the legal impact of biometric technology, 
in general and on TBIF, in particular.   
 
Chapter 1 set the framework for the research. The thesis explores the historical background 
to biometrics, its typology and purposes (Chapter 2) with a focus on TBIF applications. 
Before analysing the legal challenges of TBIF, the thesis maps the key players in the 
biometrics industry and their products and practices and finds a lack of industry ethical 
codes of practices and a need to improve self-regulation (Chapter 3). The four countries 
study framework examines the operation of TBIF in two specific contexts of immigration 
information flow and information flow in criminal databases (Chapters 4 and 5). The four 
countries study also informs the analysis of the legal challenges to personal privacy and data 
protection and civil liberties generally posed by TBIF in the two contexts of immigration and 
information criminal databases, at both the national and international levels (Chapter 6). 
 
The thesis argues that all countries need to balance properly the public interests in national 
security with individuals’ civil rights and liberties, when biometric systems are deployed and 
TBIF between and within jurisdictions are implemented. This balance, it is argued can be 
assessed and achieved with a due regard and reasoned approach to the application of the 
civil law proportionality and common law reasonableness tests (Chapter 7). This thesis 
concludes with proposals to achieve proper and proportionate levels of protection for TBIF 
and makes specific recommendations to amend privacy and data protection laws and 
reinforce existing privacy commissioner powers (Chapter 8)  
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 EXPLANATORY NOTE 
 
Biometrics is an evolving and dynamic area with regular technological and scientific 
developments occurring around the world. This thesis takes into consideration the 
latest technological, scientific, as well as legal developments as at 31 December 
2013 in relation to the focus of this thesis on Transborder Biometric Information 
Flows (TBIF). 
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CHAPTER 1.  
 
TRANSBORDER BIOMETRIC INFORMATION FLOWS: LEGAL CHALLENGES 
 
 
1.1. Introduction 
 
Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) are providing rapid updates and 
advances in the speed of access, storage capacity and generation of data. Arguably, 
one of the most important advances in ICT has been the capacity to collect, store, 
process and exchange new types of data. Prominent amongst these new forms of 
ICT data are human genomic and biometric data. Human genomic data is 
revolutionising medical research as biometric data is shaping the security industry. 
The ICT industry has developed novel modes of data collection, storage and 
exchange of biometric information. There has been both intensification and a 
diversification in the use of these technologies. These exchanges of information can 
occur within countries or across borders.  
 
Biometrics is not a new field of research and development1. What is new, however, 
in relation to biometrics, is the advances in automation to rapidly collect, store, 
process and exchange information; including, the capacity to build a large scale of 
networks and databases. This biometric technology has been intensified and 
diversified, and has penetrated into diverse areas of social interaction, from law 
enforcement, banking services, healthcare services, government social benefits and 
services, employment, immigration to even public transportation2. 
 
                                            
1
 For further details, see section 2.3. The Biometric Systems Debate: Tracking History 
2
 For further details, see section 3.3. Biometric Systems Applications: Diversification into Different 
Fields 
7 
 
Aside from the technical aspects of this ICT revolution, there are considerable 
privacy and data protection issues involved with biometrics3. From a legal 
perspective, these ICT developments bring new challenges, limitations and 
problems. The deployment of biometric systems requires not only an informed public 
debate, but also the participation of citizens in these developments. These raises the 
question as how the deployment of biometric systems and Transborder Biometric 
Information Flows (TBIF) fit in democratic societies. To begin with, it can be 
observed that there must be legal responses to the deployment of biometric systems 
both nationally and to TBIF. These responses may range from self-regulation, to 
formal international cooperation and regulation. This thesis will focus on TBIF at the 
national and international levels in the two specific contexts of immigration 
information flow 4 and information flow in criminal databases5 and will examine these 
areas in a comparative case study of four countries. This thesis does not consider 
the technical aspects of forensic DNA testing (deoxyribonucleic acid) in criminal 
investigations, prosecutions6 nor does it consider the rapidly expanding use of 
databases for scientific research purposes. However, this thesis does present an 
overview of the expanding biometrics industry7, but the market dominance of some 
specific companies in the industry are beyond the parameter of this thesis8. 
 
This thesis also examines some of the theoretical analyses of modern technology. In 
particular, this thesis focuses on rational-critical communication theory, which 
analyses how citizens come to know things and express general public opinion. 
Rational communication theory is a useful tool in addressing this rapidly developing 
biometric technology. The rational-critical communication theory work of Habermas, 
                                            
3
 There is a distinguished characteristic between Civil Law countries and Common Law countries 
using the terms of “privacy” and “data protection”. This is further discussed in detail, see section 1.3. 
Country Profiles for the Comparative Study Component   
4
 For further details, see Chapter 4. Biometric Systems in the Context of Transborder Immigration 
Flow  
5
 For further details, see Chapter 5. Biometrics in Criminal Databases: Current Transborder 
Information Flow  
6
 General prosecutions, crime scene investigations, prosecution problems and evidence, see 
Chalmers D., Genetic Testing in the Criminal Law, (UCL Press, 2007). 
7
 For further details, see Chapter 3. The Biometric Industry: An Illustrative Map of Players, Products 
and Partnerships 
8
 For further details, see section 1.5. The Aim of the Research 
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Jasanoff, Villanueva and Ugalde is considered. This work analyses the right of 
citizens to access information with transparency, accountability and public debate.  
 
This thesis considers the role of national policy and regulation in balancing the 
undoubted technical advantages of biometric systems with the critical civil liberty 
considerations. A four countries study examines the balance of public and private 
interest in the two contexts of immigration control and crime prevention. Balancing 
public interests with individual human rights is not contained with national 
boundaries. The deployment of biometric systems crosses border with TBIF that 
must be strictly scrutinised, supervised and regulated. The balance between public 
and private interests is addressed in Civil Law countries by the ‘proportionality test’. 
The Civil Law “proportionality approach” is not unknown in countries with Common 
Law systems, such as England, New Zealand and Canada. Common Law countries 
usually express the “proportionality test” in terms of their traditional “reasonableness 
standard”. This thesis will address the balance between public and private interests 
in the area of TBIF and the required level of privacy and data protection within the 
legal frameworks of the Civil Law proportionality test and Common Law 
reasonableness standard9.  
 
This introductory chapter sets out the fast evolving biometric industry and the role of 
privacy and data protection in the context of TBIF in immigration control and crime 
prevention. The examination of privacy and data protection is conducted within the 
framework of four countries comparative study component. This chapter also 
explains the methodology and aims in the specific context of TBIF in immigration 
information flow and information flow from national to international criminal 
databases. The research methodology and the reference system used is explained 
in this thesis. Finally, this chapter presents the research questions of the thesis. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
9
 For further details, see Chapter 7. Transborder Biometric Privacy Regimes: National Solutions 
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1.2. The Context of the Study: Deployment of Biometric Systems   
 
This thesis analyses and assesses the current national and international frameworks 
for the deployment of biometric systems in the contexts of immigration information 
flow and information flow in criminal databases. There is a lack of critical legal and 
regulatory analysis of TBIF in general and in relation to immigration information flows 
and information flows in criminal databases in particular. This lack of legal regulatory 
literature is despite national governments implementing biometric systems for 
identification purposes10. This implementation of biometric technology has intensified 
and diversified in different fields over the last three decades11. Biometric systems 
pose challenges for individual privacy and civil liberties and this thesis analyses 
these challenges in two contexts, immigration information flow12 and information flow 
in criminal databases13. Regulation has generally focused on national responses to 
these developments and has not involved public policy debates based on the 
introduction of the systems. Biometric systems involved a multiplicity of interests 
from politicians; supervisory authorities; the biometric industry itself; academic 
privacy groups; and, data protection activists. TBIF is a consequence of the 
implementation of biometric technology and transcends national borders; therefore, 
international cooperation is required for developing legal frameworks and common 
standards for law enforcement14.  
 
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to examine TBIF in all countries to understand all 
national responses. However, research for this thesis includes a four countries 
comparative study, limited to Australia, Mexico, New Zealand and Spain. A 
comparison between the biometric systems deployed in these countries aims to 
identify the common political agreements that are taking place internationally in 
relation to immigration control and crime prevention, especially in border controls 
and police co-operation. In the four countries study, an examination is conducted on 
                                            
10
 For further details, see Chapter 2. Biometric Systems: What is Biometrics? 
11
 For further details, see Chapter 3. The Biometric Industry: An Illustrative Map of Players, Products 
and Partnerships  
12
 For further details, see Chapter 4. Biometric Systems in the Context of Transborder Immigration 
Flow 
13
 For further details, see Chapter 5. Biometrics in Criminal Databases: Current Transborder 
Information Flow 
14
 For further details, see Chapter 8. Conclusions 
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the privacy and data protection legislation in each country and their legal frameworks 
for immigration control and biometric criminal databases. In addition, this thesis 
identifies the different emerging international and regional organisations that are 
developing regulation and standards for TBIF for different purposes, including 
immigration control and crime prevention. In the European Union, the EURODAC 
and the Schengen Information System (SIS) were identified and, in the Asia-Pacific 
Economic Co-operation (APEC) forum, the APEC Business Travel Card was 
identified. Globally, Interpol databases are significant in biometrics. 
 
One country in the four countries study, Mexico, provides an illustrative example of 
both national regulation responses and the emerging international regulatory 
framework. At the national level in Mexico, the regulatory framework adopted for 
biometric profiles was a reaction to a specific situation which aroused much public 
opinion. This situation concerned irregularities during criminal investigations in 
Ciudad Juarez (Chihuahua)15 about violence, murders and disappearances of 
women from the beginning of the 1990s. These investigations resulted in a 
prosecution case in the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, known as the “Cotton 
Field”16 in 2009. Before this trail, Mexico responded to public opinion and enacted 
several laws that had the purpose to provide a clear signal to a vulnerable population 
about the need for greater public order. However, these laws failed to provide for an 
adequate level of protection and certainty. The irregularities continued at the time 
Mexico went to trial and the Inter-American Court decision found that Mexican 
processes had legal irregularities17. This Mexican event led to a deep reflection, not 
only about the collection, storage and process of biometric information but also about 
the purpose and use of TBIF and the proper balance of human rights.  
                                            
15
 Ciudad Juarez is located in the north of the state of Chihuahua, on the border with El Paso, Texas. 
It is an industrial city –where manufacturing and/or assembly plants have flourished– and a place of 
transit for Mexican and foreign migrants. Therefore, various factors in Ciudad Juarez, such as social 
inequalities and the proximity of the international border, have contributed to the development of 
different types of organised crime, such as drug-trafficking, people trafficking, arms smuggling and 
money-laundering, which have increased the levels of insecurity and violence. Gonzalez et. al. 
(“Cotton Field”) v. Mexico (2009) 113 Inter-American Court HR (ser C). 
16
  Idem. 
17
 The following legal irregularities were found: (i) an absence of information in the report about the 
discovery of the bodies; (ii) inadequate preservation of the crime scene; (iii) lack of rigor in gathering 
evidence and in the chain of custody of the evidence; (iv) contradictions and deficiencies in the 
autopsies; and (v) irregularities and deficiencies in the identification of the bodies, as well as in their 
improper return to the families. Ibidem, 333. 
11 
 
 
At the national level, the collection, storage and process of biometric information 
must be carefully considered when creating biometric profiles or databases. 
Countries should generally plan biometric profiles or databases as exceptions or 
restrictions to the right of privacy and data protection to the individuals whose data is 
involved in this case. The creation of biometric profiles and the inclusion to 
databases have constitutional legality so as to be applied in a constitutional 
democratic State18. Biometric systems should be reasonable and not excessive19, 
and importantly guarantee respect for the rights of privacy and data protection. There 
should be a right to access, rectification, cancellation and objection to process 
personal information20. Measures should balance and reconcile, on the one hand, 
the practical aspects of the biometric systems with the individual and social interests 
in respecting the principles of dignity and human rights.  
 
National legal rights to privacy and data protection are, however, not absolute rights. 
Privacy and data protection may be restricted by legislators and limitations on 
privacy and data protection are recognised in international instruments. These 
restrictions can be assessed by the “proportionality test”, a legal tool used by most 
Civil Law countries but also implemented by international courts, such as the 
European Court of Human Rights21 and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights22. 
                                            
18
 “Democracy implies the constant possibility of modifying anything, and this option is made legally 
feasible in the constitutional text. Thus, the Constitution shall be democratic, it shall allow and ensure 
democracy, and, also, be subject to democratic decisions. The constitutional State would then be, 
according to the words of Manuel Aragón, ‘the intent of judicializing democracy and the Constitution, 
the way in which such pretention is carried out’. The people are the author of the Constitution. So, 
constitutionalism and democracy combine in order to create a government system known as 
constitutional democracy”. Nava Gomar, Salvador Olimpo, “El Estado constitucional: sinonimia 
positivizada entre Constitución y democracia (triple relación)” (2003) Anuario de Derecho 
Constitucional Latinoamericano, p. 14. 
19
 It is important to recall an event that occurred in September 2000, when the former British Prime 
Minister Tony Blair announced the creation of a genetic record of every criminal –about 3 million 
citizens that were suspected of crimes or offences– within a 3-year term. He reflected his concern for 
public opinion that seemed to consider his public order initiatives were “weak”. Mackey Neil, “Blair's 
DNA crime database plan 'dangerous and flawed'”, Sunday Herald, (Glasgow, United Kingdom), 3 
September 2000, 2. 
 http://www.shirleymckie.com/documents/Herald3.9.00.pdf (17/12/2012) Nevertheless, the measure 
raised protests from civil rights organizations due to facts such as the possibility of taking DNA 
samples from persons that committed traffic violations. 
20
 These rights are known ARCO rights or Habeas Data. Kuschenwsky, Monika (ed.), Data Protection 
and Privacy Jurisdictional Comparison (Thomas Reuters, 2012). 
21
 European Court of Human Rights http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/homepage_EN (19/02/2013) 
12 
 
This test is about the strict justification for any interference in human rights by law. 
This thesis considers the Civil Law “proportionality test” and its counterpart the 
“reasonableness standard” in Common Law countries, as a means to achieve the 
required balance between human rights and public interests23. 
 
The creation of biometric databases involved with TBIF for immigration control and 
crime prevention must have justification and constitutional legality. The comparative 
four countries study identified important broad convergences, and some 
asymmetries in the modes of data collected, updated, retrieved and exchange 
information, in the two contexts of immigration information flow and information flow 
in criminal databases24. 
 
1.3. Country Profiles for the Comparative Study Component 
 
1.3.1. The four countries selected. The countries selected for the four countries 
study, as stated before, are an illustrative attempt to identify national regulation as 
responses to the rapidly development of biometric technology. The countries 
selected for the comparative study component are: Australia, Mexico, New Zealand 
and Spain. The selection was made for the following reasons: 
 
 The four countries are deploying biometric surveillance technology. 
 
 The four countries have “functional borders” where is a requirement for a 
formal travel documentation to ensure legal entry25. 
 
 The four countries exchange information about immigration and criminal 
records. 
 
                                                                                                                                       
22
 Inter-American Court of Human Rights  
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/index.cfm?&CFID=1699709&CFTOKEN=26178292 (19/02/2013) 
23
 For further details, see section 7.4.  The Principle of Proportionality: Legitimate Restrictions on 
Privacy and Data Protection 
24
 For further details, see Chapter 6. Transborder Biometric Information Flows: Legal Challenges 
25
 Weber, Leanne and Pickering Sharon, Globalization and Borders. Death at the Global Frontier, 
(Palgrave MacMillan, 2011), p. 4. 
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 The four countries are Interpol member countries. 
 
 The four countries examined represent the Civil Law26 (Mexico and Spain), 
and the Common Law27 (Australia and New Zealand) systems. 
 
 Australia, Mexico and New Zealand are country members in Asia-Pacific 
Economic Co-operation (APEC) whereas Spain is member of the European 
Union. The other three countries interact with the European Union. 
  
 The four countries have concerns about illegal immigration. 
 
 Legislation is the major source of law in Australia28, Mexico, New Zealand29 
and Spain30. The two Civil Law countries illustrates the data protection 
legislation whereas the two Common Law countries exemplify the privacy 
legislation. 
 
 From a practical stand point of view, these countries were selected on the 
basis of the ability to access to research resources by familiarity with Spanish 
as a first language for Mexico and Spain and English as second language for 
Australia and New Zealand. 
 
This comparative study component was undertaken to assess the national regulatory 
framework and also to determine the international regulatory framework as a 
response of common political international agreements regarding the fields of 
immigration control and crime prevention. A comparison between these countries 
indicates how Civil and Common Law countries face the challenges involved in the 
                                            
26
 The Civil Law system is both the older and the more widely distributed legal tradition. The date of its 
origin is 450 B.S., the date of publication of the Twelve Tables in Rome. 
27
 The date commonly used to mark the beginning of the Common Law system is A.D. 1066, when 
the Normans defeated the defending natives at Hastings and Conquered England. 
28
 Hall, Kath and Macken, Claire, Legislation and Statutory Interpretation, (Lexis Nexis Butterworths, 
2
nd
 ed., 2009), p. 2. 
29
 Mulholland, R.D., Introduction to the New Zealand Legal system, (Butter Worths, 1976), p.1. 
30
 “The amount of legislation and the degree of authority of legislation are not useful criteria for 
distinguishing civil law systems from common law systems”. Merryman, John Henry and Perez-
Perdomo, The Civil Law Tradition. An Introduction to the Legal systems of Europe and Latin America, 
(Stanford University Press, 3
rd
 ed., 2007), p. 27. 
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deployment of biometric systems. In looking at the national and international 
framework the theoretical context of the deployment of biometric systems is 
considered as well as national approaches of political and public debates 
surrounding such systems.  
 
1.3.2. Four countries study. It is worthwhile to set out brief country profiles. Australia 
and Mexico operate as federal systems whereas New Zealand and Spain are 
unitary. However, the Spanish government acts de facto as a federal system, with 
the central government in Madrid affording some limited delegation to local regional 
bodies31. These four countries have important similarities: for example, all are 
multicultural societies with a range of ethnic groups represented; their branches of 
government and administrative divisions overlap and each enjoys universal suffrage. 
However, Australia is the only one of the four countries that has in force a system of 
compulsory suffrage. The differences among the four countries may be more 
obvious in, for example, population, geographic area (sq km)32, currency, gross 
domestic product, legal system and language. 
   
The four countries examined differ importantly in their legal, cultural and political 
traditions; this is also the case even with Spain and Mexico despite a number of 
shared traditions. Mexico´s Civil Law system is the result of different influences. 
Before the Spanish conquest, there was an indigenous customary law embodied in 
Codices. During colonial times special laws were enacted called “Laws of the Indies”. 
Later, the Spanish Civil Law created a highly formal body of law, including a specific 
collection of laws, but also recognition of customs or accepted “legal” indigenous 
practices. After 200 years of Spanish domination, Mexico began the Independence 
movement on September 16th, 1810, and this ended, officially on September 21st, 
1821. Mexico enacted its first Civil Code, in 1870, influenced by the French, Code 
Napoleon. The development of Mexican commercial law drew heavily on Italian law. 
Mexico's legal system was also influenced by the United States’ constitutional law; 
mixing the system of “checks and balance” and judicial review of legislative acts in 
                                            
31
 Merryman, John Henry and Perez-Perdomo, The Civil Law Tradition. An Introduction to the Legal 
systems of Europe and Latin America, above n 30, p. 58. 
32
 Australia 7,692,024 sq. km., Mexico 1,964,375 sq. km., New Zealand 268,680sq km and Spain 
505,988 sq. km. 
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the Mexican Constitution33. The following figure presents the convergences and 
differences between Australia, Mexico, New Zealand and Spain in relation to 
selected indicators. 
 
Figure 1. National Profiles
34
 
 
 
1.3.3. Privacy and data protection. There is a significant asymmetry between these 
four countries in the use of the term “privacy”. The terms “privacy” and “data 
protection” are not synonymous in these countries35. In general terms, the right to 
privacy is an essential right for the individual which deserves the highest respect as 
guarantee for other freedoms. In the Civil Law tradition approach, the right to data 
protection is what characterises a private life (right), understood as the right to be 
                                            
33
 After this Independence war, Mexico had a period of wars called “Interventions” against Spain, 
France and the United Sates (U.S.) that affected the development of its legal framework, as well as its 
economy and geographical territory. These “Intervention wars” were: first against Spain in 1829, the 
second was against France from 1838 to 1839, the third with the U.S. from 1846 to 1848, a fourth was 
against France from 1862 to 1867, then came another against the U.S. in 1914 and finally another 
again with the U.S. in 1916. 
34
 For a complete appreciation of Figure, see Appendix A. National Profiles Table 
35
 Cooper’s works are a distinctive and stand out by the author’s analysis of the terms “privacy” and 
“data protection”. Cooper concluded that although these terms are used in different jurisdictions, both 
terms are essentially synonymous. Nevertheless, this thesis does not share Cooper’s conclusion. 
Cooper, David M., “Transborder data flow and the protection of privacy: the harmonization of data 
protection law”, (1984) 8 Fletcher Forum, p. 339.  
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protected from illegitimate or legitimate but unwanted intrusion36. The right of data 
protection seeks to preserve privacy and confidentiality in the collection, 
management and transmission of personal information. In Civil Law countries the 
recognition of “control of what has been collected about personal life” is known as 
“informative self-determination”. So in Civil Law countries, the “informative self-
determination” right recognises the person as the owner of his or her personal 
information generated or stored by governments37. Control, here, is related to the 
possible exchange of personal data or the subsequent automated use of this 
personal information. An example of this is provided by the electronic health record, 
where a patient is the owner of the information recorded, but the public health 
provider or centre creates, maintains the records and stores the person´s medical 
information. The patient, in this case, has the right to access to his or her own 
electronic health records and to challenge any disclosure or subsequent use of his or 
her records.  
 
The term “privacy” is used in a broad sense in Common Law countries to refer to the 
protection of an individual’s personal life, including personal data, whereas the term 
“data protection” in Civil Law countries has a narrow meaning to refer to specific 
personal information (personal data)38. This is illustrated by the article 18 of the 
Spanish Constitution which uses the Spanish word “intimidad”. The literal translation 
of this, in English is “intimacy” and the Spanish law refers to the protection of 
individuals’ personal life. The Spanish and Mexican legislation refer to data 
protection39.  
 
1.3.4. Proportionality. A distinguishing characteristic emerged in the comparative 
study component between the four countries with respect to “principle of 
proportionality”. The ‘proportionality test’ is a means to find the proper legal balance 
between the individual rights and the public interest. This legal balance is achieved, 
                                            
36
 Gozaíni, Osvaldo Alfredo, Derecho Procesal Constitucional, Hábeas Data, Protección de datos 
personales, (Rubinzal-Culzoni Editores, 2001). 
37
 Idem. 
38
 Idem. 
39
 This also can be illustrate by the Ibero-American countries use the terms “informative self-
determination” or “habeas data” to refer to specific characteristics of procedures related to data 
protection. Ibero-America is a term used to refer collectively to Spain, Portugal and countries in the 
Americas that were formerly colonies of Spain and Portugal. 
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in Civil Law countries with the ‘proportionality test’. Arguably, this distinction is not so 
significant between Civil Law countries; Common Law systems, such as New 
Zealand, Canada, and England; and, mixed legal systems such as South Africa. In 
these countries, the “proportionality test” and the legal balance is achieved by the 
“reasonableness standard”40.  
 
The appropriate balance between the deployment of biometric systems for public 
purposes and individuals’ privacy and data protection rights is a major focus of this 
thesis. So too, is the appropriate legal framework for standards of TBIF by reference 
to the proportionality test.  
 
1.4. Hypothesis 
 
The major hypothesis of this thesis is that the public purposes, use and deployment 
of biometric information in Transborder Biometric Information Flow (TBIF) may 
undermine individuals’ civil liberties. TBIF uses automated techniques which facilitate 
the linkages of many databases nationally and internationally. These automated 
flows of information may breach in established rights of privacy and data protection. 
 
The main arguments in relation to this hypothesis are as follows: 
 
a) The establishment and deployment of national and also international biometric 
databases are measures that limit the individual rights of privacy and data 
protection, which are legally recognized and respected in democratic societies. 
Linkages of these databases must be legally controlled. This thesis 
acknowledges that there are some circumstances in which the State may 
circumscribe human rights. However, “these circumstances” should be specific, 
limited and justified by reference the principle of proportionality and the 
reasonableness standard.  
 
                                            
40
 For further details, see section 7.4.  The Principle of Proportionality: Legitimate Restrictions on 
Privacy and Data Protection 
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b) The biometric industry itself should establish proper and published standards of 
self-regulation. Self-regulation is a priority because a basic mapping of this 
expanding industry does not reveal an industry commitment to ethical and privacy 
practices where the industry itself enjoys a position of, market dominance41. The 
thesis assesses a basic map of this industry to inform the national responses for 
regulation. 
 
c) Public policy surrounding the implementation and deployment of biometric 
databases and TBIF should be openly debated to ensure proper levels of 
transparency and public accountability. This argument flows directly from 
research and theoretical frameworks proposed by Jasanoff in her works on “civic 
epistemology” and by Habermas in his ideas on the “public sphere”, which are 
mentioned in this chapter42. 
 
d) TBIF and the subsequent chain of linkages to other databases involving  different 
agencies from different fields nationally and internationally, challenges and 
undermines individuals privacy and data protection rights. International privacy 
and data protection regimes should ensure that personal information should only 
be collected for a specific purposes and be used solely for legitimate purposes 
that can be scrutinise, challenge and supervise. 
 
e) Misclassification of data can occur in TBIF and can result in misclassification of 
immigrants as illegal immigrants or misclassify types and levels of offenders or 
people listed on these databases. Problems of misclassification are focus in this 
thesis.  
 
 
 
 
                                            
41
 For further details, see Chapter 3. The Biometric Industry: An Illustrative Map of Players, Products 
and Partnerships 
42
 For further details, see section 1.8.3. Theoretical Approaches 
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f) The “proportionality test” in Civil Law and its counterpart the “reasonableness 
standard” in Common Law countries can address the legal challenges for TBIF 
related to privacy and data protection rights. The proper balance between public 
interests and individual human rights are focus in this thesis43. 
 
1.5. The Aim of the Research 
 
The aim of the research is to examine and assess the legal challenges, limitations 
and concerns of TBIF in two contexts, immigration information flow and information 
flow in criminal databases44. Within this aim, the research considers and assesses 
national and international responses for an adequate level of legal protection for 
TBIF in these two contexts.  
 
With this major aim, the thesis examines the diversification and intensification of the 
rapidly developing biometric industry by mapping key industries, products and 
partnerships. In addition, an empirical four countries study was undertaken to identify 
and assess officially available information about biometrics related policies and 
regulations that are not accessible online. This four countries study identified policies 
and included interviews with officials to understand towards international policies45.  
 
The thesis includes proposals for practical and achievable solutions for addressing 
TBIF challenges in the two contexts of immigration information flow and information 
flow in criminal databases but also proposes greater public debate, transparency and 
accountability in relation to the development of this technology.  
 
 
 
                                            
43
 For further details, see section 7.4.  The Principle of Proportionality: Legitimate Restrictions on 
Privacy and Data Protection 
44
 For further details, see Chapter 6. Transborder Biometric Information Flows: Legal Challenges 
45
 These interviews were conducted in accordance with formal University of Tasmania Ethics 
approval, reference H0012013 of 20/08/2014. The information collected in the four country study was 
explanatory and did not breach any secrecy or confidentiality, the information was helpful because it 
identified official political processes and policy making procedures and was indicative of future 
directions for policy developments. 
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1.6. Limitations of the Research 
 
A key limitation in the research for this thesis was the lack of traditional scholarly 
sources of research and writing of this specific area of TBIF. Whilst there is a body of 
accumulated literature about cross-border economic or business transactions, there 
is not a substantial body of scholarly work on the biometric industry in general or on 
TBIF in particular. There is published work on the technical and historical 
development of biometric systems46, but only a handful number of published work 
dealing with the specific legal and regulatory issues involved in biometrics and 
privacy47.  
 
1.7. The Significance of this Study 
 
The research for this thesis is significant for the following reasons: 
 
 The thesis contributes to an understanding of the developing study of 
biometric technology and industry and the relative lack of official self-
regulation for TBIF. 
 
 The research contributes on the wider public debate on the need of 
transparency and accountability surrounding the introduction and the 
deployment of TBIF in the contexts of immigration control and crime 
prevention. 
 
                                            
46
 Sokal, Robert and James, Rohlf, Introduction to Biostatistics, (W.H. Freeman and Company, 1973); 
Hopkins, Richard, “An introduction to biometrics and large scale civilian identification” (1999) 13(3) 
International Review of Law, Computers & Technology 337-363; Zhang, David, Automated biometrics: 
technologies and systems, (Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000); Wayman, James, et. al., Biometric 
Systems Technology Design and Performance Evaluation, (Springer, 2005); Boulgouris, Nikolaos V., 
et. al., Biometrics, Theory, Methods, and Applications, (IEEE and WILEY, 2010); Woodward, John D. 
Jr. et. al., Biometrics, Identity Assurance in the Information Age, (McGraw Hill Osborne, 2003) and 
Bolle, Ruud M., et. al., Guide to Biometrics, (Springer, 2003). 
47
 Van Der Ploeg, Irma, “Biometrics and Privacy: A note on the politics of theorizing technology” 
(2003) 6 Information, Communication & Society 85-104; Lyon, David, Identifying Citizens: ID Cards as 
Surveillance (Polity, 2009); Lyon, David and Bennett, Colin (eds.) Playing the Identity Card: 
Surveillance, Security and Identification in Global Perspective (Routledge, 2008); Epstein, Charlotte, 
“Guilty Bodies, Productive Bodies, Destructive Bodies: Crossing the Biometric Borders” (2007) 
1 International Political Sociology 149-164. 
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 The thesis provides a limited map of the biometric industry and identifies the 
need for a system of self-regulation in the biometric industry.  
 
 The thesis identifies deficiencies on TBIF in specific circumstances, such as 
immigration control and crime prevention, and makes specific proposals to 
address these concerns. 
 
 The thesis identifies the need for a greater international cooperation for a 
TBIF. Transborder Data Flows have been on the international agenda since 
the OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of 
Personal Data48 in 1980 and the movement of data protection laws that 
started to emerge, especially in the European Union and the United Sstates 
of America49. Two additional OECD reports were produce in 2004 on 
biometrics recognition technology50 and in 2006 on cross-border enforcement 
of privacy laws51. These reports focused on transborder financial data and did 
not resolve the issue of TBIF. 
 
 This thesis contributes to the development of national and international 
framework with practical and achievable proposals that address TBIF privacy 
and data protection within the legal framework52. These proposals may 
influence legislative policy and decision-making on the deployment of 
biometric systems in different countries.  
 
 
 
 
                                            
48
 Economic Cooperation and Development’s (OECD), Guidelines Governing the Protection of Privacy 
and Transborder Flows or Personal Data (1980). 
49
 It is possible to identify academic work on the topic of TDF since the 1970s and 1980s, where the 
main characteristic of these works are discussions on personal data transferred for business 
transaction purposes. 
50
 OECD, Biometric-based Technologies, Report 101 (2004) http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/232075642747 
(22/08/2012) 
51
 OECD, Report on the Cross-Border Enforcement of Privacy Law, Report 121 (2006) 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/231304814207 (23/12/2012) 
52
 For further details, see section 7.5. Recommendations to Address Legal Framework for TBIF 
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1.8. Research Methodologies and Theoretical Approaches 
 
Different theories and methods including an empirical study of the rapidly developing 
industry, traditional legal methods of statute and cases analysis (both Common Law 
and Civil Law) and a comparative methodology were incorporated into this thesis. 
The following specific methods and theories were used for the research. 
 
1.8.1. Empirical. This method was employed in two different stages of the study. 
First, through websites searches which, helped to draw a general map of the 
biometric industry identifying key industry players, products and partnerships53.  
 
Second, semi-structured face-to-face interviews with academics and public officials 
in the four countries were applied to the baseline mapping of the industry to 
complement the extent of biometric use and identify the emerging policy 
development in relation to TBIF. 
 
These semi-structured face-to-face interviews with academics and public officials in 
the four selected countries54 were conducted with under an Ethics Approval with a 
Minimal Risk Ethics Application from the Tasmania Social Sciences HREC. 
 
1.8.2. Social Science Methods. The thesis made use of the following methods: 
 
 Deductive: the starting point is the relationship between the established right 
to privacy and data protection, the right to access to personal information and 
their connection with security and police co-operation. The research considers 
the right to privacy and data protection as a fundamental freedom for the 
individuals, an essential pillar in the construction of constitutional democratic 
States. 
 
                                            
53
 For further details, see Appendix D. List of Companies in the Biometric Industry (Complete Table) 
54
 For further details, see Appendix J. Interview Questions and Interviewees 
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 Inductive: the point of departure in the research is the analysis of local 
criminal law and the initiative for international police co-operation in order to 
identify the reasons for undermining privacy and data protection and 
subsequently fulfil the purpose. The research also analysed immigration laws 
and criminal databases frameworks. 
 
 Analytical: the individual right to access to one´s own personal information is 
set apart from the right to data protection. A theoretical framework was 
elaborated for the purpose of establishing a balance between civil liberties as 
a necessity in a democratic society; and the need to protect security and 
public interests. The transmission and preservation of biometric information in 
relation to the criminal offences in Federal or National Criminal Codes are 
identified and analysed in the four countries examined. 
  
 Synthetic: with this method, the research detected the causes of restrictions to 
the right to privacy and data protection in the four countries examined. 
 
 Comparative: the research identified how the four countries, with their legal 
and public ethics value systems, have implemented biometric systems and 
regulate the universal principles of dignity, confidentiality and privacy in their 
biometric databases imply, as well as how legal conflicts are solved. 
 
 Historical: the research analyses the precedents of biometric technology.  
 
1.8.3. Theoretical Approaches. The following approaches were applied for the study: 
 
 Modern technology theory. This theory is about the theoretical analyses of 
modern technology were used, particularly the “systemic understanding of co-
production (spread of knowledge)” and “rational-critical communication (public 
debate)” theories of Sheila Jasanoff (civic epistemology) and Jürgen 
Habermas (public sphere) Ernesto Villanueva and Luis Carlos Ugalde who 
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uphold the importance of public debate, transparency and public 
accountability55. 
 
 Human Rights theory, especially on the rights to privacy and data protection.  
The works of Georgina Battle, Carlos Ruiz Miguel, Alan Westin, Samuel D. 
Warren, Louis D. Brandeis, Irma van Der Ploeg, Ruth Gavison and Lee A. 
Bygrave are referred to serve as the foundations for the content of the rights 
to privacy, data protection and right to access to personal information. 
 
 Civil Law Constitutional law theory rests upon the conceptual framework of a 
constitutional democratic State and considers that its foundations lay upon 
two fundamental pillars: the recognition of the public freedoms as a limitation 
to public power, and, the establishment of internal and external controls for 
public administration.  
 
The “power of reform” (legislative power) should not unduly infringe upon the 
content of individual rights by imposing limitations for political interests 
because rights are already recognized and guaranteed constitutionally. It 
would be remarkably difficult for a citizen to oppose for the collection of 
biometric information when the request of information has been legitimate by 
the government, where previously this request is found in the legal framework 
and not to win elections, for example. But, then, following this line of 
argument, citizens should demand continuity of privacy and data protection to 
countries where biometric information has been exchanged without regulation 
and legislative scrutiny56.  
                                            
55
 An important characteristic of “public sphere” and “civic epistemology” is that information should be 
complete and in a plain language to enable citizens to participate in a democratic society. In addition, 
through public policy debates and participation of citizens it is possible to legitimise not only the 
deployment of technology but also public policies related to this type of technology. 
56
 It mentions as elsewhere argued in this thesis the concept of a democratic constitutional State 
through the work of Águila, Rafael del, Manual de Ciencia Política (Editorial Trotta, 5th ed., 2008); 
Aragón, Manuel, Constitución, Democracia y Control, (Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas de la 
UNAM, 2002); García De Enterría, Eduardo, La Constitución como norma y el Tribunal 
Constitucional, (Editorial Civitas, 2006); Nieto, Santiago, et. al., Control externo y responsabilidad de 
los servidores públicos del Distrito Federal, (UNAM, 2005); Nino, Carlos, La constitución de la 
democracia deliberativa, (Gedisa, 1997). Pérez Luño, Antonio Enrique, Derechos Humanos, Estado 
de Derecho y Constitución, (Tecnos, 2003); Sartori, Giovanni, Homo Videns, la sociedad teledirigida, 
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 International Public law theories and International treaties, conventions and 
regional agreements in relation to human rights and biometrics technology 
were analysed in this thesis, as well as their interpretations through the 
resolutions form international tribunals, particularly the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECHR) and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
(IACHR). The work carried out by the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
(APEC) was also considered, as was that of the European Union (EU) and 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) for the 
purpose of studying the corresponding considerations or conflicts for the 
implementation of the regulations on this issue. 
 
1.9. Reference System 
 
The comparative approach adopted for this thesis covers four jurisdictions (Australia, 
Mexico, New Zealand and Spain) and involved analysis and comparison of different 
sources in legislation, protocols, reports, cases, guidelines, books and academic 
articles, across these jurisdictions. 
 
A significant feature is that both Australia57 and New Zealand58 have official 
guidelines regarding legal citations for academic research, but neither Mexico nor 
Spain has such regulation. In these two countries, each academic institution sets its 
own editorial criteria for legal citations. This thesis follows the "Guidelines and 
Criteria of the National Autonomous University of Mexico”59 when citing from 
Mexican or Spanish sources. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                       
(Taurus, 2004); Vega García, Pedro de “Significado constitucional de la representación política” 
(1985) 44 Revista de Estudios Políticos 53-74. 
57
 Australian Guide to Legal Citation http://www.library.uq.edu.au/endnote/aglc/aglc3_ENX4.pdf 
(22/01/2013) 
58
 New Zealand Law Style Guide http://www.lawfoundation.org.nz/style-guide/index.html (22/01/2013) 
59
 Marquez Romero, Raul (ed.) Lineamientos y Criterios del Proceso Editorial, (UNAM, 2008) 
http://www.juridicas.unam.mx/publica/critedit/critedit.pdf (22/01/2013) 
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Therefore, both the bibliography and footnotes follow the Australian Guide to Legal 
Citation. However, it is noted that in the case of legislative material from both Mexico 
and Spain, some information was added, such as the publication date and latest 
revision published in both the Official Journal of the Federation (DOF) (Mexico) and 
in the Official Gazette (BOE) (Spain), as well as the official website for easier and 
clearer reference. Such information is generally translated from original Spanish. 
 
1.10. Appendices 
 
This thesis includes detailed appendices on information relevant of this thesis [on 
Biometrics Typology, in appendix B; the Schengen Information System, in appendix 
F; the Prüm Convention, in appendix G; and, National Immigration Policy, in 
appendix H]. This information is included in appendices rather than in the body of 
this thesis to avoid breaking the flow of the arguments. Each appendix has been 
cross referenced it in the body of this thesis. 
 
1.11. Research Questions and Overview of the Thesis 
 
The thesis considers the following research questions: 
 
What is biometrics and what are the key legal issues involved in biometric systems? 
 
In Chapters 2 and 3, the thesis provides the context for biometric systems. Chapter 2 
briefly traces the most important events in the history of biometrics, its definition, 
typology and conditions. This includes a critical review of how biometric systems 
operate and the various uses of biometric technology. Chapter 3 discusses the 
biometric industry; mapping the context of the biometric industry, its importance and 
the development, diversification and intensification of this technology. The chapter 
identifies key companies, products and partnerships behaving different in each 
country studied. This chapter also discusses ethical practices in the biometric 
industry and the necessity for self-regulation.  
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What are the legal issues in biometric systems related to immigration and criminal 
databases?  
This question includes the related questions of How do countries collect, retrieve, 
store and exchange information? How are the approaches of the implementation of 
biometric systems between the four countries examined? How do we learn and know 
about biometrics? And who spreads the knowledge of biometrics?   
 
In Chapters 4 and 5, the thesis examines privacy and data protection by collecting, 
retrieving, storing and exchanging biometric measurements for immigration control 
and border security purposes. The thesis also considers the circumstances in which 
the State legally and reasonably limit and challenge individuals’ privacy and data 
protection rights. Chapter 4 discusses controversies about the proper balance 
between State powers and individuals rights in relation to the modes of data 
collection and the capacity for such data to be collected, updated, retrieved, 
analysed and exchanged in the context of immigration control. The governance and 
regulatory systems are analysed for immigration using a comparative methodology. 
Chapter 5 examines criminal databases and the actual collection methods for DNA 
and biometric information. This chapter analyses the actual systems for the 
exchange of information and linkage with international biometric databases. The 
research considers Interpol’s databases as the best practice for biometric criminal 
databases. 
 
How does cross-border biometric data flow?  
This question includes the related legal questions of what are the legal challenges at 
national and international level in relation to TBIF? Are the legal frameworks 
proportional between the public interest and human rights? 
 
In Chapters 6 and 7, the thesis contains analysis of the central research questions in 
relation to the legal challenges to the balance between the legitimate interests of the 
State in the protection of their citizens balanced against individual privacy and data 
protection rights. Chapter 6 examines these legal challenges at national level in the 
context of immigration information flow and information flow in criminal databases. 
This chapter considers the challenges of TBIF within the framework of the four 
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countries study. Chapter 7 discusses TBIF at the international level with an 
examination of the official and semi-official international organisations. This chapter 
assesses the developing international regulatory framework against the national 
level to assess, using comparative methodology, the adequacy and effectiveness of 
national privacy and data protection legal framework. Importantly, this chapter 
includes practical and achievable proposals for revisions and improvements in the 
legal framework for TBIF.  
 
What are the findings and the conclusions of this research? 
 
Chapter 8 presents the findings of the research and the conclusions of this thesis. 
This chapter acknowledges the rapidly developing biometric industry diversifying into 
different field with limited regulated intervention and a lack of self-regulation. The 
chapter examines the actual emerging international regulatory framework for TBIF in 
immigration control and crime prevention contexts. The chapter identifies 
asymmetries and common legal concerns in immigration information flow and 
information flow in criminal databases for TBIF in the four countries study. The 
chapter proposes a practical and achievable solution for an effective TBIF legal 
framework relying on privacy and data protection regimes. 
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CHAPTER 2.  
 
BIOMETRICS SYSTEMS: WHAT IS BIOMETRICS? 
 
 
2.1. Biometrics Critical Review 
 
The history of biometrics reveals a development process that has been ad hoc, led 
and initiated by scientific breakthroughs and technological innovations. Deployments 
of biometric systems have often occurred well in advance of regulatory consideration 
by policy makers and law reformers, and public discussions about the systems have 
been limited and retrospective. Furthermore, in recent decades, biometric systems 
have expanded and diversified rapidly and the intensification of their impact upon 
privacy and data protection, accountability and citizen-state relations have not been 
fully explored, understood or incorporated into an informed, considered and 
systematic approach to regulation. 
 
Whilst not all biometric systems have an equal impact upon areas like privacy and 
civil liberties those systems that focus on identification and authentication purposes 
are particularly important areas. The collection, storage, retrieval and actual use of 
biometric information in areas like Transborder Biometric Information Flows (TBIF), 
especially immigration information flow1 and information flow in criminal databases2, 
needs far more extensive scrutiny, debate and attention especially from those 
outside the biometric industry3. An overview on the history of biometrics and its 
development reveals little attention given to regulation and/or the balancing of civil 
liberties and the public interest. The dynamic nature of recent developments, 
covered in this thesis, has intensified the necessity to find ways to ensure a full 
                                            
1
 For further details see Chapter 4. Biometric Systems in the Context of Transborder Immigration Flow  
2
 For further details see Chapter 5. Biometrics in Criminal Databases: Current Transborder 
Information Flow  
3
 For further details see Chapter 3. The Biometric Industry: An Illustrative Map of Players, Products 
and Partnerships 
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public discussion of these developments. A necessity for all four countries featured 
in this thesis. 
 
The failure to foster or develop a robust public discussion about these developments, 
especially those at the centre of this thesis, and the relative exclusion, or 
marginalisation of various interests from participating in the development of 
regulatory frameworks is a major deficiency. In terms of a Jasanoff and Habermas 
analysis the key problems are the lack of: public debate, transparency and scrutiny. 
The deployment of biometric technology needs to be surrounded by transparency, 
accountability, citizen engagement and collaboration of multiple interests, such as 
civil society, biometric industry itself and supervisory authorities. According to 
Jasanoff and Habermas, governments focus more on the particular outcome rather 
than on the process to achieve that outcome and forget that it is the process that 
confers legitimacy4.  
 
The significance of a brief historical review is that it demonstrates some constant 
themes. First, the focus of most of the key authors who have written about biometrics 
since the 20th century onwards has been to focus on biometrical knowledge its 
development, application and reliability. Any discourse about the relationship 
between citizens, State and emergence biometric developments have been rare or 
non-existent. Some authors have discussed the legal impact of biometrics on privacy 
and data protection5, yet they have not focused in extension on regulation, industry 
self-regulation or the necessity for public debate. A by-product of much of this 
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authorship is a technical literature of limited accessibility that compounds the largely 
“industry” focus shown in Chapter 36. 
 
This chapter traces the historical background of privacy and presents a general 
introduction of biometric systems. Research was undertaken through traditional 
sources to draw a general sketch of the technical literature. This research uncovered 
little traditional scholarly sources of research with multidisciplinary approaches and 
little to spread the knowledge. This chapter draws the relationship between biometric 
systems and the rights to privacy and data protection. It discusses the most popular 
physical and behavioural characteristics, including DNA for biometric systems and 
the creation of biometric profiles through the purposes and limitations of biometric 
systems. Finally, this chapter identifies the necessity for an informed public 
discussion of biometrics’ knowledge. 
  
2.2. Comments on the Articulation of Biometrics Knowledge 
 
The well-established line of technical literature related to biometric systems explains 
its origin and typology. These authors explain how biometric profiles are created, 
how these systems work, their purposes and their applications7. Nevertheless, these 
authors do not explain the relationship to or handling of privacy in terms of biometrics 
and are largely written for a technical audience. 
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Historical, social and political factors have shaped the definition of biometric 
systems. An interesting perspective is developed from sociology, in the articulation of 
biometric knowledge represented by Epstein8 and Lyon9 whose works explain how 
biometrics is used in a surveillance society. 
 
The concept of biometric systems is moving towards empowering society, global 
communication, information technologies and the biometric industry, where all these 
actors are interrelated in this technology. According to the theoretical analyses of 
modern technology, it is essential to understand the importance of multidisciplinary 
approaches in the literature on biometric systems in order to know on which side 
interests are tipping the balance10. 
 
Jasanoff defines “civic epistemology” to be “the systematic practices by which 
nation´s citizens come to know things in common and to apply their knowledge to the 
conduct of politics”11. Habermas defines “public sphere” as the “first of all a realm of 
our social life in which something approaching opinion can be formed where access 
is guaranteed to all citizens”12.  
 
If science and technology are considered as instruments of social progress and 
personal liberation13 why cannot citizens, in constitutional democracies, access 
easily to public information regarding the deployment of biometrics. The preliminary 
expectation was to find traditional scholarly sources of research with multidisciplinary 
approaches; however, there is not a substantial body of scholarly work on the 
biometric industry or on Transborder Biometric Information Flows (TBIF)14 in 
comparison with the extensive privacy and data protection literature, where scholarly 
work covers different approaches its many challenges and limitations.  
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This lack of literature and the lack of multidisciplinary approaches directly affect the 
central role of civic engagement in the articulation of biometric knowledge. According 
to Jasanoff: 
  
“[D]emocratic theory cannot be articulated in satisfactory terms today without 
looking in detail at the politics of science and technology. That contemporary 
societies are constituted as knowledge societies is, of course, an important 
part of the reason. It follows that important aspects of political behaviour and 
action cluster around the ways in which knowledge is generated, disputed, 
and used to underwrite collective decisions”15.  
 
Habermas states that “a portion of the public sphere comes into being in every 
conversation in which private individuals assemble to form a public body. Citizens 
behave as a public body when they confer in an unrestricted fashion –that is with the 
guarantee of freedom of assembly and association and the freedom to express and 
publish their opinions- about matters of general interest”16. 
 
Based on these theoretical analyses, the deployment of biometric systems requires 
not only government debates on the introduction and deployment of biometric 
technology, but also citizens, academics and activist groups expressing their opinion, 
in open discussion about biometric information, including risks and advantages, but 
in plain language without technical terms17.   
 
The idea of participation as public debate has proliferated in recent years. Today, 
there is a broader wave of interest in situations where citizens communicate with 
each other about matters of public concerns through the Information and 
Communication Technology (ICT). But, at the same time there are increasing 
                                            
15
 Jasanoff, Sheila, Designs on Nature Science and Democracy in Europe and the United States, 
above n 4, p. 6. 
16
 Habermas, Jürgen, “Sfera pubblica (Una voce di enciclopedia)”, above n 4, p.49. 
17
 Jasanoff, Sheila, Designs on Nature Science and Democracy in Europe and the United States, 
above n 4 and Habermas, Jürgen, “Sfera pubblica (Una voce di enciclopedia)”, above n 4. 
34 
 
scientific complexity topics, such as genetics or biometrics, along with a lack of 
social consensus about how these types of technology should be managed.   
 
“Open public debate” is aimed at producing reasonable, well-informed opinion in 
which citizens are willing to revise preferences and new information. Therefore, open 
public debate should be understood as a procedure to improve decision making. 
Habermas and Jasanoff have theorized and studied how “open public debate” have 
emerged and how they play an important role in generating ideas and information 
that can improve knowledge, understanding and enhance decisions18. They have 
also examined the circumstances where “open public debate” becomes distorted 
through manipulation, coercion and misinformation. Habermas focuses on the social 
and cultural functions that are served by the “open public debate”. These deliberative 
spaces, for him, are considered to be an ideal kind of social environment where 
citizens can discuss and debate common concerns, access a wide range of 
information, and reflect and revise their understanding of issues19. 
 
The aim of “open public debate” is completely different from technocracy movement. 
The technocracy movement was marked by a high degree of optimism about 
scientific expertise and the merits of technology that would eventually lead to 
improvements in efficiency, environmental quality and quality of life20. According to 
Jasanoff, this highly scientific approach failed when they left little room for public 
participation and discussion, since such activities were viewed as unnecessary 
roadblocks to technological progress21. However, in recent years, for her, scholars 
have again pushed our understanding of the value of local knowledge and citizen 
science. They have helped us to critically examine scientific and technical 
information, and to value a broader array of knowledge that can assist in decision 
making22. Today, several democratic systems have positioned public participation 
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activities at the centre of their decision-making processes; creating new models of 
relationship between State and citizens.  
 
Following this theory23, several models of the relationship between State and public 
information can be found. For example, an open data or freedom of public 
information model, recognizes a citizen´s right to access information by a formal 
request to public authority or to have information released to the public by the 
government. These models represent different conceptions regarding the State’s 
obligations of transparency and accountability to inform its citizens. But, both models 
of open data and of freedom of public information recognise the capacity of 
governments to be closer to citizen’s needs in relation to the deployment of biometric 
technology24. In addition, these models can be interpreted as transparency and 
accountability as a control mechanism. 
 
For Villanueva “transparency” is “the obligation of government authorities to perform, 
as a general rule, their actions publicly, as a mechanism to control power and 
promote democratic legitimacy of public institutions”25. Transparency and 
accountability for Villanueva would consist in biometric systems being subject to 
public knowledge and assessment by citizens. Particularly, the following information 
would be available: 
  
a)  Information regarding the public management of biometric databases;  
b) Criteria on which the decisions are made to implement biometric technology and 
TBIF; and,  
d) Reports on the behavior of public officers using or deploying biometric systems 
and TBIF26. 
 
There are two related criticisms, on one hand, that public will not maintain an active 
interest without hope of influencing a decision or changing a situation. On the other, 
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that public will not understand these issues. These criticisms have been the primarily 
concerns from the democratic theory approach. In fact, the analysis of the effects of 
public involvement on decisions remains somewhat unsolved. Nevertheless, from 
the modern technology theory approach the “open public debate” considers that the 
optimal solution is derived from extensive discussion and debate that favours some 
form of consensus decision making. Where optimal decisions are therefore 
understood in the context of balancing competing interests, where all players 
(citizens, academics and activist groups) are engaged in the process, but overall 
have a fair chance of influencing the final outcome27.  
 
Modern technology theory approach is more concerned about the processes of 
representation, participation, involvement and inclusion28. For example, in a 
participatory process of biometric systems deployment decision making, the 
questions to ask shall be, “Do the participants represent all significant sectors of the 
community?”. In addition, Jasanoff have address issues of local versus nonlocal 
participation, lay versus expert participation, and diffuse versus concentrated 
interests29.  
 
This chapter highlights the necessity for informed public discussion accompanying 
the rapid developments in biometric systems. This is a central theme of this thesis. 
However, it is possible to pose a question regarding if citizens will understand 
biometric systems issues. Jasanoff explains that internal exclusion may rise even 
when individuals and groups are nominally included. Such situations occur when 
opportunities for discussion are limited to certain key spokespersons and specific 
(technical) kinds of arguments30. Jasanoff argues for different modes of practices 
that allows a linkage among knowledge, technology and power within contemporary 
industrial democracies31. 
 
                                            
27
 Jasanoff, Sheila, Designs on Nature Science and Democracy in Europe and the United States, 
above n 4 and Habermas, Jürgen, “Sfera pubblica (Una voce di enciclopedia)”, above n 4. 
28
 Idem 
29
 Jasanoff, Sheila, Designs on Nature Science and Democracy in Europe and the United States, 
above n 4 
30
 Idem 
31
 Idem 
37 
 
Further multidisciplinary research regarding the role of this type of technology is 
relevant to other legal fields that are beyond of this thesis. More public debate, 
transparency and accountability about the benefits and risks of biometric systems 
and TBIF should be available to citizens. 
  
2.3. The Biometric Systems Debate: Tracking History 
 
This section considers a well-established technical literature explaining biometrics, 
as well as the difference between the terms biometry and biometrics. This 
examination of the literature provides both an understanding of biometric terminology 
and how legal implications will be shaped by specific contexts of biometrics.  
 
It is possible to identify two types of literature on biometrics. In the first type, most of 
the literature explains biometry from the statistical science point of view, as applied 
in biology. The second type, explains how biometrics has been used as a technique 
in different scientific fields. However, these two scientific types do not explain the 
social and legal relationships of biometrics between citizens and governments.  
 
A multidisciplinary approach can be used to identify another type of literature. This 
approach can be grouped into an historical background to biometric systems32. Here, 
it is possible to trace when and how biometric systems have been implemented. This 
literature considers and explains the relationship between citizens and governments 
by using biometric systems in law enforcement, such as forensic analyses and 
criminal anthropology. There has been discussion on the use of biometric systems in 
public policies for immigration and/or human social policies, examples of which are 
the cases of Germany during the Nazi period, the United States and northern Europe 
during the eugenics movement. A significant characteristic of the well-established 
technical literature is the attempt to articulate biometric knowledge by explaining 
biologically inspired models for biometric features, technologies, techniques and 
applications. This literature goes from the biological “concept of evolution” to the 
social “eugenics movements”. However, these discussions failed to meet the 
expectations for legal analysis and more open debate identified by Jasanoff and 
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Habermas, who would argue that this literature fails not only to publicly discuss 
biometrics, but also fails to involve all sectors of a society33.  
 
The specialised literature has always directed its attention to: objectives, purposes, 
characteristics and applications of biometric systems. Nevertheless, it seems that 
social, ethical or privacy and data protection implications of biometric systems have 
not created great interest to be included in all technical literature. 
 
2.3.1. Definition: Biometry or Biometrics? According to the general literature, Sokal 
and Rohlf have accredited the term “biometry” to Pearson and Weldon34, while for 
Armitage, the term “biometric” was first used by Bernoulli, in 184135. The terms 
“biometry” and “biometric” derive from the Greek words bios, life and metron, 
measure. The Australian Concise Oxford Dictionary defines the noun biometry as 
“the application of statistical analysis to biological data” and the adjective biometric 
as “of or pertaining to biometry”36. The Dictionary of Genetics defines biometry as 
“the application of statistics to biological problems”37. These terms have been used in 
different fields, for example biology, medicine and agronomy. It is possible to 
assume that biometrics measures biodiversity using statistics.  
 
After analysing the literature, three questions are posed: first, which term do 
researchers use? Second, is there any difference in the meaning of these terms? 
And finally, is biometrics a science or a technique?  
 
In this field of study, these questions are central and fundamental to any legal 
discussion. The language and definitions are not consistent and their meanings can 
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be ambiguous. For example, in 1963, in 1973 and later in 2003, Sokal and Rohlf38 
define “biometry” as the “application of statistical methods to the solution of biological 
problems. The original meaning of biometry was much narrower and implied a 
special field related to the study of evolution and natural selection; however, the 
wider definition is customary now. Biometry is also called biological statistics or 
simply biostatistics”39.  
 
Whereas Hopkins states that “[t]he strict definition of biometrics is the science that 
involves the statistical analysis of biological characteristics”40. However, further along 
in the same article, he refers to the term as: 
 
“[T]he statistical analysis of biological characteristics. The use of the term 
‘statistical analysis’ itself implies that interpretation of the biometric data is 
necessary. Biometrics is not therefore an exact science. It needs to take into 
account different mechanisms for interpretation of data and different 
environmental conditions when the data was captured”41.  
 
Hopkins tried to establish biometrics as a science. However, he recognises that 
biometrics cannot give solutions or answers by itself; a requirement for it to be 
considered a science.  
 
By contrast, Zhang defines the term biometric as “technology that uses human 
being’s unique physical or behavioural features to identify or verify persons. It relies 
on ‘something that you are’ to make personal identification and therefore can 
inherently differentiate between an authorized person and a fraudulent impostor”42. 
 
As mentioned above, the definitions set in specialised literature are not consistent 
and suggest that the terms “biometry” and “biometrics” are employed in two senses 
                                            
38
 A pupil of Sewell Green Wright, who developed with Ronald A. Fisher and J.B.S. Haldane 
Theoretical Population Genetics and established a related discipline of quantitative genetics. 
39
 These authors use plain language. Sokal, Robert and James, Rohlf Biometry, (W.H. Freeman and 
Company, 3
rd
 ed., 2003), p. 1-2 and Sokal, Robert and James, Rohlf, Introduction to Biostatistics, 
above n 7. 
40
 Hopkins, Richard, “An introduction to biometrics and large scale civilian identification”, above n 7. 
41
 Idem. 
42
 Zhang, David, Automated biometrics: technologies and systems, above n 7, p. 1. 
40 
 
or with two meanings. The first is scientific, represented by Hopkins as 
measurements or the statistical43 study of biological phenomena or processes, as 
well as the physical properties of living beings; the second, represented by Zhang, is 
the application of a technique that consists of recognizing and/or verifying a person’s 
identity based on physical and behavioural characteristics.  
 
Therefore the main difference between the terms “biometry” and “biometrics” is how 
authors apply them. However, nowadays the term “biometrics” has been used in the 
context of automated systems. 
 
From our perspective there are three concepts that create some issues regarding 
biometrics. These three concepts are: technique, science and technology. Biometrics 
seen as a technique relates to the production of things; it implies an empirical 
knowledge of how to collect biometric information, such as samples, patterns or 
minutiae. While biometrics seen as a science regards exclusively to the generation 
of new knowledge through research. Biometric technology refers to an advance 
degree of knowledge; is the “know how” to do automated biometric systems based 
on scientific grounds44.  
 
Technique, science and technology differ in the various objectives pursued: science 
seeks to understand nature and society; technique and technology seek to produce 
goods and provide services45. Therefore, this thesis will refer to the term “biometrics” 
as the technique in charge of identifying, or authenticate the identity of a person 
based on physical or/and behavioural characteristics. In the following chapters, the 
thesis will refer to the term “biometric systems” as a specific form of technology used 
to identify or authenticate people. 
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2.3.2. The Historical Background of Biometric Systems. For a multidisciplinary 
approach, this chapter identifies biometric systems through related historical events. 
In fact, some historical events have helped to develop biometrics, and assist in 
understanding the terms “biometry” and “biometrics” and how they have been 
applied. Human anatomy has long been studied using biometrics as a technique and 
one of the most important examples was the eugenics movement.  
 
 Biology represents the background of biometrics and genetics 
 
The first historical biometric event was recorded in 1858. Herschel captured hand 
images for identification purposes. He stamped a handprint on the back of each 
worker’s contract to distinguish his employees from others who might claim to be 
employees when payday arrived.46 In those years, the study of population structure 
was widespread because of the concept of “evolution interest”. In 1859, Darwin 
published On the Origin of Species47.  
 
In 1865, Mendel discovered what today we call Mendel's Laws of Inheritance48. Two 
years later, Darwin published Variation in Animals and Plants under Domestication49.  
 
By 1869, Wilson had measured the heads of 464 criminals, “finding their average 
size less than that of the ordinary population, and coming to the conclusion that ‘the 
cranial deficiency is associated with real physical deterioration’”50. Twenty years after 
Darwin published On the Origin of Species, the idea of evolution gained currency 
and as a result Galton51 published Natural Inheritance52.  
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 Forensic analysis and biometrics have the same roots 
 
The first forensic studies were developed during 1880s. At that time, Bertillon53 
developed the Bertillonage system, an alternative method of fingerprints which 
consisted of measuring body parts to identify criminals54. Bertillon also developed 
"metric photography" in which identification photographs and visual images of crime 
scenes are standardized. Currently, the rules of Bertillon’s Metric Photography are 
still in force in forensics55. 
 
Herschel sent his records to Galton and in 1892, he was able to confirm that 
fingerprints do not change over the course of an individual’s lifetime. He presented a 
basic classification system using prints from all fingers, which proved that no two 
fingerprints are identical56.  
 
In 1896, Vucetich57 worked and perfected the Galteneano system. His fingerprints 
system was known as Vucetich’s system58. However, almost at the same time, 
criminal investigation in British India developed by Edward Henry overthrew 
Bertillonage and expanded Galton’s fingerprints classification system59. The Henry 
classification system allows for the logical categorization of ten-print fingerprint 
records into primary groupings based on fingerprint pattern types60. Consequently, 
fingerprints can be considered as oldest biometric identification system. 
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Biological variation studies were continued by Pearson and Weldon applying 
statistical methodology to the analysis of biological variation61. It is important to 
highlight that at that time, biology was not regarded a quantifiable science62.  
 
 Biometrics shares the same background of genetics and eugenics 
 
The first studies of genetics started in 1900s. In 1905, Bateson coined the word 
“genetics”63 and four years later, in 1909, Wilhelm Johannsen and Nilsson–Ehle 
rediscovered Mendel’s Law of Inheritance, which implies that genetic methods and 
forensic analysis have the same roots as biometry64.  
 
Between 1910 and 1940, the dominant figure in biometry was Major Greenwood. He 
was a critic of the eugenics movement because he believed there was a 
fundamental conflict between the demands of medical ethics and social conscience, 
and a rigorous adherence to eugenic principles65. In these years, eugenic science66 
was accepted and institutionalized in northern Europe and the United States of 
America67. In Europe, Lombroso and his pupils Ferri and Garofalo, among others, 
developed the theory of criminal anthropology68. Meanwhile in the United States, 
Daveport published a book entitled Heredity in Relation to Eugenics, in which he 
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noted that single genes did not seem to determine important mental and behavioural 
characteristics69. 
 
Briefly, the development human social problems, such as poverty, insanity, and 
criminality were associated as a result of hereditary traits and defects. Human 
genotypes were difficult to measure and have often been treated as unobservable 
attributes. An example of this arose during the Nazi period: 
 
“Eugenic research in Germany before the Nazi period was similar to that in 
the United States and Britain, and much of it remained similar after Hitler 
came to power. The Institute of Anthropology, Human Heredity, and 
Eugenics, for example continued to press investigations into subjects such 
as the genetics of diabetes, tuberculosis, and brain disease: the heritability 
of criminality: the effects of race crossing (with no particular emphasis on 
Jews or Aryans)”70. 
 
During the Nazi period, the idea that all human weaknesses were the result of poor 
heredity took root. Also, in the United States, immigration was seen as detrimental to 
‘American’ heredity stock71. In the Nazi period class and racial prejudice were 
prevalent and widespread72. 
 
“During the Hitler years, however, Nazi bureaucrats provided eugenic 
research institutions with handsome support and their research programs 
were expanded to complement the goals of the Third Reich. They exploited 
ongoing investigations into the inheritance of disease, intelligence, 
behaviour, and race to advise the government on its biological policies”73. 
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 Kevles, Daniel J. And Hood, Leroy (eds), The Code Of Codes, Scientific and Social Issues in the 
Human Genome Project, above n 66, p. 7. 
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 Ibidem, p. 8. 
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 Ibidem, p. 7. 
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 Bresler, Jack, B. (ed.), Genetics and Society, (Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1973), p. 5 
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In 1918, that the two theories, Darwin’s and Mendel’s, were fused by Fisher in The 
Correlation between Relatives on the Supposition of Mendelian Inheritance74. After 
that, Fisher and other colleagues as Haldane, Hogben, Huxley and Muller hold that 
eugenics must be free of racial and class bias, and must also be consistent with 
what was known about the laws of heredity75. 
 
“The new students of human heredity preferred to search for well defined, 
sharply segregating traits as immune as possible both to uncertainty in 
identification and to environmental influence”76. 
 
After 1930, the eugenics movement declined and new studies suggested that human 
heredity was much more complex than formerly thought77.  
 
“[W]elcomed with particular enthusiasm the rapidly increasing knowledge of 
the human blood groups. The blood groups displayed patterns of inheritance 
that seemed to conform to Mendel’s laws”78. 
 
In summary, in the late 19th century and the early 20th century, the terms “biometry” 
and “biometric” were associated with the study of the inheritance of continuous 
characteristics. These terms were not usually used in a more general sense79. In the 
1930s, these terms almost disappeared forgotten. However, in 1946, the statistical 
community promoted the use of the term “biometric” when organising the first 
International Biometric Conference80. 
 
“Biometry first emerged as a speciality within the discipline of biology. Its 
definition as a separate speciality was largely dependent on its claim that 
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statistical analysis of organic populations would lead to the elucidation of 
evolutionary processes”81. 
 
Currently, the term “biometrics” is used for the automated technique for identification 
and authentication in systems. The use of this type of technology has been 
intensified and diversified into different fields, particularly for security purposes.  
 
2.3.3. Biometrics and Popular Culture. Interestingly, developments in biometric 
technologies can be traced to ideas from science fiction literature and, later 
produced in films and television programs. The following table shows some film and 
television examples of now operational biometric systems. 
 
 
Figure 2. Science Fiction Literature Associated with Biometrics 
 
  
“The Andromeda Strain” (1971), directed by Robert Wise and based on the novel of 
the same name by Michael Crichton, first showed the biometric system on hand 
geometry, which also triggered the possibility of performing biometric fingerprints and 
palmprints. These systems were used for the first time in 1974 by the United States 
government, but were not fully implemented until the Atlanta Olympic Games in 
199082. 
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 Farral, Lyndsay A., “Controversy and Conflict in Science: a Case Study –The English Biometric 
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The second example on the table is "Blade Runner" (1982), directed by Ridley Scott 
and based partly on Philip K. Dick’s novel "Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?" 
(1968). The film shows the iris biometric system for verification, first used 
commercially in 1986 and which went on sale in 199583. 
 
"Tomorrow Never Dies" (1997), the eighteenth film in the James Bond series, shows 
the face recognition biometric system. The U.S. government implemented it in 2001 
during the XXXV Super Bowl (Florida). On that occasion, the police in Tampa Bay, 
Florida, used the facial recognition biometric system to identify criminals84. 
 
Finally, the table shows the hit U.S. television series "Mission Impossible" (1966-
1973) and shows the voice biometric system for recognition, the prototype of which 
was developed in 1975 and marketed in 198085. 
 
Biometric systems are the result of the functionality and convenience of technologies 
in operation. Automated biometric technologies have only become available over 
recent decades and have lately been receiving the attention of popular media. This 
automated biometric system makes it possible to collect, store, process and 
exchange massive volumes of biometric data. 
 
2.3.4. Biometrics is not an Independent Science. Based on its current use, scientific 
literature demonstrates that biometrics is not an independent science. As mentioned 
above, biometrics is a statistical method of acquiring data, and uses observation and 
experimentation to describe natural phenomena. It has failed to explain the natural 
phenomena in itself. Biometry can be defined as the study of statistical methods to 
biological characteristics and the application of technological biology for uniquely 
identifying or verifying humans based on physical and/or behavioural characteristics. 
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In summary, biometrics has been studied since 1880s and it has been introduce 
indirectly in immigration policy in many countries and directly in enforcement law. 
These techniques have had consequences in both immigration and criminal 
investigations, which are the focus of this thesis. 
   
2.4. Biometric Systems: Privacy Review 
 
Biometric systems present a legal challenge to privacy, as do many other 
technologies. In this respect, it is important to explain the historical background to 
privacy and to identify how privacy and data protection have become recognised as  
human rights before identifying how privacy has been studied, within the biometric 
systems literature. 
 
Privacy is an historic reality that has been constructed differently within different 
societies86. According to some authors, the concept of privacy appears with the 
arrival of Christianity87; however, human beings had already enjoyed privacy88. 
 
In the Middle Age, the concept of privacy was limited in the sense that its regulation 
at that time did not favour any distinction between private life and public life. “The 
consciousness of the Western man is based on the idea of being as a purpose in 
itself, like an autonomous centre of personal life”89. It was not until the 18th century 
that an attempt was made to define “public life and what did not have that 
character”90. Indeed, it was said that “while man made himself in public, he 
performed his nature in the private realm, mostly experiences within the family 
nucleus”91. It  should, be noted, however, that the Declaration of the Rights of Man 
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 Privacy is a historic reality because at the beginning of time not all individuals were able to enjoy 
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and of the Citizen, as well as other similar instruments written in the 18th century, did 
not contain any mention whatsoever of the right of privacy or data protection.  
 
With the birth of Christian thinking in the Middle Ages, the pursuit of intangible goods 
began to deepen: intangible goods belong to the person who contributes to the 
progressive development of personal relations. Based on the Christian idea, privacy 
was considered a basic good belonging to the person, that is, it would become a 
supreme and sacred value for individual existence92. The modern idea of human 
rights comes from the contrast between nature and culture, recognising that if 
person´s feelings were hurt or the person humiliated, this would constitute a 
restriction of their natural rights93. 
 
Some examples of privacy, prior to the early modern period, are reading of the Bible 
together as a family, inner dialogue with God, self-seclusion, writing personal 
journals, and so on. These actions may be deemed internal acts because the 
individual claims for a space and inner life, an “internal realm”, from a religious 
context. In other words, a demand was denoted in numerous new attitudes and other 
customs that were not common until that moment. So, the rules of good upbringing 
and courtesy codes would emerge with the acknowledgement of privacy, in which 
the need to preserve a space around the body was depicted as an area far from the 
sight and contact of strangers94. 
 
In the Modern Age95, the right to privacy became one of the most important desires 
of each individual. The ideal was a space free from any interference where the 
person might enjoy an individual sphere and avoid all kind of intrusions96. 
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 Saint Augustine, in his work Confessions, explores privacy systematically and in detail. He says 
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Therefore, most of the scholars agree in stating that “the acknowledgement of the 
right of privacy emerges from liberal systems and consists of an aspiration to have 
access to what formerly used to be a privilege of only a few. Thus, the idea of 
privacy was thought of in such way for it to be enjoyed by a select “bourgeois” group, 
without implying a concern in making it available to the poorest groups of the 
population. Hence, it could not be considered a universal right”97. 
 
These first formulations of the concept were proposed by Locke98. He started from 
the so-called “negative freedom” and thought that every human being should own a 
minimal sphere of recognized personal freedom that must on no account be violated 
by any other person. It would be an individual’s right to react before pressures and 
external influences, as well as having the freedom to act as that person deems 
appropriate, according to the regulations that rule over and organize the society in 
which that individual participates99. 
 
According to Kant, this right revolves around the orbit of the internal realm; that is, a 
person’s space must be kept free from State interference, as well as separate from 
community social relations100. Like other human rights, the right to privacy has 
maintained its historicity and positiveness, establishing itself in the modern era101.  
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 As an example, it is more than enough to consider the material conditions of the life in which the 
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The specialised literature on privacy generally adopts three approaches in modelling 
the concept of “privacy”: privacy as information control (self-determination)102, 
privacy as non-interference103 and privacy as a condition of limited accessibility104. 
 
The core provisions on the modern conception of the right to privacy can be found in 
the main human rights treaties, the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (Article 12) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(Article 17). For the purposes of this thesis, other important regional human rights 
instruments are the European Convention on Human Rights (Article 8) and the 
American Convention on Human Rights (known as the Pact of San Jose, Costa 
Rica) (Article 11). 
 
It is important to note that in 1990, the United Nations General Assembly issued 
specific Guidelines concerning Computerized Personal Data Files105.  However, the 
1980 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Guidelines 
on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data commanded 
the greatest influence on the international community. 
 
Bygrave acknowledges that in 2000, when the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union (CFRUE) was enacted, the right of data protection was incorporated 
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internationally in a human right instrument106. Before that, data protection as 
international human right had been derived indirectly in the protection of the right of 
privacy107. Moreover, Bygrave highlights that Article 8 of the CFRUE does not define 
the right of data protection, but instead states a systematic categorization of the 
principles of data protection and supervision by an independent data protection 
authority108. The principles expressly mentioned are fair and lawful processing, 
specified purposes, consent, access to data and rectification.  
 
2.4.1. The Legal Impact on Privacy and Data Protection. Privacy is the right of an 
individual to remain free from intrusions, to be autonomous and to control access to 
his/her personal information109. This section will argue that biometric technology 
presents an inherent challenge to privacy and data protection rights. International 
and national privacy and data protection regimes are discussed in greater detail in 
further chapter110. 
 
It is important to highlight that in the 1970s, studies on the automatic processing of 
personal data started as a reaction to the potential and capability of computer 
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systems to collect, store and process personal information111 until 2000 when data 
protection was recognised as a human right in the CFREU112.  
 
Under this theoretical framework it is possible to identify the main impact on privacy 
and civil liberties: intrusiveness, the loss of privacy, the disclosure and possible 
misuse of personal information. However, the advancement of technology exposes 
the impact of uncertainty in areas dealing with securing personal information 
transmitted through electronic identification systems (eID), the purpose and misuse 
of information in electronic storage capacity and individuals’ knowledge or consent in 
electronic collection of information capacity. In addition to this, there are concerns 
about identity theft. 
 
“A man without privacy is a man without dignity: the fear that Big Brother is 
watching and listening threatens the freedom of the individual no less than 
the prison bars”113. 
 
Intrusiveness, the loss of privacy and the disclosure of personal information are three 
examples of the inherent challenge of biometric technology because: 
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 First, biometric characteristics are physical and behavioural measurements in 
origin and biometric technology might acquire additional personal information 
from scanned biometric features114. That is, the case of features found in the 
eyes (retina and iris) could reveal blood pressure disorders and diseases like 
glaucoma. This derived information could be used as a basis for 
discrimination. In addition, biometric characteristics are not secret because 
one of the conditions is their universality115. It is possible to obtain an 
individual’s pattern without his or her knowledge or consent, such as face data 
with CCTV and fingerprints with sensors.    
 
 Second, biometric technology –such as fingerprints and facial recognition 
systems- allows for the possibility of obtaining identifications that are 
unwanted due to safety reasons. Individuals in the witness protection program 
could be identified based on their fingerprints or facial recognition116. In 
addition, minors could be identified because biometric technology does not 
make any distinctions regarding age.  
 
 Third, biometric technology combined or used with Radio Frequency 
Identification (RFID), any Global Positioning System (GPS) or any Automatic 
Identification and Data Capture (AIDC) technology empowers not only the 
identification or authentication of people, but it also increases the collection of 
data without their knowledge or consent. Software platforms or applications 
available for both public and private sectors could link biometric information 
with more personal information about individuals enrolled in widely different 
databases or electronic systems. An example of this fusion of technologies is 
ELISE, a platform that combines multiple biometrics and biographic data in a 
single search developed by the company WCC Smart Search and Match117. 
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 Prabhakar, Salil et. al., “Biometric Recognition: Security and Privacy Concerns”, (2003) 41 IEEE 
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Today, the intensification and diversification of biometric technology poses an 
increasing risk on privacy and civil liberties. Through interactive platforms it is 
possible to deliver personal services or online interactions like electronic commerce, 
electronic government, electronic health and electronic education, among other 
electronic activities. While personal data is collected, stored, analysed and 
exchanged in most cases to grant access to multiple electronic identification systems 
(eID) both on and off the Internet118, in other cases, it is done for law enforcement, 
commercial, social or marketing purposes or simply for convenience.  
 
These interactive platforms have set the role of a strong electronic identity119. 
Furthermore, the advancement of storage capacity of personal information and the 
facilitation of information flow creates legal concerns regarding the purpose and 
misuse of information (subsequent use of personal information).  
 
The biometric industry has been centring its attention on highly secure access-
control applications, in which the primary objective is to deter impostors and avoid 
threats against biometric systems. 
 
Most biometric information is stored on electronic servers, networks or private clouds 
and a common threat is cyber-crime. The threat of any information system range 
from relatively harmless intrusions like viruses, worms, Trojan horses to the 
                                                                                                                                       
official website http://www.wcc-group.com/page.aspx?menu=products_001&page=products_software  
(18/12/2012) 
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disruption of critical information systems like fraud or identity theft120. Thus, privacy 
concerns are about uncertainty in securing personal information, the disclosure of 
information and identity theft. 
 
The use of biometric technology certainly challenges privacy and civil liberties121. 
Thus, it is not only important to have an adequate privacy and data protection legal 
framework that covers biometric information122, but also to have citizens involved 
and participating in an informed public policy debate. The deployment of biometric 
systems should be accompanied by transparency and accountability, as a public 
interest control mechanism123. In addition, it is important that the biometric industry 
does not failed to acknowledge the weakness of their products and offer solutions in 
the form of system architecture, design consultation, installation support and 
customer training to avoid any negative impact for their clients124. Otherwise, not 
only will it affect the balance of human rights, but it could also raise financial and 
technical issues for their clients. The deployment of biometric technology transcends 
national borders. This issue will be discussed in later chapters.  
 
2.5. Biometric Characteristics: Typology 
 
After tracking privacy and data protection rights recognition and reviewing the 
specialised literature related to biometrics this section centre its attention to biometric 
typologies. Biometric typologies are categorized in terms of physical or behavioural 
characteristics and more detailed information on biometrics typology is included in 
Appendix B. 
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There is also another classification based on software according to signal types (one 
dimension or two dimensions) or sensor types (touching or non-touching) used in 
biometric technologies. However, they will not be discussed in this thesis as they are 
related to engineering systems. 
 
The general agreement set by the specialised literature considers that the physical 
and behavioural characteristics chosen for identification purposes should basically 
satisfy five conditions: 1) Universality, every person should have the characteristic; 
2) Uniqueness, there are differences between individuals based on this 
characteristic; 3) Permanence, the characteristic should not change much with 
environment or over time; 4) Collectability, the characteristic can be measured; and 
5) Acceptability, the public in general should have no objection to having the 
biometrics collected125. The following figure presents the most popular biometrics 
typology. 
 
Figure 3. Biometric Typology 
 
 
Specialised literature emphasizes that these physical and behavioural characteristics 
are unique: they cannot be stolen, forgotten, duplicated or shared. However, no 
single biometric system has clear attributes that will guarantee its ascendancy over 
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 Zhang, David D., Automated Biometrics Technologies and Systems, above n 7, p. 5; Hopkins, 
Richard, “An introduction to biometrics and large scale civilian identification”, above n 7; Woodward, 
John D. Jr. et. al., Biometrics, Identity Assurance in the Information Age, above n 7, p. 71-130; 
Wayman, James, et. al., Biometric Systems Technology Design and Performance Evaluation, above 
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the others. Each has its strengths and its weaknesses126. Given this uniqueness of 
biometric characteristics the importance of public debate is critical to publicise not 
only the interaction between citizens and technology, but also the interaction 
between governments and biometric industry127.  
 
2.5.1. The Special Case of DNA (Deoxyribonucleic Acid) DNA is a very special case 
in biometric characteristics. Specialised literature is divided; for example Zhang does 
not consider DNA as a physical characteristic for biometric systems whereas Van 
der Ploeg does. This thesis however treats and recognises DNA as a physical 
biometric characteristic128. 
 
Human beings have several thousands of genes –specific DNA sequences in 
specific areas of the chromosomes- and each gene represents a specific sequence 
of amino acids that creates RNA for the formation or coding of specific proteins129. 
Different versions of a gene appear as a pair of alleles at a specific position, and a 
specific collection of alleles are labelled as a genotype. While over 99 per cent of all 
genes in humans are identical to the corresponding genes in all other humans, the 
other one per cent is important because that one per cent is thought to lead to 
individual differences in both genotypes130. Human beings exhibit several thousands 
of observed behaviours and any well-defined subset of these behaviours is labelled 
a phenotype131. 
  
The methods of genetic analysis of behaviours are used to elucidate and improve 
our understanding of the relationships among particular variations or combinations of 
genotypes and particular variations or combinations of phenotypes132. In 1998, the 
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FBI launched the Combined DNA Index System (CODIS) to digitally store, search 
and retrieve DNA markers for forensic law enforcement purposes133. 
 
2.6. Biometrics Profiles: How are they Created? 
 
The templates of physical and behavioural characteristics are used in biometric 
systems. Biometric profiles are created by using templates. This section discusses 
the content of biometric DNA databases. 
 
Biometric profiles are biological samples134, which usually contains human genetic 
information to determine the exclusive sequence or the identity of a person. The 
information obtained from blood, skin, bone cells or blood plasma can be digitally 
stored in automated databases135. 
 
These databases manage different categories of information regarding genetically 
individualized criminals, evidence found at a crime scene or even genetic information 
from the victims. Therefore, the data collected in these databases is corresponds to 
natural or physical characteristics of persons identified or to be identified. Thus, 
handling this information should be in accordance to regulations for privacy and 
personal data protection136. As this is sensitive information collected, stored and 
exchange in these biometric databases137, civil society, industry, special advocates 
and public official should also be involved in public debates about the introduction, 
development and operation of these databases138. 
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2.7. Biometric Systems: How do they Work? 
 
Physical and behavioural characteristics are used as a technique for identification 
(recognition) and authentication (verification). This technique is known as biometric 
systems. Biometric systems can be designed to be automated or manual. This 
section discusses the use, purposes and limits of biometric systems. 
 
Specialised literature recognises that there are other techniques that have been 
used to identify and verify humans, which include, for example, a variety of types of 
credentials, passwords or tokens. The main difference between the other methods 
and biometric characteristics is that the person him/herself is the key139. 
 
These visible characteristics are unique to each individual and cannot be transferred 
as discussed in preceding section140. Biometric systems have been progressively 
associated with enhanced security141 which demands public policy debate regarding 
the deployment of such biometric systems. 
 
Biometric systems have two objectives (identification or authentication) and are 
designed based on their objectives. Identifying and verifying are different activities, 
which is why some biometric systems are more appropriate for recognition 
(identification) than authentication (verification) and specialised literature 
acknowledges this142. 
 
Likewise, it is not possible for everything to be considered a biometric characteristic 
in itself, for example blood type, weight, height and shadow, among others. In some 
cases, biometric systems either for identification (recognition) or authentication 
(verification) require that two or more characteristics be measured. Combined 
                                            
139
 Routine photographs, radiographs and dental impressions are examples of other methods used to 
identify.  
140
 Uniqueness is the direct result of the individual differences that exist in the development of a 
body’s anatomical structures. For further details, see Appendix B. Biometrics Typology  
141
 For further details, see Chapter 1. Transborder Biometric Information Flows: Legal Challenges 
142
 Wayman, James, et. al., Biometric Systems Technology Design and Performance Evaluation, 
above n 7; Boulgouris, Nikolaos V., et. al., Biometrics, Theory, Methods, and Applications, above n 7; 
Bolle, Ruud M., et. al., Guide to Biometrics, above n 7; Zhang, David D., Automated Biometrics 
Technologies and Systems, above n 7. 
61 
 
biometric systems, for instance blood type and DNA, are used because the type of 
blood by itself does not identify a specific person. Combining two or more biometric 
technologies yields better performance and reliability, reducing biometric systems’ 
false rejections and false acceptance rates143. 
 
Bolle explains that biometric systems require processing unique data that is 
extracted from the sample and a template is created. Physical characteristics are 
rich enough that a onetime sample may be sufficient for comparing templates. For 
behavioural characteristics, any given sample may not give any information about a 
person’s identity, but it is the temporal variation of the signal that contains the 
information144. Meanwhile, Zhang highlights that the templates for any two persons 
should be different, and different samples from the same person should be similar 
enough145. 
 
For Zhang, Hopkins and Boulgouris, the two important operations in a biometric 
system are enrolment and testing because, in cases of enrolment an individual’s 
biometrics in a database, and during the testing phase, an individual’s biometric 
information is detected and compared with that stored in the database146. For more 
detailed information on how biometric systems work, see Appendix C147. As stressed 
in this thesis148, it is crucial that governments inform to citizens about the creation 
and management of these biometric databases. 
 
2.8. Purposes and Limits of Biometric Systems 
 
The development of biometric systems depends on the purposes of the identification 
or verification, which are in themselves different activities. The following figure 
presents how biometric systems work. Identification or recognition aims at 
determining who subject is without information given by the individual. Identification 
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and recognition mean that characteristics are selected from a database to produce a 
list of possible or likely matches149. Meanwhile, authentication or verification as the 
name suggests seeks to verify the individual based on information provided by the 
user. Authentication and verification mean that when a person makes a claim that he 
or she is a specific person, only that specific person’s characteristics are checked to 
see if they match150. 
 
Figure 4. Purposes of Biometric Systems 
 
In an identification system, a huge database is used to store hundreds of thousands 
of people’s digital biometric features, whereas in a verification system, it is not 
necessary to have a database since the objective of such a system is to verify a 
person’s identity, which means the registered pattern is displayed when a 
comparison is conducted151. More detailed information on how biometric systems 
work, is included in Appendix C. 
 
2.8.1. Accuracy and limits of biometric systems. Most behavioural biometric systems 
are still in the testing stage, but most of physical characteristics are operational. The 
accuracy and effectiveness of these systems need to be checked in a real time 
operation environment. An essential legal concern for biometric systems is related to 
the level of accuracy of data. 
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The biometric systems have used two performance measurements to rank the level 
of matching accuracy152, known as the false rejection rate and the false acceptance 
rate. The first is concerned with the number of instances an authorized individual is 
falsely rejected by the system while the second refers to the number of instances a 
non-authorized individual is falsely accepted by the system153. 
 
For Zhang, a biometric system’s accuracy is determined by combining the rates of 
false acceptance and false rejection. The performance of a biometric system, and 
therefore the false rejection rate and false acceptance rate, could be affected by154: 
 
 Environmental conditions like extreme temperature and humidity 
 The age, gender, ethnic background and occupation of the user 
 The beliefs, desires and intentions of the user. If a user does not wish to 
interact with the system, then performance will be affected. 
 The physical make-up of the user. A user without any limbs cannot use 
signature biometrics. 
 
Hopkins claims that “[i]t needs to take into account different mechanisms for 
interpretation of data and different environmental conditions when the data is 
captured”155. Hopkins explains that biometric systems can present two kinds of 
errors or mistakes: false acceptance –when the biometric system authenticates an 
impostor- and false rejection –when the system rejects a valid user156.  
 
Fingerprints and iris recognition biometric systems are ideal for limiting entry into 
secured areas to known and trusted individuals. But, this biometric system is not 
very useful for recognizing people in public places whereas biometric facial 
recognition systems can recognize people at a distance, without their knowledge or 
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cooperation157. More recently in the United Kingdom, as a result of threats to public 
safety, some public places have been heavily populated with video surveillance 
cameras. On average, a person moving through London is captured on video over 
five times a day158. Fingerprint systems can be used either for identification or 
authentication. Iris recognition is more suited for use as personal verification than 
fingerprints159. 
 
In biometric voice identification systems, there is no prior identity claim, and the 
system decides who the person is, or what group the person belongs to. While 
biometric voice authentication systems analyse an utterance from an unknown 
speaker and compare it with the model of the speaker whose identity is claimed. The 
fundamental difference between identification and authentication is the number of 
decision alternatives160. 
 
2.9. Conclusions 
 
This chapter explored the historical background and definition in a broad sense, of 
biometrics. It identified that biometrics has been studied since the early 19th century, 
but technological advances within the ICT have revolutionised the features to 
generate automated systems able to collect, stored, process and exchange an 
impressive volume of personal data. This chapter also identified specialised authors 
that share a common concern in distancing themselves from a certain notion of 
biometrics and biometric systems, the essential feature of which is that they 
attempted to articulate a kind of “biometrics’ knowledge”. But, most of these authors 
do not explain relationship (or subordination) of biometrics between citizens and 
governments. Indeed, there are a few authors who discuss the legal impact of 
biometrics on privacy and data protection. Nor do these authors discuss the issues 
of regulation, or possible self-regulation, of the biometric industry. Moreover, the 
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literature does not explain why biometrics has not been openly debated. A 
characteristic of most of these authors is that their work is written in technical terms 
or for a specific audience, limiting the access to “biometrics’ knowledge”. This 
chapter highlighted the need for transparency and accountability, based on 
Habermas and Jasanoff’s theories, as part of political practice161. 
 
In the next chapter, the thesis analyses the biometric industry and the development 
of technology for the main purpose of enhancing security by identifying and 
authenticating individuals. In relation to privacy and data protection rights the 
following chapter maps out the biometric industry and explores the common 
practices, highlighting the importance of self-regulation. It is important to explore how 
far the biometric industry is willing to or can improve its self-regulation before 
discussion of legal problems, limitations and challenges posed by TBIF in 
immigration control and crime prevention contexts. 
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CHAPTER 3.  
 
THE BIOMETRIC INDUSTRY: AN ILLUSTRATIVE MAP OF PLAYERS, PRODUCTS AND 
PARTNERSHIPS 
 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
Before analysing the legal challenges of Transborder Biometric Information Flows 
(TBIF) there is a need to explore the biometric industry, which is responsible for 
rapid technological developments in automatic collection, storage, process and 
exchange of biometric systems. These technologies have not only transformed and 
expanded their original market in commercial or businesses cases, but have also 
diversified and intensified the use of this technology. Experts predict that this market 
will reach approximately USD$9,542 million by 20141. This research, however, is 
neither about competition policies nor about patents2. 
 
This chapter provides an illustrative map of the industry, its players, products and 
partnerships. The biometric industry is evolving and expanding into different areas; 
developing many products and creating strategic partnerships between specialised 
biometric companies and other ancillary technology companies. There are biometric 
products developed and offered by this industry3 that do not comply with 
international standards regarding encryption standard security for TBIF in the context 
of immigration information flow4. 
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There is a lack of publicly available information about biometric industry, privacy 
principles, ethical commitments, current practices and regulation, apart from the 
information on websites and specialised magazines. In addition, there is a lack of 
systematic studies regarding the biometric industry itself. The absence of public 
debate on ethical commitments, practices and improvement for self-regulation is 
replicated at the international and national level. This is in contrast to the open public 
debates at the international and national level; on privacy and data protection 
positions. 
 
The website analysis methodology was the approach undertaken for this thesis 
despite the limitations of such an approach. Surveys and/or face-to-face interviews 
might have gathered more information on the organisations; commitments and 
practices on the industry, however, that is not the key focus of this thesis. 
Nevertheless, the website search methodology did highlight an industry that is 
rapidly expanding, diversifying with different current practices in the four countries 
examples and extend their quality self-regulation and impacting significantly upon 
privacy and data protection rights.  
 
Authors on Transborder Data Flows (TDF) since the 1980s have focused on 
electronic commerce its development, regulation, partnerships and reliability. Some 
authors, such as Cooper, have noted that the company, International Business 
Machine (IBM) clearly dominated the international computer hardware market5 
without much public debate. These authors do not centre their attention on biometric 
technology6. Nevertheless, this illustrative attempt to map the industry shows the 
important and continuing roles of key players of computer technology such as IBM, 
Hewlett Packard (HP) and Microsoft as well as new key players like Datacard Group, 
Safran Morpho, Gemalto, Suprema, Steria and Thales. Discourse about the 
relationship between citizens, government and biometric industry has been rare; with 
exceptions represented by Epstein and Lyon whose work discusses how biometrics 
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are implemented in a surveillance society. None of these authors have focused in 
the self-regulation in the biometric industry. 
 
The website search on the diversification of biometric systems and current national 
practices in Australia, Mexico, New Zealand and Spain demonstrated not only the 
absence of common and clear commitment to ethical and privacy practices, but also 
suggested the need, in the short-term, to improve industry self-regulation. It might 
have been expected to find common industry codes of practice, issued by official 
bodies or professional associations, similar to those in other industries, such as the 
Payment Card Industry (PCI) and their Security Standard Council7. However, it was 
only possible to identify a specialised watchdog organisation in Australia: the 
Biometric Institute. The Australian Biometric Institute promotes biometric 
technological security standards, it has developed privacy guidelines and privacy 
impact assessments complying with the Privacy Act 1988. Members of the Biometric 
Institute can access annual reports online8, but the public can only access by 
request.  
 
The website search revealed two types of forums in which biometrics have been 
discussed. These are, first, the forums organised by the biometric industry where the 
discussion centres on technical issues, working more as venues for vendors. 
Second, the academic forums where the discussion centres on legal concerns, 
generally with audiences of undergraduate and postgraduate students from law and 
science, academic colleagues and a few public officials.  These types of forums use 
technical terms and are for a specialised audience, limiting the access to “biometrics´ 
knowledge” and the level, direction and type of dialogue entered into9. This reflects 
the view of Jasanoff, who has observed that “developments suggest that some of the 
liveliness of contemporary democracy is to be found away from the polling booths, 
where one often looks for it in vain, in the less examined machinery of science and 
technology policy that is, in technical advisory committees, court proceedings, 
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regulatory assessments, scientific controversies, and even the ephemeral web 
pages of environmental groups and multinational corporations”10. 
 
This chapter argues the need to promote three types of biometric industrial 
guidelines: the technological security standard codes; privacy and data protection 
codes; and, importantly, ethical codes. Nationally or internationally, regulation should 
be consistent and uniform11. Regulation should include mutual benefits for the 
industry, government and society. Ideally, regulation should combine regulatory 
State order as well as self-regulatory biometric industry ethical and privacy codes12. 
In co-regulation and self-regulation systems the interaction between government, 
industry and social actors can address any possible limitations associated with direct 
State intervention13. Such approaches assist in the legitimisation on the deployment 
of biometric systems14.  
 
The fusion of biometric technology with other types of technology increases the 
capacity for storage of personal information. At the same time, the facilitation of 
information flow creates legal concerns regarding the transfer and possible misuse of 
information. It is important to note that these technologies are: Radio Frequency 
Identification (RFID), Global Positioning System (GPS) and Automatic Identification 
and Data Capture (AIDC). While these are mentioned at various points throughout 
the chapter, they are not discussed in detail15. They are mentioned because some 
biometric companies have established, as business partners, companies that 
develop other types of technology.  
 
The empirical websites research provides a general map of biometric industry, 
classifying the companies involved in biometric technology. This chapter presents 
key players of biometric industry, products, commitments to ethical practices and 
self-regulation. The examination of commitments to ethical practices, self-regulation 
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and currents practices is conducted within the framework of four countries 
comparative study. The chapter also assesses the diversification of biometric 
systems into different fields. Finally, this chapter argues the necessity to significantly 
improve national level co-regulation and but also self-regulation within the industry. 
 
3.2. Mapping the Biometric Industry: Overview 
 
Despite the absence of systematic studies on biometric industry and legal traditional 
sources, the empirical web research presents insights into a rapidly developing 
industry. This research revealed that the biometric industry consists of many 
companies, but relatively little is known about them or their strategic alliances with 
other technology industries16 or even the developers and researchers in the 
biometric technology.  
 
The website research identified that the biometric industry recognises its own 
weaknesses and challenges of their products not only to their clients (or potential 
clients) but also to people interested in their technology. This industry presents their 
products as effective technologies to determine identity and enhance security; and, 
productivity for individuals, organisations and governments. Some products may 
have the technical capacity to control the confidentiality and integrity of databases 
containing biometric information17. 
 
The biometric industry is a small part of the wider surveillance industry which, before 
2001, was centred on the police, armed forces and other government security 
agencies. Before the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001 security was already a 
priority. However, after this date governments started to implement security systems 
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in different areas, including immigration control18 and crime prevention19, which 
aimed to eliminate security risks by identifying individuals in an automated way.  
 
Today biometric technology covers different market segments beyond law 
enforcement and security, to education, transportation (air, land and sea), banking 
services and financial services. Biometric technology also applies to energy, farming, 
agriculture, health care (pharmaceutical and medical), as discussed in the following 
section20. Acknowledging that biometrics technology has been developed to identify 
and authenticate individuals21 and is used or implemented by police, armed forces 
and governments for security reasons, the deployment of biometric systems in 
different areas, including immigration and crime prevention, demands an informed 
public debate. This public debate should include a coordinated interaction between 
different actors from different areas. This interaction should involve policy makers, 
public officials, civil society, special advocates but also biometric industry 
associations. This dynamic relationship between different actors should take place 
nationally and internationally because biometric companies and TBIF extends 
beyond national borders22.   
 
This mapping exercise obtained information from companies’ websites, but also 
included specialised trade magazines, information gathered at the Tenth ID World 
International Congress23 and online power points presentations24. Basic sample 
information on the biometric industry was available on these official websites. The 
aim of the searches was to draw an indicative rather than a complete map of the 
biometric industry. Through these website searches, it was possible to identify 100 
companies involved in biometric technology. All the companies’ profiles, products 
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and services were reviewed and analysed for the illustrative map of the biometric 
industry. 
 
There are different ways to classify the companies that form the biometric industry. 
For example, one classification could be based on market segments or capitalization 
or size of companies or business area. However, the classification of these biometric 
companies, presented in this thesis is based on the products offered: specialised 
businesses, ancillary or mixed businesses, business partners, strategic alliances and 
researchers, consultancy magazines.  
 
a. Specialised companies. The companies classified in this group develop and offer 
biometric solutions, based on the following criteria:  
 
1) Companies that own the most licenses, 
2) Have designed an apparatus that meets one or more standards for 
interoperability, and 
3) Have developed a software platform, hardware and/or application platforms. 
 
Under these criteria, 29 companies were identified out of 100. An interesting aspect 
is that most of these products are offered by companies classified as strategic 
alliance and business partners.  
 
It is important to note that specialised companies are small in size compared to 
ancillary or mixed businesses. Nevertheless, specialised companies are not local or 
national, but do business worldwide. 
 
b. Ancillary or mixed businesses. The companies classified in this group not only 
develop and offer biometric solutions and comply with the criteria set out in the 
previous classification, but also offer other types of technology, such as smart 
and display cards, RFID, GPS or AIDC. An interesting aspect is that most of 
these companies are either part of a corporation or subsidiaries companies. 
Under these criteria, 20 were identified out of 100 companies.  
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c. Strategic alliances and researchers. The companies classified in this group 
invest in research to develop biometric technology and develop software, 
hardware or application platforms, but they may or may not own the license for a 
specific biometric technology. Under these criteria, 20 were identified out or 100 
companies. 
  
It should be noted that IBM, Microsoft and HP can be classified as business 
partners. However, due to the amount of biometric research carried out and the 
number of patents they own, these companies were classified as strategic alliances 
and researchers. 
 
d. Business partners. The companies classified in this group develop technology 
cards, RFID, GPS or AIDC, but offer biometric solutions as system integrators, 
added value resellers or distributors. Under these criteria, 26 companies were 
identified out of 100. 
 
e. Consultancy Magazines. The last group classification is consultancy and 
magazines. There are companies that offer consultation services. On one hand, 
this might suggest that the market is growing so fast as to allow the emergence of 
specific services designed to help companies make the most of their 
developments. On the other hand, it might simply be a limited understanding of 
how biometrics technology could be commercialised and how the biometric 
industry is developing. Company comprises those that offer news or journals both 
electronically and on paper. Their aims are to support the exchange of 
information on biometric technologies and promote their products and 
experience. Under these criteria, 5 were identified out of 100 companies. 
 
 
 
74 
 
The following figure shows the classification of the companies presented. More 
detailed information on the specialised companies, is included in the Appendix D25. 
 
Figure 5. Biometric Industry Classification 
 
 
 
 
                                            
25
 For more information on each classification of the companies, websites, headquarters, type of 
technology, solutions and products, see Appendix D. List of Companies in the Biometric Industry 
(Complete Table) 
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The figure shows the average type of the companies classified under these criteria, 
based on the table above. 
 
Figure 6. Type of Companies 
 
   
3.3. Biometric System Applications: Diversification into Different Fields 
 
Biometric systems were developed and mainly implemented for law enforcement 
activities, security and forensic science, but these systems have now been applied in 
other fields as well26. This section discusses the deployment of biometric systems in 
different areas in order to enhance security and solve identity-related problems. 
 
The implementation of biometric systems is often called biometric technologies and 
these, in turn, are diverse and expanding. 
 
“The increased prominence of social control via engineering is related to 
concerns over issues such as crime, terrorism, drug abuse, border controls, 
AIDS, and economic competitiveness; and to technical developments in 
electronics, computerization, artificial intelligence, biochemistry, architecture, 
and materials science. The scale, mobility, and anonymity of mass society 
and ironically, increased expectations of and protections for privacy, have 
furthered reliance on external, impersonal, distance-mediated, secondary 
technical means, and database memories that locate, identify, register, 
record, classify, and validate or generate grounds for suspicion. The 
perception of catastrophic risks in an interdependent world relying on 
                                            
26
 For further details, see Chapter 2. Biometric Systems: What is Biometrics? 
76 
 
complex technologies and the entrepreneurial efforts of the security industry 
and governments such as the United States with its war on drugs, have 
helped spread the technologies internationally”27. 
 
As noted there is a lack of publicly available systematic studies on the biometric 
industry that explain and assess the expansion and diversification of the biometric 
technology. This research relies on the technical specialised literature that promotes 
the implementation of this technology in the variety of applications, ranging from 
healthcare to banking services, immigration to public transportation, and private and 
public security. Theoretically, this specialised literature has no consensus on 
classification of biometric systems. For some authors28 the classification should be 
based on purposes and limits of biometric systems29, identification and 
authentication, where others consider that classification should be based on 
biometric systems applications30. The specialised literature that supports the 
classification based on biometric systems applications has developed four categories 
of classification. The first system category is that of controlling access to data, such 
as logging onto a device or a network; the second is that of controlling access to 
tangible materials or areas, such as physical access control; the third category is 
validating a claimed identity against an existing credential, as happens in a border 
control environment; and the fourth is registering or identifying individuals whose 
identities need to be established biometrically, most often using centralised or 
distributed databases31.  
 
To illustrate this diversification and expansion of biometric industry in everyday life of 
the popular fields, where it is possible to find the deployment of biometric systems 
can be presented. These are: law enforcement, banking, computer networks, 
                                            
27
 Marx, G.T., “Technology and Social Control”, International Encyclopaedia of the Social & 
Behavioural Sciences, (Elsevier, 2001), pp. 15506-15512. 
28
 Zhang, David, Automated biometrics: technologies and systems, (Kluwer Academic Publishers, 
2000); Boulgouris, Nikolaos V., et. al., Biometrics, Theory, Methods, and Applications, (IEEE and 
WILEY, 2010); Woodward, John D. Jr. et. al., Biometrics, Identity Assurance in the Information Age, 
(McGraw Hill Osborne, 2003); Bolle, Ruud M., et. al., Guide to Biometrics, (Springer, 2003). 
29
 For further details, see section 2.8. Purposes and Limits of Biometric Systems 
30
 Wayman, James, et. al., Biometric Systems Technology Design and Performance Evaluation, 
(Springer, 2005); Day, David, “Biometric Applications, Overview”, Encyclopaedia of Biometrics, 
(Springer, 2009). http://springerlink.metapress.com/content/q22t17844168/fulltext.pdf  (18/12/2012) 
31
 Idem. 
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physical access, benefit systems or social programmes, immigration and border 
control, national identity cards, telephone systems, and employment, among others.  
 
a) Law enforcement. Over the last 60 years, biometrics has been in law enforcement 
but the role of biometrics has expanded into a wide range of applications in the 
private sector. The law enforcement field is perhaps the largest biometrics user 
group. Biometric systems have been used as surveillance systems. An individual’s 
fingerprints are used to determine or confirm the identity of people of interest32. 
 
Another use can be found in the forensic identification of suspects, convicts and 
victims in disasters by using DNA33. 
 
“In the UK, the recognised ‘world leader’ in forensic DNA databases, the 
criteria for inclusion has advanced from those people convicted of a crime, to 
those charged, and then in 2004, simply to those arrested. On an 
international level, talks about increasing cooperation in the areas of 
security, law enforcement, and policing, include the idea of exchanging DNA 
data”34. 
 
b) Banking. According to Zhang and Day, banks have been testing a range of 
biometrics technologies for many years. Emerging markets such as telephone 
and Internet banking must also be completely secure for clients and bankers 
alike. A variety of biometric technologies are now striving to prove themselves in 
this diverse market opportunities national and global banks35. 
 
                                            
32
 The FBI currently holds one of the largest biometric databases, comprised of tens of millions of 
civilian and criminal fingerprint records. Zhang, David D., Automated Biometrics Technologies and 
Systems, above n 28, p. 14; Day, David, “Biometric Applications, Overview”, above n 30. 
33
 Since 1988, the European DNA Profiling Group (EDNAP) established systematic procedures for 
data-sharing across the European community. The main purpose of the Standardization of DNA 
Profiling in the European Union (STADNAP) group is to promote cooperation across the European 
Union in order to utilise DNA profiling to detect “mobile serial offenders”. The European Network of 
Forensic Science Institutes (ENFSI) has similar ambitions to standardise forensic practices in support 
of policing across the entire European Union. Van Der Ploeg, Irma, “Genetics, biometrics, and the 
informatization of the body” (2007) 43(1) Ann Ist Super Sanità 44-50. 
34
 Idem. 
35
 Zhang, David D., Automated Biometrics Technologies and Systems, above n 28, p. 13; Day, David, 
“Biometric Applications, Overview”, above n 30. 
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c) Computer networks. Biometrics is commonly used to control access to 
centralised databases of healthcare information or financial records. Biometric 
technologies are proving to be more than capable of securing computer 
networks. This market area has phenomenal potential, especially if the biometrics 
industry can migrate to large-scale Internet applications36. 
 
d) Physical access. Offices, schools, hospitals and military facilities around the 
world are implementing biometric systems in place of old fashioned key codes to 
minimize security threats. The potential applications are infinite. Cars, buses and 
houses, for example, are under the constant threat of theft and biometrics could 
offer the perfect security solution37. 
 
e) Benefit systems. Benefit or social systems like welfare especially need biometrics 
to fight fraud and ensure payment to the correct person38. 
 
f) Immigration and border control. For immigration and border control authorities 
around the world it is essential to quickly and automatically process lawful 
travellers and identify law breakers39. The International Civil Aviation 
Organization (ICAO) adopted a global blueprint to integrate biometrics into 
machine readable travel documents40.  
 
g) National Identity. Biometrics are beginning to assist governments as they record 
population growth, identify citizens and prevent fraud from occurring at local and 
national elections. Finger, face and signature biometric recognition systems are 
particularly strong in this area and plans to implement this technology are already 
underway in Colombia, Jamaica, Lebanon, India, Mexico, the Philippines, South 
Africa, Spain, Germany and Poland, among other countries41. 
 
                                            
36
 Idem. 
37
 Idem. 
38
 Zhang, David D., Automated Biometrics Technologies and Systems, above n 28, p. 14. 
39
 Ibidem, p. 14 and 15; Day, David, “Biometric Applications, Overview”, above n 30.   
40
 For further details, see Chapter 4. Biometric Systems in the Context of Transborder Immigration 
Flow 
41
 Zhang, David D., Automated Biometrics Technologies and Systems, above n 28, p. 15. 
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h) Telephone systems. Global communication has expanded over the past decade. 
Telephone companies are concerned about fraud and biometric systems are 
considered. Speaker ID is well-ranked to the telephone environment and is 
making inroads in these markets42. 
 
i) Employment. Biometric systems technologies are used to carry out background 
checks as a condition of employment in many government agencies and the 
private sector. Generally, it can also be used to track employee attendance and 
work patterns43. 
 
These examples demonstrate the diversification and expansion of biometric 
technology, but also raise basic questions on how both the private and public sectors 
have adopted this technology; how the implementation of biometric technology and 
TBIF fit into the broader international framework and national regulation; and, how 
self-regulation instruments are needed in this industry. It is important to note, 
however, that the implementation of biometrics in the private sector is beyond the 
parameters of this thesis. Public process should be coordinated by governments to 
address those questions by balancing public interests, on security and national 
defence with individuals’ privacy and data protection rights. This type of public 
process should be accompanied with the creation of new patterns of interaction 
between social actors, biometric industry and government. These public processes 
cannot and are not intended to prevent the development of biometric technology but 
to legitimise the implementation of biometric technology and TBIF, in immigration 
control and crime prevention in particular. Governments cannot assume that they 
have a monopoly on the exercise of power and control44. In addition, legislators can 
use these processes to address technological legal issues of co-regulation and 
encouraging self-regulation45.       
                                            
42
 Idem. 
43
 Idem; Day, David, “Biometric Applications, Overview”, above n 30. 
44
 Jasanoff, Sheila, Designs on Nature Science and Democracy in Europe and the United States, 
above n 9 and Habermas, Jürgen, “Sfera pubblica (Una voce di enciclopedia)”, Cultura e Critica, 
(Einaudi, 1980). 
45
 For further details, see section 3.5. Development of Self-Regulation in the Biometric Industry 
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3.3.1. Products Developed by the Biometric Industry. This section identifies the most 
popular or common biometric products developed and offered by the biometric 
industry. From the 100 companies classified, 53 are directly involved in developing 
biometric technology as specialised businesses, ancillary or mixed businesses and 
strategic alliances and researchers. 
 
These companies develop intrusive (DNA, veins patterns, iris and retina patterns) 
and non-intrusive (fingerprints, palmprints, facial recognition, signature and voice) 
biometrics technology. For full information on biometrics typology, see Appendix B46. 
It has been possible to identify the development of other behavioural biometric 
technology. More information on these companies and their biometric products and 
solutions, are included in Appendix D47. 
 
The most common or popular biometric technology products offered are for 
fingerprints with 43 companies; facial recognition with 38; iris recognition with 23; 
and, palmprints with 19 companies. The following charts show the average type of 
intrusive and non-intrusive biometric technology products. 
 
Figure 7. Intrusive Biometric Products 
 
 
The iris and retina recognition systems are the most common intrusive biometric 
technology available on the market. Fingerprints and facial recognition are the most 
common non-intrusive biometric technology available on the market. 
 
                                            
46
 For further details, see Appendix B. Biometrics Typology 
47
 For further details, see Appendix D. List of Companies in the Biometric Industry (Complete Table) 
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Figure 8. Non-Intrusive Biometric Products 
 
 
It is important to note that most biometric software solutions have been compiled for 
the most common platforms like Windows XP, Windows Server Applications, 
Windows CE or Linux. Most of the companies specialising in smart cards or 
electronic ID (eID) comply with international security standards48 like American 
National Standard Institute (ANSI), National Institute of Standards and Technology 
(NIST) and International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), according to their 
websites. 
 
3.3.2. ePassport Technology: The New Generation. The biometric industry merges 
and evolves to meet market expectations with its technological innovations. National 
governments plan for these services with a view to the mobility of their resident 
populations.  
 
The challenge that the biometric industry faces regarding travel documents  
(passports and visas) is to select and design a secure travel document with the right 
mix of quality, security, durability and cost to manage risks49. Habermas and 
Jasanoff50 theories argue that it is possible to legitimise political policies on the 
implementation and deployment of this technology through the participation of 
citizens. Jasanoff argues that “the visibility and influence of each actor type varies 
from country to country, as do their institutional resources and opportunities to 
                                            
48
 Standards are requirements for interoperability between dissimilar systems and exchange 
encrypted information to avoid the disclosure of personal information, including biometric information. 
49
 Nick Nugent, “High Security Identification Documents Using QSDC to Determine the Right Mix” 
(Paper presented at the Tenth ID WORLD International Congress, in Milan, 4 November 201). 
50
 Jasanoff, Sheila, Designs on Nature Science and Democracy in Europe and the United States, 
above n 9 and Habermas, Jürgen, “Sfera pubblica (Una voce di enciclopedia)”, above n 44. 
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participate in political debate”51. This became relevant when governments select or 
choose the specialise company for travel documents, such as ePassports.  
 
The production and issue of passports and visas involve specialised businesses or 
ancillaries or business partners, such as booklet producers, inlay manufacturers, 
chip makers, standardization manufacturers, high security paper manufacturers and 
security printer makers, among others. There are three mandatory types of electronic 
passport (ePassport) generations according to the International Civil Aviation 
Organization (ICAO)52: biometric passports with Basic Access Control (BAC); 
biometric passports with Extended Access Control (EAC); and, biometric passports 
with Supplemental Access Control (SAC). These ePassports are known as Machine-
Readable Travel Document (MRTD) embedded with a secure element based on the 
specifications defined by the ICAO. All ePassports have a contactless 
microprocessor chip on which information about the passport holder is stored. This 
may include biographic data such as name, date and country of birth, medical 
information and a facial image of the passport holder53. A contactless enabled reader 
is used to read this data from the passport.  
 
Figure 9. Biometric Passport
54
 
 
                                            
51
 Jasanoff, Sheila, Designs on Nature Science and Democracy in Europe and the United States, 
above n 9, p. 29. 
52
 The ICAO is a specialised agency of the United Nations created in 1944 to promote the safe and 
orderly development of international civil aviation throughout the world. The ICAO Machine Readable 
Travel Documents, DOC 9303 is divided into three parts with their respective volumes. The 
specifications are located in Part 1, Volume 2, which states that MRTD must be used to conform to 
ICAO’s globally interoperable requirements and qualify as a true ‘ePassport. ICAO Machine Readable 
Travel Documents, DOC 9303, (Pt 1, 6
th
 ed, 2006) vol. 2   
http://www.icao.int/publications/pages/publication.aspx?docnum=9303 (19/12/2012) 
53
 A facial image of the passport holder is mandatory according to ICAO specifications. Idem.  
54
 Image from the Bundesdruckerei website http://www.bundesdruckerei.de/en/1205-epassport-id3 
(19/12/2012) this company has been identified in this chapter. 
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These are new generation ePassport with chip stores of both demographic and 
biometric data. Biometric data may include fingerprints, iris patterns or other 
biometric data (optional according to ICAO specifications) and facial biometric image 
(mandatory according to ICAO specifications): 
 
a) Biometric passports with Basic Access Control (BAC). The BAC is a mechanism 
that was introduced to ensure that the biographic data and facial imaged stored 
on the ePassport microprocessor chip is read securely. Australia55 and New 
Zealand56 issue this type of passports. 
 
b) Biometric passports with Extended Access Control (EAC). These are the second 
generation biometric passports. The EAC is a mechanism that restricts access to 
highly sensitive biometric data, including both optional and mandatory biometric 
characteristics. This ePassport is based on asymmetric cryptographic protocols 
and uses stronger encryption. 
 
c) Biometric passports with Supplemental Access Control (SAC). These are the 
third generation biometric passports. The SAC is a Password Authentication 
Connection Establishment (PACE) that restricts access to highly sensitive 
biometric data more, including optional and mandatory biometric characteristics. 
It implements asymmetric cryptographic and bases data encryption on a key 
shared between the reading device and the chip. Spain will issue this type of 
passport57. 
 
 
 
                                            
55
 Australia began issuing October 2005  https://www.passports.gov.au/web/epassport.aspx 
(19/12/2012) 
56
 New Zealand began issuing September 2005 http://www.passports.govt.nz/ (19/12/2012) 
57
 Spain began issuing biometric passport with Basic Access Control (BAC) since July 2003. 
However, in December 2014 Spain will began issuing biometric passport with Supplemental Access 
Control (SAC) http://www.policia.es/documentacion/docu_esp/pasaporte/concepto_pas.html 
(19/12/2012) http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/e-library/documents/policies/borders-and-
visas/document-security/docs/comm_decision_c_2013_6181_en_.pdf (27/10/2013) 
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It was not possible to identify the type of access control of Mexican biometric 
passports. The publicly available information specified that Mexico began issuing 
biometric passport at the end of 201258 with an electronic bar code and a hologram 
picture of the holder in the centre right. The front cover of a Mexican biometric 
passport does not have the symbol of the contactless microprocessor chip on the 
front page of the passport. The company which won the nationwide passport project 
in Mexico was Suprema Inc59.  
 
A significant finding of this websites research was that, of the 100 companies 
identified on the mapping biometric industry60, only 50 companies described 
themselves on their websites as suppliers of ePassport technology. But, comparing 
these 50 companies and their products against ICAO’s specifications the result was 
that not all companies fully meet the terms established by ICAO61. Only 19 
companies of 50 that announced themselves as suppliers of ePassport technology 
comply with ICAO´s requirements. This is critical considering that governments as 
clients of these companies rely on their expertise and knowledge of biometric 
technology in general and ePassport technology in particular. There have been 
biometric passports of different countries that fail the test performance and the test of 
operational impacts of processing ePassports on the primary inspection process62. 
This raises three main questions about the ethical commitment; current practices 
and the quality of self-regulation of biometric industry. 
 
The following figure shows the companies that are authorized to supply the 
mandatory ICAO components, equipment, information technology and services for 
issuing ePassports. 
 
                                            
58
 Mexico began issuing November 2012 
http://www.sre.gob.mx/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=242&Itemid=264 
(21/07/2013) 
59
 This company has been identified in this chapter 
http://www.supremainc.com/eng/news/press.php?mark=1&bbs_no=11372&bbs_code=10001&symod
e=view (21/07/2013) 
60
 For further details, see section 3.2. Mapping the Biometric Industry: Overview 
61
 ICAO Machine Readable Travel Documents, DOC 9303, above n 52. 
62
 Wing, Bradford, “Future of ID, Developments in Standards & Critical Projects”, above n 17. Wing is 
a Biometrics Standards Coordinator, Information Access Division - National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST), USA. 
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Figure 10. ePassport Industry 
 
 
According to ICAO’s report, over 104 countries distribute ePassports63. It is important 
to highlight that the ICAO published a supplement to Doc 9303 in October of 201364. 
This supplement does not replace DOC 9303, but updates, clarifies and incorporates 
new technologies and solutions into ePassports. 
 
Besides the issue of ePassports, national governments are deploying a border 
management systems to address illegal immigration, cross-border criminals and 
terrorist threats. Both the implementation of border management systems and the 
deployment biometric databases are measures that limit the rights of privacy and 
data protection65. These issues will be discussed in greater detail in a later chapter66. 
 
                                            
63
 ICAO, “The Implementation of ePassports”, MRTD Report No. 3 (2012) 
http://www.icao.int/publications/journalsreports/2012/MRTD_Report_Vol7_No3.pdf (19/12/2012) 
64
 ICAO Machine Readable Travel Documents, DOC 9303, above n 52. 
65
 For further details, see section 1.4 Hypothesis 
66
 For further details, see Chapter 4. Biometric Systems in the Context of Transborder Immigration 
Flow and Chapter 5. Biometrics in Criminal Databases: Current Transborder Information Flow  
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3.4. Industry Commitment to Ethical Practices 
 
The biometric industry makes claims to a commitment to ethical, legal and self-
regulation practices. The biometric industry develops technology that may undermine 
privacy and civil liberties, hence the importance of identifying whether this industry is 
in actual practice committed to ethical practices. Through the website search, it was 
possible to identify this industry commitment in three categories, namely extracts of 
ethical codes; extracts of privacy and data protection codes or guidelines; and, 
references to white papers67.   
 
It is important to note that 74 were identified out of 100 companies provide a section 
on their websites related to terms and conditions, legal notices on privacy and data 
protection policies regarding its customers’ privacy and personal data. These 74 
include a range of companies from specialised to ancillary business, a small number 
of strategic alliances, a small number of business partners, and, some consultancy 
companies. This may be interpreted as a misunderstanding of concepts related to 
terms and conditions with ethical codes; with privacy and data protection policies and 
confidentiality for clients. A small number of companies, most of them classified as 
strategic alliances and business partners68, had sections on ethical practices and 
corporate responsibilities, (Edaps Consortium, Gemalto, HP, IBM and Microsoft), but 
these sections are broad, nonspecific and vague. Corporate responsibilities 
statements are limbed to self-regulation but in the absence of a professional 
associations or an impartial body to supervise these companies globally, these 
statements are not actionable. However, it is noted that these companies embrace 
ideas of social good and responsibility for their actions69.  
 
 
                                            
67
 White papers are guides that help to understand an issue, solve a problem or make a decision. 
68
 For further details, see section 3.2. Mapping the Biometric Industry: Overview 
69
 For further details, see section 3.5. Development of Self-Regulation in the Biometric Industry 
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Only three companies give specific details on their commitment to practices in 
relation to privacy and civil liberties: IdTect and Digital Persona, classified as 
specialised business, and HID Global, classified as ancillary70. On its website, IdTect 
states that: “Our idEye software can be customized to suit individual client’s 
requirements, and it also complies with all privacy legislation principles”71. Digital 
Persona mentions 10 white papers on access control and data encryption72; 
perhaps, the most important of which is about complying with data breach 
notification laws. This white paper explains the potential economic effects of security 
breaches of personal identifiable information by theft or unauthorised access and 
proposes technological security solutions73. The company HID Global has 40 white 
papers covering most of their products74, with the most relevant about access control 
best practices75. This white paper offers a choice on the use of a secure protocol to 
protect stored personal information and protect cross-border communications. 
However, these examples of commitment to privacy practices are not industry 
standards and do not meet any rigorous analysis from a human rights perspective.  
 
In summary, the biometric industry is rapidly evolving and is gaining a presence in 
different fields. Some preliminary conclusions can be drawn in terms of ethical 
commitments. It is possible that the biometric industry is confused on the use of the 
terms privacy and confidentiality. There is a lack of a common and widespread 
interest to engage with ethical commitments or corporate responsibilities. In addition, 
the research identified companies that declare themselves as suppliers of 
ePassports technology but fail to meet ICAO's specifications; this situation raises 
concerns about the quality of self-regulation. Society and government trust in these 
private enterprises and its technology. Further legal research is needed to explore 
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 For further details, see section 3.2. Mapping the Biometric Industry: Overview 
71
 This company has been identified in this chapter.  http://www.idtect.com.au/ (19/12/2012) 
72
 This company has been identified in this chapter http://www.digitalpersona.com/resources/case-
studies_white-papers/ (19/12/2012) 
73
 
http://www.digitalpersona.com/uploadedFiles/Collateral/White_papers/WP_Compliance_DataBreach_
20100831.pdf (19/12/2012) 
74
 This company has been identified in this chapter http://www.hidglobal.com/document-
library?field_category_tid_i18n=All&field_brand_tid_selective=All&field_document_type_tid_selective
=711 (19/12/2012) 
75
 http://rs-
test.hidglobal.com/sites/hidglobal.com/files/resource_files/hid_global_best_practices_in_access_contr
ol_white_paper_04-20-2012.pdf (19/12/2012) 
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self-regulation and market dominance, as these issues are beyond the parameter of 
this thesis76.  
 
3.5. Development of Self-Regulation Standards in the Biometric Industry. 
 
Regulations consist of a set of legal rules that establish rights and legal duties of 
persons in the scope and limits of their activities, generally enacted by legislatures. 
By contrast, self-regulation is the control of actions independently of legislative and 
governmental supervision. This independent supervision should be often undertaken 
by professional associations, in this case the biometric industry itself. Finally, a 
combined system, where both “regulation” and “self-regulation” coexist (co-
regulation77) involves certain advantages for the biometric industry. Regulation 
encourages the participation of government bodies and feedback between different 
sectors of society. The most important issue in a self-regulatory model is the 
existence of mechanisms that limits government intervention. The legitimacy of the 
self-regulation model for the biometric industry implies a commitment to carry out 
activities that involve the values and ethical recognition from society. However, self-
regulation can fail as it does not involve any penalty or sanction. The effectiveness of 
self-regulation depends on public opinion and public confidence78. 
 
The aim of the regulation, on the other hand, is to create the minimum legal 
principles necessary in a democratic constitutional State79. Regulation is directed at 
the industry and not at the technology itself. Self-regulation for the biometric industry 
itself aims to achieve the highest possible quality of practices through the continuous 
feedback of activists and academic experts, especially in the field of privacy and data 
protection.  A generic definition of the idea of self-regulation has been offered by the 
United States Department of Commerce: 
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 For further details, see section 1.5. The Aim of the Research 
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 Black, Julia, “Decentring Regulation: Understanding the Role of Regulation and Self-Regulation in a 
“Post-Regulatory” World”, above n 12. 
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 Braithwaite, John, “Responsive Regulation in Australia” in Grabosky, Peter y Braithwaite John 
(eds.), Regulation and Australia’s Future,  (Australian Institute of Criminology, 1993), p. 81-88; Doyle, 
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“Most basically, we need to define what we mean, as the term “self-
regulation” itself has a range of definitions. At one end of the spectrum, the 
term is used quite narrowly, to refer only to those instances where the 
government has formally delegated the power to regulate, as in the 
delegation of securities industry oversight to the stock exchanges. At the 
other end of the spectrum, the term is used when the private sector 
perceives the need to regulate itself for whatever reason— to respond to 
consumer demand, to carry out its ethical beliefs, to enhance industry 
reputation, or to level the market playing field— and does so”80. 
 
The combined or mixed system, known as co-regulation is the better solution for an 
industry that is expanding and evolving rapidly. Co-regulation is a mechanism of 
sharing responsibility between governments, society and the biometric industry. Self-
regulation has the strategic problem of the voluntary will of biometric companies to 
meet best practices. One failure by a biometric company can expose and affect the 
reputation of the whole biometric industry81. In a co-regulation system the strategy is 
to determine a structured cost benefit approach to policy development to identify 
whether the proposed regulation meets the dual goals of “effectiveness” and 
“efficiency”82 creating mutual benefits for biometric industry, government and society. 
Thus, the resolution of problems of ethical commitments, corporative responsibilities 
and breaches of rights should be governed by both the regulatory system and the 
self-regulation system83. These are not exclusive or antithetical systems, on the 
contrary, they complement each other.  
 
Within a co-regulation system or self-regulation system, the biometric industry should 
create open global forums to discuss ethical practices; corporate responsibilities; 
and, compliance with privacy and data protection laws. There is, arguably an 
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absence of these types of forums, with little public discussion about the introduction 
of biometric technology and a lack of publicly available information on the 
deployment of biometric systems and TBIF in the context of immigration information 
flow and information flow in criminal databases84. For Spain, as a European country, 
the Directive 95/46/EC sets an article where the Member Countries shall encourage 
the draw up of a code of conduct85. Nevertheless, only Australia from the four 
countries study has a professional body that has made efforts to promote an 
effective and appropriate use of biometric technology.  
 
3.5.1. Biometric Industry Self-Regulation: Professional Associations in Australia. The 
four countries study revealed one organisation that has made modest and impartial 
efforts in the biometric industry, the organisation Biometric Institute.  
 
The Biometric Institute, an Australian based non-profit organisation, proposed its 
Biometric Institute Privacy Code, in 2006, with recommendations based on National 
Privacy Principles and the Privacy Act 198886. Companies like Unisys, Identix and 
Argus Solutions are members of the Biometric Institute. However, this Biometric 
Institute Privacy Code was revoked by the Australian Privacy Commissioner on 2012 
because of “the Code only binds the members of the Institute that subscribe to the 
Code. There have been low members of subscribers to the Code. This was cited by 
the Biometrics Institute as a reason for seeking the revocation of the Code”87. In 
addition, in the Biometric Institute website sections of ‘annual reports’ and ‘resource 
library’ are only available to members, who apply, pay and become a member. 
Significantly research articles; government reports; white papers; and, vendor 
reports are not publicly available. This Biometric Institute is not a significant body in 
                                            
84
 Jasanoff, Sheila, Designs on Nature Science and Democracy in Europe and the United States, 
above n 9; and Habermas, Jürgen, “Sfera pubblica (Una voce di enciclopedia)”, above n 44. 
85
 Article 27 EU Directive 95/46/EC on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of 
personal data and on the free movement of such data, [1995] OJ L 281/31. 
86
 Most of its members are Australian users and industry. Although its members primarily are form 
Australian and New Zealand its goal is to include members from the entire Asia Pacific region. The 
Biometrics Institute industry members include Unisys, Identix and Argus Solutions. For further 
Biometric Institute information see http://www.biometricsinstitute.org/ (19/12/2012)  
87
 Under the Privacy Act 1988, the Australian Privacy Commissioner can approve codes of practice 
about personal information. Explanatory Statement, The Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) 1-5, 4 
http://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/F2012L00869/Explanatory%20Statement/Text (19/12/2012) 
91 
 
spreading public debate, transparency and accountability in the deployment of 
biometric technology and TBIF in Australia.   
 
3.6. Current Practices of the Biometric Industry in Different Countries 
 
This section examines four countries examples of the current applications of 
biometric technology in different fields and biometric industry practices. Mapping the 
biometric industry illustrates not only the key players, products and partnerships, but 
also opens a global window on the current practices and ethical commitments of this 
industry. These country examples, two Common Law countries and two Civil Law 
countries, reveal the approach legal challenges in biometrics technology in a 
proportional way.  In addition, these examples present the impact on privacy and 
data protection rights in the four countries: Australia, Mexico, New Zealand and 
Spain88. 
 
3.6.1. Australia: Database IdEye Implemented in Pubs and Clubs. The company 
Idtect89 is an Australia specialised company that developed ID scanning software 
with two software identification tools: “Alcohol Management Systems” and “idEye for 
clubs and pubs”. This research will focus its attention on the idEye for clubs and 
pubs. 
 
In Australia, the private sector is covered by the Privacy Act 1988 and must comply 
with the Australian Privacy Principles (APPs) in handling personal information. Under 
the Privacy Act 1988 the Federal Privacy Commissioner does not have a complete 
jurisdiction to audit private sector systems90. But, in 2010 guidelines for private 
sector hospitality organisations were drawn up by the Federal Privacy 
Commissioner91 for pubs and clubs that demand an ID. Some pubs and clubs also 
demand biometric photos and fingerprints of every individual who enters. Idtect 
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scanners scans identities onto a database, called “the ban list” which is shared on 
local, state or national levels. The system stores the data for a month and then 
deletes it, but any troublemaker’s personal information can be kept indefinitely. In 
this case, the argument used to justify the implementation of this technology is that 
“public safety should over rule issues about privacy”. In this scenario, the information 
collected does not reveal sensitive personal information. However, the collection of 
photographs, fingerprints and driver licences raises concerns about unauthorised 
access, misuse, identity fraud and disclosure of information.  
 
First, under 2010 guidelines for private sector hospitality organisations, individuals 
must be notified what will happen to the information collected at pubs and clubs: the 
purpose of the collection, with whom they will exchange this information, who will 
have access to it and when the information will be destroyed.  
 
Second, based on the characteristics of the venues and the software identification 
idEye the information may be stored on their servers as a backup. When the venue 
shares or collects from third parties, the information is stored on the database 
located in each venue’s network servers or even on a private cloud. Under the 
Privacy Act 1988 and the National Privacy Principles, venues must have robust 
security measures that protect information, but they also must ensure that personal 
information is accurate and up-to-date. 
 
It is important to highlight that biometric information must be collected for valid 
reasons, in this case, valid business reasons. The most interesting legal concern is 
that regarding the ban list. The ban list means that individuals banned at one location 
may be refused entry at other venues. The individual on that biometric database is 
flagged and venues may choose to accept or ban him or her. Venues impose bans 
for a discretional period of time: a day, a month, a year or indefinitely. This ban list 
database infringes, on one hand, civil liberties since the disclosure of the ban list 
could cause discrimination. On the other hand, the existence of a ban list where 
cancelation of personal information is discretional; this clearly undermines privacy 
and data protection rights. This discretional period of time consists in transgression 
to “the right to be forgotten or the right to withdraw their consent to data processing” 
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and it is consistent with Castellano that explains the “right to be forgotten” as an 
element of the right of data protection (self-determination) when the owner of the 
data has withdrawn his/her consent for processing or when he/she objects to the 
processing of his/her personal data92. 
 
It can be argued that the discretionary power to ban people could be the result of a 
proactive society in activities in which government has a security and protection role 
in fighting violence in pubs and clubs. However, the State has responsibilities in the 
use of such technologies. 
 
“Although individual interests must on occasion be subordinated to those of 
a group, democracy does not simply mean that the views of a majority must 
always prevail: a balance must be achieved which ensures the fair and 
proper treatment of minorities and avoids any abuse of a dominant 
position”93. 
 
The State should not be passive towards transgressions against civil liberties and 
rights. So Valades has stated that, “if the violation of one of those rights and 
freedoms is the result of a breach of that duty in terms of national legislation, the 
State is ultimately responsible for any violation”94. 
 
3.6.2. Mexico: Fingerprint Implemented at Banco Azteca. The company Digital 
Persona95 is a U.S. specialised business that develops biometric fingerprint products 
for two applications: customer authentication for secure banking and credit 
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transactions, and employee authentication for branch executives, tellers and vault 
access.  
 
In 2002, Banco Azteca96 started operations targeting the low income sector, which 
represents the 70% of population not served by traditional banks. In addition, Banco 
Azteca became the first bank to implement biometric fingerprints as a method to 
protect customers’ savings in a product called “Guardadito” (saving accounts). At 
that time, Mexico neither had a data protection law nor a Data Protection 
Commissioner. 
 
In Mexico, recognizing data protection as a fundamental right has been a gradual 
process. This process started in 200797 and in 2010 the Federal Data Protection for 
Private Sector Law was approved. This law came into force in January 2012. Under 
the Federal Data Protection for Private Sector Law, all private sector entities, 
including banks, must notify individuals about their information collected on their 
websites: the purpose of said data collection, with whom the information will be 
exchanged, who will have access to said information and when this information will 
be destroyed98. 
 
In 2007 any movement of money through bank portals had to be confirmed by a 
dynamic passwords device; thus Banco Azteca expanded the use of biometric 
fingerprints to customers’ financial and banking services, to secure employee access 
to bank vaults and to time attendance control99. There were two companies involved 
                                            
96
 Banco Azteca is a subsidiary of Group Elektra, a Mexican financial and retail corporation owned by 
Grupo Salinas. Currently, Banco Azteca has holdings in Panama, Honduras, Guatemala, El Salvador, 
Peru and Brazil. 
http://www.bancoazteca.com.mx/PortalBancoAzteca/publica/conocenos/historia/quienes.jsp 
(19/12/2012) (information in Spanish) 
97
 Since 2000, several bills have been presented without coming to any fruition. In 2007, The Federal 
Congress approved an amendment to Article 6 of the Constitution which recognizes and gives content 
to the right to data protection. The amendment reflected the rights that holders have over this type of 
data, such as those of access, rectification, cancellation and objection (known by its acronym in 
Spanish as ARCO rights). This is highly significant considering that personal data are in the hands of 
governments and the private sector (companies, organisations and professionals). 
98
 http://www.bancoazteca.com/PortalBancoAzteca/publica/conocenos/historia/AvisoPrivacidad.htm 
(19/12/2012) 
99
 Customers can acquire a fingerprint reader from the bank and plug it into their computers for $55 
AUD plus tax ($742.40 Mexican pesos) and the software can be downloaded from Banco Azteca’s 
website. 
95 
 
in the biometric applications: Biometria Aplicada100, a reseller, and Digital Persona. 
Furthermore, Banco Azteca plans to incorporate biometric fingerprint readers into its 
ATM machines for customers to check their balances, withdraw cash or purchase 
pre-paid mobile phone minutes. Banco Azteca requests an official identification card 
with the holder’s current address, email address, personal information and one 
biometric fingerprint. The information collected does not reveal sensitive personal 
information. However, many customers are farmers and construction workers whose 
fingers are damaged and worn. 
 
Based on bank characteristics, the information is stored on different databases 
where distributed database management is required. The information is stored on 
multiple network servers. This gives banks the ability to link the different databases 
of each location and gain access to bank branches. 
 
It is important to highlight that it has only been two years since the data protection 
law has come into force. Thus, there are no complaints against Banco Azteca or 
appeals yet to be solved by the Federal Privacy Commissioner101 whereas at the 
National Commission for the Protection and Defence of Users of Financial Services, 
it is ranked number one in the 2011 Index of Fines102. It will be a matter of time to 
find out whether Banco Azteca is complying with the data protection regime. The 
Federal Privacy Commissioner has that authority to audit their databases and, in 
case of irregularities, to impose a corresponding sanction. 
 
3.6.3. New Zealand: Biometric Voice Recognition. The company Salmat103 is a 
specialised Australian company that provides customer communication solutions. It 
has developed three Voice ID versions: one similar to the interactive voice response 
system, an online identification system and a mobile identification system, all of 
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which use biometrics104. The voice identification biometric systems are inexpensive 
and good for remote database access, but it can be affected by physical conditions 
or emotional states.  
 
In 2008, New Zealand’s Inland Revenue (IR)105 began to modernise its phone 
interface. In November 2011, IR implemented Salmat Voice ID106 as its interactive 
voice response system. This voice ID allows taxpayers to access their accounts by 
telephone instead of entering a PIN number. In the first four weeks, 10,000 
customers enrolled; in a year, this number increased to 400,000 customers107 by 
2012 using this system to confirm their identity. 
 
The Bank of New Zealand, National Australia Bank, Centrelink, St. George Bank and 
the Ministry of Social Development (MSD)108 are implementing Voice ID in their 
contact centres, as well as other biometric systems for banking transactions. 
However, information security policies and compliance statutes have undergone 
considerable changes both locally and internationally over the last few years109.  
 
Given the proliferation of this type of identity verification systems and the fight 
against fraud and identity theft, the New Zealand parliament has passed the Identity 
Information Confirmation Act 2012110 and Electronic Identity Verification Act 2012111. 
Under these Acts, the New Zealand Privacy Commissioner may call for periodic 
reports on confirmation service operations. While the Identity Information 
Confirmation Act 2012 will help with face-to-face transactions, the current Electronic 
Identity Verification Act 2012 and the identity verification service play a 
complementary role in the online environment112. This legal framework also covers 
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the RealMe program113, which includes a combination of authentication techniques 
and support for biometric voice recognition system.  
 
The New Zealand Privacy Commissioner has made two recommendations to 
address the adequate level of privacy protection. The first related to a proposal to 
amend an electronic identity credential and the second dealt with protection from 
liability114. 
 
3.6.4. Spain: Compulsory National ID Card. Spanish compulsory national ID cards –
called DNIs- are provided by the Royal Spanish Mint (known by its acronym FNMT-
RCM), which use embedded microprocessors provided by ST Microelectronics115. 
 
The DNI has been used for over 50 years and Spaniards over the age of 14 must 
present it as proof of identity for a very wide range of transactions116. It is governed 
by two laws: Royal Decree 1553/2005 of 23 December 2005, which regulates the 
issue of national identity and electronic signature certificates117, and Law 59/2003 of 
19 December 2003, which deals with electronic signatures118.  
 
The Spanish Data Protection Agency119 has specific regulations for personal 
information management, namely the Organic Law on the Protection of Personal 
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Data120 on the one hand and the Organic Law on Exact Nature of Security Measures 
to Protect Personal Information121 on the other.  
 
The information shown on the front of this card consists of the individual’s full name, 
place of birth, gender, nationality, DNI number in relation to his or her tax number, 
photograph and signature. The information shown on the back consists of place of 
birth, local state or province, parents’ names, address and province address. A 
microchip contains the individual’s data, electronic photograph, signature and 
biometric fingerprint. 
 
In 2008, the Spanish Minister of the Interior decided to expand the information 
contained in the microchip with biometric photographs and fingerprints. This proposal 
also included RH blood group information. However, the Spanish Data Protection 
Agency objected to the project, arguing that “a document that incorporates additional 
data would be different from electronic DNI, which would require new legislation for 
its implementation and development"122. The DNI is only used as proof of identity 
when Spaniards use electronic signatures for secure personal information 
transmitted through electronic identification systems (eID). 
 
3.7. Conclusions 
 
These four countries examples provide an outline of the current practices within the 
biometric industry. These examples also show, on the one hand the interaction 
between society and government, and on the other, the interaction between society 
and technology. There has been little debate which “underlines the deeply contested 
character of the transition to the tightly interdependent, knowledge-dominated, high-
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tech economies of the twenty-first century”123. The sketch of the types of political and 
public debates surrounding the deployment of biometric systems in the four countries 
support that view.   
 
This chapter has explored the biometric industry, as well as its key players, 
practices, commitments and regulation. This thesis does not propose to regulate the 
biometric technology itself, but it does acknowledge the importance of regulating the 
people who will apply the technology. This chapter provides an overview of the 
products that have been developed by this technology. Products, such as 
ePassports, have not only enhanced border controls, but also play a key role in the 
world economy by ensuring trade with legitimate travellers. At the same time, 
concerns about terrorism, cross-border crimes and illegal immigrants are 
incentivizing national governments to adopt biometric ePassports, but this 
development has been with relatively little public knowledge of the biometric industry 
without a public debate. 
 
The biometric industry debate should not be viewed solely in terms of a map the key 
players, such as IBM, HP, Microsoft, Datacard Group, Safran Morpho, Steria, 
Gemalto and Thales internationally. The biometric industry should be seen in terms 
of how this industry interacts with governments124. From a government’s perspective, 
this interaction may not only leads to a potential loss of national control resulting 
from TBIF on international networks and platforms, but it also has an impact on 
national policies without public scrutiny, particularly in the context of immigration 
control125 and crime prevention126.  
 
This chapter has also discussed some aspects of the biometric industry at the 
national level, because of different practices in different countries, such as Australia, 
Mexico, New Zealand and Spain. This thesis focuses on the individual privacy 
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implications rather than other legal implications related to this expanding biometric 
technology. In competition law, for example, it is important for the ICT legal and 
regulatory framework to generate conditions to promote public interest, confidence 
and participation in the sector. In media law, it is important to set media content 
regulation, spectrum regulation or net neutrality. The same happens in commerce 
law in terms of intellectual property and other legal fields127. 
 
Finally, this chapter argues for an improvement both in national level regulation and 
self-regulation within the biometric industry.  These two levels of national regulation 
and industry self-regulation need to be consistent nationally and internationally but 
also need to be transparent and accountable.  
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CHAPTER 4.  
 
BIOMETRIC SYSTEMS IN THE CONTEXT OF TRANSBORDER IMMIGRATION FLOW  
 
 
4.1. Biometrics in Immigration: Information Flow 
 
The central focus of this thesis is Transborder Biometric Information Flows (TBIF). 
This chapter considers the specific contexts of transborder biometric immigration 
information flow. A comparative study of four countries, two from the Civil Law 
tradition and two from the Common Law tradition1, have been selected, as an 
analytic tool to identify some of the more important problems, limitations and 
challenges related to TBIF in the context of immigration information flow.  
 
This chapter provides an insight of the interaction between the current deployment of 
biometric systems as mechanism to enhance border control and the actual way in 
which four countries collect, store, process and exchange immigration information 
flow.  The chapter discusses the lack of public debate in the deployment of biometric 
systems and TBIF in the context of immigration information flow. The research 
reveals the actual mode of data collected, retrieved, analysed, stored and 
exchanged in the four countries examined, while highlights the technical international 
and national immigration policies. Finally, this chapter calls for a transparent, 
accountable and supervised TBIF framework in the context of immigration control. 
 
The TBIF comparative study of immigration information flow in the four countries 
demonstrates that, in the absence of both specific international treaties on biometrics 
deployment and a self-regulating biometric industry, two international organisations 
have emerged and are setting significant and influential standards on the 
deployment of biometric systems in immigration. The International Civil Aviation 
Organisation (ICAO) and the International Organization of Migration (IOM) have 
made recommendations and established mandatory specifications in this area. In 
addition, two regional organisations are moving towards establishing not only 
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recommendations and specifications, but also biometric system standards on border 
control strategies. These are the European Union (EU) and the Asia Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC). 
 
The work and publications of these organisations focus on technical aspects. 
Arguably, these technical aspects have not included public discussion of the social 
and theoretical requirements and dimensions of public debate, transparency and 
scrutiny2. Jasanoff has addressed this view in stating that “the pinpoint here are 
consequences for the day-to-day conduct of society, occur within elites, in the courts, 
the expert bodies that advice parliaments and presidents, and the professional 
classes that control much of the meaning making in advanced industrial societies. 
These are the groups, then, that can be observed enacting and performing some of 
the continuities of culture, with significant implications for convergence and 
divergence across national polities”3. 
 
The TBIF comparative study of the four countries, in immigration information flow, 
reveals two types of asymmetries. The first asymmetry relates to differences 
between the information collected, stored, processed, retrieved, updated, analysed 
and exchanged by the four countries. The second asymmetry relates to specific 
immigration differences in border control strategies and travel documents. For 
example, in the case of Mexico, biometric passports have been more recently issued 
for citizens, than in the other three countries. These asymmetries pose short and 
long-term challenges for international cooperation, an aspect that will be formally 
discussed further in this thesis4. 
 
The deployment of biometric systems in the context of immigration has been mainly 
to increases efficiency along national borders in the processing of immigrants 
generally. These measures have been adopted to enhance border security with new 
methods to collect and record traveller identities through with border control 
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checkpoints. These measures also aim to stop illegal immigration, help fight cross-
border crimes and prevent terrorism. 
 
These are commendable public policy and protection goals but not such as to avoid 
an informed public debate on the deployment of this technology in the immigration 
context5. This chapter discusses the lack of public debates in the deployment of 
biometric systems and TBIF in the context of immigration information flow. The 
implementation of these new biometric identification systems raises legal, political 
and ethical concerns. The legal concerns should be tested by the principle of 
proportionality, discussed in a later chapter6. 
 
This chapter examines the interaction between the current deployment of biometric 
systems as mechanisms to enhance the goal of border control and the actual ways 
in which the four countries collect, store retrieve, analyse and exchange immigration 
information flow. The chapter examines this interaction in the context of developing 
international and national immigration policies. This chapter also examines TBIF7 
whether privacy and data protection legal frameworks are operating effectively. 
Finally, this chapter assesses the requirement for transparent, accountable and 
supervised national and international TBIF frameworks in the context of immigration 
control.  
 
4.2. Transborder Biometric Information Flows: The Need for Public Debate  
 
The deployment of biometric systems in immigration has intensified and diversified8, 
however, there is a very little public discussion about this development outside of the 
industry and the small group of public officials working in this area. “Popular media 
and official discourse are the two main sources how people create and use 
                                            
5
 Jasanoff, Sheila, Designs on Nature, Science and Democracy in Europe and the United States, 
above n 2; Habermas, Jürgen, “Sfera pubblica (Una voce di enciclopedia)”, above n 2. 
6
 For further details, see section 7.4. The Principle of Proportionality: Legitimate Restrictions to 
Privacy and Data Protection 
7
 For further details see section 1.5. The Aim of Research 
8
 For further details, see section 3.3. Biometric Systems Applications: Diversification into Different 
Fields 
104 
 
“knowledge” for everyday life”9 but there is equally little knowledge within societies 
about these systems and their impact on privacy and civil liberties10. 
 
The dynamics of the interaction between popular media and official discourse follows 
an important aspect of political behaviour in the implementation of biometric 
systems. This thesis shares Vega’s argument about the free shaping of public 
opinion and the democratic State being closely related concepts11. Even more so in 
cases, in which biometric travel documents present legal, political and ethical 
concerns, mainly because these biometric documents can breach privacy and data 
protection rights12.  
 
The actual national immigration policy context in the each of the four countries study 
demonstrates that the decision-making processes are dominated not only by 
domestic concerns, but also by international security interests in preventing illegal 
immigration, cross-border crimes and the prevention of terrorism.  
 
There has been a lack of multidisciplinary research on biometric surveillance 
systems and their technical aspects. There has also been an absence of public 
discussion focusing on the risks of centralised biometric databases for immigration 
purposes, the link between immigration information flow and information flow in 
criminal databases and the TBIF between countries and international organisations 
                                            
9
 Jasanoff, Sheila, Designs on Nature, Science and Democracy in Europe and the United States, 
above n 2; Habermas, Jürgen, “Sfera pubblica (Una voce di enciclopedia)”, above n 2. 
10
 Interview with Ernesto Villanueva Villanueva and Issa Luna Pla, Professors, Instituto de 
Investigaciones Jurídicas de la Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México [Legal Research Centre of 
the National Autonomous University of Mexico] (Mexico City, 23 November 2011); Interview with 
Charlotte Epstein, Professor, University of Sydney (Sydney, 28 October 2011); Interview with Katina 
Michael, Associate Professor, University of Wollongong (Sydney, 21 February 2012) This component 
of the research project received approval from the University of Tasmania Human Research Ethics 
Committee. Approval Ethics Ref: H0012013 of 29/08/2011. 
11
 Public opinion has been Pedro de Vega’s permanent area of study, which has been captured in 
several publications. Vega García, Pedro de, “El principio de publicidad parlamentaria y su 
proyección constitucional” (1985) 43 Revista de Estudios Políticos 45-66; Vega García, Pedro de 
“Significado constitucional de la representación política” (1985) 44 Revista de Estudios Políticos 53-
74.  
12
 For further details on the legal impact of biometrics, see section 2.4. Biometric Systems: Privacy 
Review 
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generates concerns. These concerns should be publicly debate in the interest of 
transparency and scrutiny13.  
 
Following the lines of argument of Jasanoff, people should be allowed to “own” their 
biometric characteristics once border protection personnel have extracted them for 
identification and verification identity purposes14. Sartori considers that “in a direct 
democracy a simple citizen must –should- know the issues over which he decides, 
as well as be competent, in a certain way, on the topics assigned to his 
competence”15. Citizens should be aware that they may exercise rights of access, 
rectification16, challenges to the processing17 of their biometric personal data under 
privacy and data protection laws. More generally, individuals need to exercise their 
democratic rights to request transparency and accountability in the management of 
biometric databases for immigration purposes and the way TBIF is carried out by 
countries and international organisations. This includes the democratic right to know 
which national and international entities are involved in the processing of biometric 
data and cross-border exchanges.  
 
The principle of transparency has permeated beyond the idea of mere publicity of 
acts of State organizations. “Transparency” extends to ideas of State authorities’ 
obligations to carry out their actions, as a general rule, according to prescribed 
powers that are publicly available. This is a major procedural mechanism to control 
the power and democratic legitimacy of public institutions18. In this case, national 
governments should publicly debated or provide information regarding policies on 
the implementation and deployment of biometric systems.  
                                            
13
 Jasanoff, Sheila, Designs on Nature, Science and Democracy in Europe and the United States, 
above n 2. 
14
 Ibidem, p. 27. 
15
 Sartori, Giovanni, Homo Videns, la sociedad teledirigida, (Taurus, 2004), p. 163. 
16
 In Mexico and Spain the control over personal data is exercised by ARCO or Habeas Data rights, 
which give the individuals to protect effectively their personal information and control over it. This 
ARCO rights are: Access, Rectification, Cancellation and Objection.  Kuschewsky, Monika (ed.), Data 
Protection and Privacy Jurisdictional Comparison (Thomson Reuters, 2012). 
17
 In Mexico and Spain instead of challenge the process of personal data, individuals exercise ARCO 
rights, especially Cancellation and Objection. “Cancellation is individuals’ right to block free of charge 
their personal data when it is inadequate, excessive or unnecessary or when it is stored in a period in 
excess of that which is established in Law whereas Objection is individuals’ right to request that the 
processing of their personal data not be carried out”. Idem.     
18
 Villanueva, Ernesto, Derecho a la Información, (Porrua-Camara de Diputados-Universidad de 
Guadalajara, 2006) pp. 69-72. 
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This thesis generally argues for a legal framework with an adequate level of privacy 
and data protection, to secure civil liberties. However, this legal framework must be 
accompanied by greater public debate, transparency and accountability about 
benefits and risks on the deployment of biometric systems and TBIF. This type of 
information must be available to citizens in a plain language while privacy and data 
protection rights are promoted in a cross-border co-operation and collaboration 
mechanism. 
 
4.3. Personal Data: Inconsistencies in Data Collection Internationally 
 
On the international level, immigration policies favour the implementation of 
biometric systems for the benefits of cost reduction for immigration services; 
lessening identity fraud; improved confidence in administration; greater efficiency in 
border processing; as well as preventing illegal immigrants; fighting cross-border 
crimes; and, preventing terrorism. This section compares the ways in which 
Australia, Mexico, New Zealand and Spain actually classify and collect migration 
data. Significantly, the four countries study shows that these countries do not and 
cannot easily exchange immigration information among themselves for practical 
classification reasons rather than technical or legal reasons. The categories of data 
collected by each country may not be exactly the same and differs depending on the 
period of time because each country’s updates are not contemporaneous or 
harmonised. For example, the websites of Australia, Mexico New Zealand and Spain 
on migration statistics data present a large number of migration information 
regarding types of visas or categories. The four countries use different terms and 
expressions for visas, as well as different classifications. Another inconsistency that 
was found was that the terms cover different periods of time between visas. The 
terms and expressions differ and definitions in their migration frameworks are 
inconsistent, vague and contradictory. However, it is a common factor in the four 
countries to exclude citizens departing with the status of military personnel and their 
dependants and nomads, persons without a fixed place of residence who move from 
one site to another, are also excluded from their migration statistics. 
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For this reason, comparative statistical information on immigration information flow in 
the four countries examined is more difficult to provide in an integrated manner. 
Accordingly, it is possible to achieve the data collection goal of the Global 
Commission on International Migration (GCIM) as reported to the United Nations in 
2005: “that the data collection, composition, categorisation, retrieval, collation and 
exchange reflect national legislative, administrative and policy imperatives”19. 
However, it is considerably more difficult to present this data in a consistent and 
uniform international manner. 
 
The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the 
International Organization for Migration (IOM) provide datasets, however, IOM does 
not have global coverage for all migration data20 and the migration statistics collected 
by the OECD in many of the countries covers economic, population and labour 
immigration data rather than specific categories of immigration21. In 1998, the 
Glossary to the UN Recommendations on Statistics of International Migration was 
published22. The Glossary is a useful study about the collection of international 
migration statistics –including terminology and definitions- with the aim of broadly 
assisting the understanding of the importance of the dynamics of international 
                                            
19
 This GCIM closed in 2005. Global Commission on International Migration (2005),   
http://www.migrationdevelopment.org/fileadmin/data/resources/gender/research_papers/GMP_No_01
.pdf (20/12/2012)  
20
 IOM collects and collates some regional data considered important to its operations, such as from 
the Commonwealth Independent States (CIS) and Statistical Information System on Migrations in 
Central America (SIEMCA), to obtain some of its data. IOM also sources data back to the OECD, 
Eurostat, UN Population and Statistics Division, US Census Bureau and other UN agencies known to 
have reliable data on the subject matter it covers. http://www.iom.int/cms/about-migration 
(20/12/2012) 
21
 In its entry of international migration data, the OECD notes in material posted on its website under 
the headings “OECD Factbook 2010” and “Country Statistical Profiles 2010” that the sources of 
migration statistics in many of the countries it covers are population registries; residence or work 
permits; acceptances for permanent settlement; censuses; and, surveys. However, it observes that a 
wide variety of other data sources exists, such as border crossing counts, analyses of passenger 
landing cards and special surveys like labour force surveys. http://www.oecd-
ilibrary.org/search?option1=titleAbstract&option2=&value2=&option3=&value3=&option4=&value4=&o
ption5=&value5=&option6=&value6=&option7=&value7=&option8=&value8=&option9=&value9=&opti
on10=&value10=&option11=&value11=&option12=&value12=&option13=&value13=&option14=&valu
e14=&option15=&value15=&option16=&value16=&option17=&value17=&option21=discontinued&valu
e21=true&option22=excludeKeyTableEditions&value22=true&option18=sort&value18=&form_name=
quick&discontin=factbooks&value20=18147364%2C15615537&option20=factbooks&value1=country+
statistical (20/12/2012)  
22
 This document identifies the core and optional information for all categories of international 
migrants. UN Recommendations on Statistics of International Migration, UN Department of Economic 
and Social Affairs Statistics Division (1998)  
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/publication/SeriesM/SeriesM_58rev1E.pdf (20/12/2012) 
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migration, its causes and effects. More recently, in 2004, IOM published its Glossary 
on Migration23. However, these reports do not set mandatory standards for member 
countries in the collection and presentation of migration data, the reports have only 
the status of recommendations. 
 
There is also a problem in immigration data because of an absence of universally 
accepted definitions in this area. The absence of a precise definition for terms and 
the lack of international standards for data collection in immigration impede and 
prevent exact comparisons24. From 2008 to 2009, Australia and New Zealand 
adopted part of the Glossary of the UN Recommendations on Statistics of 
International Migration. Since that date Australia, Mexico, New Zealand and Spain 
have some consistent and complete series of immigration statistics flows that 
conform well to the definitions for long-term migration as suggested by the United 
Nations. Nevertheless, the definitions for short-term migration information differ in 
terms for categories of visas, as well as different visa’s classifications terms. These 
countries have their own databases for foreigners who enter as temporary residents. 
The problem lies in their current data collection systems and the categories for short-
term migration information contained in their own databases for foreigners because 
all four countries have not adopted completely the Glossary and there are actual 
inconsistent with the terminology.   
 
Australia is able to consult its own immigration-based databases for significant 
information about migrants. However, data about population by country of birth, age 
and sex are usually taken from periodical censuses which are updated from 
immigration data between censuses, as well as from registers of deaths. Australian 
data on immigrants’ employment status is taken, for example, from monthly labour 
surveys or from specific migrant surveys that are conducted from time to time25. 
However, historical statistics related to certain immigration categories can be found 
since 2002.  
                                            
23
 Perruchoud, Richard (ed), “Glossary on Migration”, International Migration Law, (IOM, 2004) 
http://www.iom.int/jahia/webdav/site/myjahiasite/shared/shared/mainsite/published_docs/serial_public
ations/Glossary_eng.pdf  (20/12/2012) 
24
 UN Recommendations on Statistics of International Migration, UN Department of Economic and 
Social Affairs Statistics Division (1998), above n 22. 
25
 Australia Government, Department of Immigration and Citizenship, Annual Report (2011-2012) 
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As a “developed” country, Mexico has most of its data entered and recorded 
electronically so can be retrieved with relative ease. It has been updated regularly, 
on a monthly basis since 2002. Furthermore, historical statistics for specific 
categories have been in existence since 199526. However, if a comparison between 
the classification of visas between Mexico and Australia were undertaken, 
inconsistencies would be apparent. Australia classifies its types of visas as 
temporary and permanent with 140 subclasses of visas while Mexico classifies them 
as visitor and resident with only 10 subclasses27.  
 
In New Zealand, there is a range of government agencies that collect data on 
international migration movements and their outcomes. Having different data 
collection and collation agencies creates challenges to exchange accurate 
information without considerable effort. This has led to a requirement for the 
development of a cross-agency view, based on each agency’s considering the “risks 
and benefits” for its own data collection. However, historical statistics regarding 
certain immigration categories can be found since 1998. 
 
Spain has a mix of manual retrieval of hard copy records and electronic collation of 
data. The information collected is updated every three months. However, the 
numbers come from immigrants who are registered on a neighbourhood list for a 
particular city council (municipality) of Spain. This immigration registration is 
obligatory for education and academic positions and to obtain the health (sanitary) 
card. Historical statistics related to immigration can be found since 199628. 
 
The four countries study revealed the common use of biometric passports and visas; 
but, again without common and consistent data collection. Australia and New 
Zealand collect facial and iris characteristics for their respective nationals, whereas 
Spain and Mexico collect facial and fingerprints characteristics for their nationals. For 
                                            
26
 Mexico, National Institute of Migration (INM) historical statistics website 
http://www.inm.gob.mx/index.php/page/Series_Historicas  (20/12/2012) 
27
 For further details, see Appendix H. National Immigration Policy 
28
 Spain, National Institute of Statistics (INE) 
http://www.ine.es/ss/Satellite?L=0&c=INEPublicacion_C&cid=1259924959454&p=1254735110672&p
agename=ProductosYServicios%2FPYSLayout&param1=PYSDetalleGratuitas (20/12/2012) 
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border control processing of foreign travellers these four countries use face 
recognition system which is used to verify traveller’s identity and check blacklists. 
However, this is combined with the traveller’s type of visa. Not all the types of visa 
issued by the four countries are biometric.  
 
These asymmetries raise the question why the deployment of biometric technology 
in immigration control was differently applied into the four countries. Jasanoff would 
argue that even these differences are hard to explain, this only makes the task the 
more intellectually engaging29. Nevertheless, apart from iris and fingerprint data 
differences, the four countries have deployed biometric systems for immigration 
purposes with centralised biometric databases; their border control procedures and 
processing are common; biometric verification at the border control process is used 
to check against criminal biometric databases; and, the four countries have common 
control strategies deployed in immigration. 
 
4.4. Immigration Policy: The International Context 
 
Immigration occurs for many reasons: the search for better economic opportunities, 
the wish to join family members who have migrated or the escape from political 
conditions in a country. Article 13(2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
recognises that: “everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own and 
to return to his country”30. The international community has declared this right 
necessary to protect other human rights. The right to travel is a necessary attribute 
of a democratic constitutional State. Immigration and migration play important roles 
in the complex rapid and often violent process of change in the current international 
political order in many regions of the world. This change has impacts on States, 
regions, societies, economies and policies31. 
  
                                            
29
 Jasanoff, Sheila, Designs on Nature Science and Democracy in Europe and the United States, 
above n 2, p. 8 and 9. 
30
 Adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
adopted by G/A/RES 217A (III) of 10 December 1948, article 13(2).  
31
 Boudin, Leonard B., “The Constitutional Right to Travel” (1956) 56 Columbia Law Review 47-75. 
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The international legal framework composed of treaties, conventions, principles and 
agreements are balanced with State sovereignty rights to protect borders, to confer 
nationality, to admit and expel foreigners, to combat trafficking and smuggling and to 
safeguard national and regional security. These international legal frameworks need 
to be balanced not only with citizens’ right to leave their country, but also with other 
human rights involved in immigration issues, such as privacy and data protection 
rights. This international legal framework of human rights constitutes the main pillars 
of public policies on international immigration. This thesis will test these issues and 
arguments by examining the balancing of private and public interests32. 
  
4.4.1. The Deployment of Biometric Technology. The deployment of biometric 
technology for immigration purposes must be legitimate and have a basis on 
constitutional grounds33 to be justified and applied in a democratic constitutional 
State34. Thus, the “knowledge” of the technical and legal aspects of biometric 
systems is essential for elected officials in charge of authorizing and, implementing 
this type of technology into comprehensive and integrated programs35.  
 
“Defining policy”, argues Jasanoff, “is not a sure fire recipe for placating constituents 
at home, as politicians in the globalizing world have discovered to their sorrow. In 
policy as in politics, there is no substitute for a committed domestic constituency 
satisfied with the handling of immediately recognizable local problems”36. 
 
The implementation of biometric systems give rise to controversial legal issues 
particularly in relation to constitutional safeguards as biometric technology directly 
affects individual privacy and data protection rights. This legal concern must be 
addressed to secure political support and public acceptance for biometrics in public 
                                            
32
 For further details, see section 7.4. The Principle of Proportionality: Legitimate Restrictions on 
Privacy and Data Protection 
33
 For further details, see section 1.4 Hypothesis 
34
 It is true that every State has a Constitution, but not all of them are constitutional States. García De 
Enterría, Eduardo, La Constitución como norma y el Tribunal Constitucional, (Editorial Civitas, 2006), 
p. 43. 
35
 Habermas, Jürgen, “Sfera pubblica (Una voce di enciclopedia)”, above n 2; Jasanoff, Sheila, 
Designs on Nature, Science and Democracy in Europe and the United States, above n 2. 
36
 Jasanoff, Sheila, Designs on Nature, Science and Democracy in Europe and the United States, 
above n 2, p. 85. 
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policies. The legal response to this concern must consider the balance required 
within the proportionality test37. 
 
4.4.2. International Organisations in Immigration. There are no specific United 
Nations, General Assembly international treaties or conventions issued and 
approved related to the implementation of biometric systems for immigration 
purposes. However, on an international level, Article 13 of the Convention on 
International Civil Aviation deals with the deployment of biometric technology and 
states:  
 
“The laws and regulations of a contracting State as to the admission to or 
departure from its territory of passengers, crew or cargo of aircraft, such as 
regulations relating to entry, clearance, immigration, passports, customs, 
and quarantine shall be complied with by or on behalf of such passengers, 
crew or cargo upon entrance into or departure from, or while within the 
territory of that State”38.  
 
The two key international organisations operate in the biometric migration area. The 
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) is the principal international 
organisation for international standards, recommendations and procedures regarding 
immigration practices. ICAO is in charge of biometric passports and visa 
specifications39. Since 1995, ICAO has been investigating biometrics and its 
potential to enhance identity confirmation in travel documents. However, it was not 
until 2001 that a recommendation of the use of facial recognition as the primary 
biometric was released40. 
 
                                            
37
 For further details and the equivalent Common Law reasonableness standard, see Chapter 7. 
Transborder Biometric on Privacy and Data Protection: National Solutions 
38
 Convention on International Civil Aviation opened for signature 7 December 1944 (entered into 
force 4 April 1947), Article 13. 
39
 For further details, see section 3.3.2. ePassport Technology: The New Generation 
40
 ICAO, Selection of a Globally Interoperable Biometric for Machine Assisted Identity Confirmation 
with MRTDs, Technical Report (2001) 
http://www.icao.int/Security/mrtd/Downloads/Technical%20Reports/ICAO_MRTD_History_of_Interope
rability.pdf (27/11/2012) 
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Secondly, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) is the other leading 
international organisation for migration. The IOM offers “advice, research, technical 
cooperation and operational assistance to States, intergovernmental and non-
governmental organizations and other stakeholders, in order to build national 
capacities and facilitate international, regional and bilateral cooperation on migration 
matters”41. 
 
ICAO and IOM are the two main international organisations that have made 
recommendations and established specifications for biometric systems to be 
deployed in immigration policies. 
 
4.4.3. International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). The International Civil 
Aviation Organization (ICAO) is a specialized agency of the United Nations that has 
the responsibility of adopting international standards and recommended practices 
and procedures regarding immigration42.  
 
The Convention on International Civil Aviation sets the structure of ICAO43. The 
following figure shows the four countries examined as ICAO contracting members. It 
is important to highlight that Australia, Mexico and Spain are all Council member 
States44. 
 
ICAO has developed several standards related to travel documents, principally 
passports and visas, as well as for border control policies on identification. A 
passport is not only a certificate of identity; it is also a promise of protection, with the 
implication that it can be withheld if the government considers the citizen unworthy of 
                                            
41
 IOM, International Organization for Migration http://www.iom.int/cms/en/sites/iom/home/about-iom-
1/mission.html (20/12/2012) 
42
 http://www.icao.int/Pages/icao-in-brief.aspx (20/12/2012) See also, Turak, Daniel C., The Passport 
in International Law, (Lexington Books, 1972), p. 30. 
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 The Convention on International Civil Aviation is also known as the Chicago Convention.  
It took place in 1944. According to the terms of the Convention, ICAO is made up of an Assembly, a 
Council of limited membership with various subordinate bodies and a Secretariat. The chief officers of 
the ICAO are the President of the Council and the Secretary General. Convention on International 
Civil Aviation opened for signature 7 December 1944 (entered into force 4 April 1947).  
44
 ICAO Council Members http://www.icao.int/MemberStates/Member%20States.English.pdf 
(20/12/2012) 
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such protection45. A passport46 is evidence of the protection to which people of a 
nationality are entitled to receive from their government when travelling in foreign 
countries47.  
 
An ePassport issued in compliance with ICAO specifications contains biometric data 
to which access needs to be controlled. These specifications include a contactless 
microchip48 with a data storage capacity of at least 32kb. 
  
For ICAO, the only method of linking a person unequivocally with a document is 
through a physiological characteristic of that person associated with travel document 
in a tamper-proof manner. The biometric characteristics that ICAO49 uses for 
identification in ePassports50 are: a) facial recognition as mandatory, and b) 
fingerprint or iris recognition as optional. 
  
ICAO chose facial identification as mandatory for recognition in biometric passports 
because face photographs are considered non-intrusive for biometric data 
verification. Face photographs can be used by a person or automated face 
recognition systems, either for confirmation of claimed identity (recognition) by 
searching a database of face images for determining the authentication (verification) 
of the image51.  
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 Turak, Daniel C., The Passport in International Law, above n 42. 
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 The standard states that “a valid passport shall be the basic document providing public authorities 
with information relating to the individual passenger on arrival or departure of a ship”. Ibidem, p. 31. 
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 Boudin, Leonard B., “The Constitutional Right to Travel”, above n 31; Turak, Daniel C., The 
Passport in International Law, above n 42. 
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 ICAO, “Why ICAO Selected the Face as Primary Biometric Identifier specified to ePassports”, 
MRTD Report (2007) 
http://www2.icao.int/en/MRTD2/ReportsPastIssues/ICAO%20MRTD%20Report%20Vol.%202%20No.
%201,%202007.pdf (20/12/2012) 
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 ICAO Machine Readable Travel Documents, DOC 9303, (Pt 1, 6
th
 ed, 2006) vol. 2   
http://www.icao.int/publications/Documents/9303_p1_v2_cons_en.pdf (20/12/2012) 
50
 For further details, see section 3.3.2. ePassport Technology: The New Generation 
51
 Face photographs are used in passports, visas, driver licences or other identification documents. 
ICAO, “Why ICAO Selected the Face as Primary Biometric Identifier specified to ePassports”, above n 
48. 
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The optional biometric fingerprint or iris characteristics are also available for 
recognition purposes. These options can be used when States may have existing 
fingerprint or iris databases in place against which they can verify these biometric 
characteristics.  
 
4.4.4. International Organization for Migration (IOM). The International Organization 
for Migration (IOM) was created in 1951 and specialises in the field of migration and 
works closely with governmental, intergovernmental and non-governmental 
partners52. IOM, partnered with ICAO and the company International Business 
Machine (IBM)53, is increasingly being called upon to assist States to address 
complex border management issues54. 
 
“In support of IOM strategy, IBM activities are directed at helping 
governments create policy, legislation, administrative structures, operational 
systems and the human resource base necessary to respond effectively to 
diverse migration challenges and to institute appropriate migration 
governance. Such activities are designed as partnerships, with the 
requesting government and other relevant interlocutors working closely with 
the IBM Team to identify needs, determine priority areas, and shape and 
deliver interventions.  
The IBM portfolio is steadily growing, with over 300 active projects valued at 
nearly USD 90 million implemented worldwide in 2010”55. 
 
IOM works with States to assess and improve the integrity of their travel and identity 
documents. IOM, along with ICAO and the company IBM, have a programme for 
“Identity Management”56. IOM’s Identity Management program covers two main 
                                            
52
 IOM, International Organization for Migration http://www.iom.int/cms/about-iom (20/12/2012) 
53
 This company was identified in Chapter 3. The Biometric Industry: An Illustrative Map of Players, 
Products and Partnerships  
54
 http://www.iom.int/jahia/webdav/shared/shared/mainsite/activities/ibm/01-IOM-IBM-FACT-SHEET-
IBM-Programme-general-overview.pdf (20/12/2012) 
55
 Idem. 
56
 http://www.iom.int/jahia/webdav/shared/shared/mainsite/activities/ibm/06-IOM-IBM-FACT-SHEET-
Identity-management.pdf (20/12/2012) 
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areas: a) travel documents and related issuance systems and b) travel document 
inspection57. 
 
As part of this Identity Management program, IOM also has a Personal Identification 
and Registration System (PIRS), which allows the collection, processing and storage 
of traveller information, including biometric data58. The PIRS can also be linked to 
Interpol’s I-24/7 Global Communication System for Interpol’s Lost Travel Documents 
Database59. The following figure shows the PIRS screen.  
 
Figure 11. Personal Identification and Regulation System (PIRS)
 60
 
 
 
As part of the Immigration and Border Management program, IOM operates the 
Immigration and Visa Support Solution project (IVSS)61. IVSS includes: “1) country 
information; 2) logistical assistance to support visa processing; 3) skills and 
language testing facilitation; 4) visa application assistance; 5) travel document 
handling; 6) visa application centres; 7) interview facilitation; 8) self-payer health 
assessments; 9) DNA services; 10) biometrics enrolment; 11) document integrity and 
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Border-Migration-Information-System-BMIS.pdf (20/12/2012) 
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 For further details, see Chapter 5. Biometrics in Criminal Databases: Current Transborder 
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verification; 12) self-payer travel assistance; 13) web-based visa appointment 
scheduling and visa issuance systems; 14) border management information 
systems; 15) information services and 16) family tracing”62.  
 
4.4.5. Global Interoperability Challenges. For all biometric systems, the enrolment, 
data processing, personalisation, issuance, storage, lecture and verification of an 
image are necessary to achieve global interoperability. However, there are three 
classes of fingerprint biometric systems: finger image-based systems, finger 
minutiae-based systems and finger pattern-based systems63. Systems for iris 
biometrics emerged based on the methodology of one ICAO-recognized technology 
vendor64.   
 
In the short-term, these different types of biometric fingerprint systems do not 
present any challenge because the biometric information stored on ePassports are 
matched against the information stored on a country’s own databases on the arrival 
of its own citizens. However, in the long-term, these dissimilar types of biometric 
fingerprint systems may present challenges to global interoperability. 
 
There are other long-term challenges posed by many factors that can affect the 
performance of face recognition, fingerprints and iris recognition systems: 
 
a) An individual’s appearance, such as his or her facial characteristic, hair style, and 
accessories; and the image acquisition conditions, such as the camera’s field of 
view, focus and shutter speed, depth of field, background and lighting65. Many 
countries are issuing biometric passports66 under their own guidelines for 
                                            
62
 Idem. 
63
 Early on, the systems were not interoperable and as a result, there are three systems for fingerprint 
interoperability: image data storage, minutiae data storage and pattern data storage. 
64
 ICAO, “Why ICAO Selected the Face as Primary Biometric Identifier specified to ePassports”, 
above n 48. 
65
 Face Image Data was approved as an international standard by ISO/IECJTC1 SC37 in 2005. This 
standard defines a data format for digital face images to allow interoperability among face image 
processing systems. 
66
For further details, see section 3.3.2. ePassport Technology: The New Generation.  
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producing and submitting face photographs following ICAO requirements67: this is 
the case with Australia68, Mexico69, New Zealand70 and Spain71. In this respect 
ICAO’s illustrative guidelines for Machine Readable Travel Document (MRTD) 
were updated in October 201372. 
 
b) Image quality factors such as resolution, contrast and brightness, as well as other 
factors, affect the accuracy of face and iris recognition, including subject 
positioning, pose and expression, illumination uniformity, and, in the case of 
faces, the use of eyeglasses or makeup, as well as the time difference between 
two photographs being compared, for instance73. However, in the case of iris 
recognition is considered intrusive. During the enrolment process, an expert can 
determine whether the person suffers from common medical conditions like 
diabetes, arteriosclerosis or hypertension. The system can produce a false 
acceptance, false match or false rejection for a person whose iris has already 
been recorded but has been diagnosed with glaucoma74.  
 
c) Fingerprints can also be inexact. A person who handles chemical products could 
present a false rejection in fingerprint biometrics because these chemicals can 
cause a reduction of a fingerprint quality over time. Other inexact fingerprint 
individuals are the elderly and children under the age of six. 
 
                                            
67
 ICAO has consequently designed illustrative guidelines for portraits in a Machine Readable Travel 
Document (MRTD) for the next generation of electronic passports, the so-called biometric Passports. 
ICAO Machine Readable Travel Documents, above n 49. 
68
 Australia photo guidelines https://www.passports.gov.au/images/photo_guidelines.pdf#zoom=100 
(20/12/2012)  
69
 Mexico photo guidelines http://www.sre.gob.mx/index.php/primera-vez/252 (20/12/2012)  
70
 New Zealand photo guidelines http://www.passports.govt.nz/Passport-photos---adults (20/12/2012) 
71
 Spain photo guidelines http://www.interior.gob.es/pasaporte-29/clases-y-requisitos-183?locale=es 
(20/12/2012) 
72
 For further details, see section 3.3.2. ePassport Technology: The New Generation 
73
 ISO/IEC 19794-5:2005, Information Technology –Biometric Data Interchange Formats –Part 5: 
Face Image Data- AMENDMENT 1: conditions for taking photographs for face image data (2007). 
The International Organization for Standardization/International Electro-technical Commission 
(ISO/IEC) 19794-5 Biometric Data Interchange Formats defines a standard data format for digital face 
images to allow interoperability among face recognition systems, government agencies, and other 
creators and users of face images. 
74
 Van Der Ploeg, Irma, “Biometrics and Privacy: A note on the politics of theorizing technology” 
(2003) 6 Information, Communication & Society 85-104. 
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In 2004, an open letter on the dangers of biometric passports was sent to ICAO by 
the Non-Government Organization (NGO) Privacy International and signed by many 
other NGOs from around the world. In this letter, the NGOs expressed their concerns 
regarding the disproportionate effects of the implementation of biometric travel 
documents on privacy and civil liberties. They expressed their greatest concern over 
the creation of centralised national biometric databases75.  
 
4.4.5. Regional Organisations. Apart from the two key international organisations of 
ICAO and IOM, there are some important regional organisations implementing 
biometric systems for immigration purposes. The European Union (EU) and the Asia 
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) are significant standard setting organisations 
at the regional level. 
 
Uniform immigration policies on a global basis may be unachievable because of the 
wide range of immigration issues related to countries’ interests around the world. 
However, the harmonisation of policies on regional bases is becoming more 
common. For example, within the European context, the Schengen Information 
System (SIS) and EURODAC system76 are promoting a common visa policy under 
which a visa is valid in any Schengen-zone country77 and may be issued by one 
country for travel to another. In the Asia Pacific context, the APEC has created a 
Business Travel Card (ABTC) that facilitates short-term entry to participating 
member countries (referred to as member ‘economies’)78. These common regional 
visa policies have developed because of the confluence of interests in these 
countries have in the movement of migrants through their regions. 
 
                                            
75
 “Privacy International was founded in 1990 and was the first organization to campaign at an 
international level privacy issues”. Gus Hosein, Privacy International was founded in 1990 and was 
the first organization to campaign at an international level privacy issues (30 March 2004) Privacy 
International https://www.privacyinternational.org/blog/open-letter-to-un-agency-on-dangers-of-
biometric-passport-standard (20/12/2012) 
76
 For further details, see Appendix E. Eurodac Introductory Information 
77
 The Schengen zone includes 26 countries: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Malta, The Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, 
and Switzerland. http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/borders-and-
visas/schengen/index_en.htm (20/12/2012) 
78
 http://www.apec.org/About-Us/About-APEC/Business-Resources/APEC-Business-Travel-Card.aspx 
(20/12/2012) 
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As far as the EU is concerned, “[i]nternational terrorism is, because of its cross 
border dimensions, a migration issue. But immigration policy, particularly on border 
control, is just one area where national and international enforcement measures can 
be taken against terrorism”79.  
 
The reach of these regional organisations extends to interactions between the four 
countries study group of Australia, Mexico, New Zealand and Spain. Australia, 
Mexico and New Zealand are country members in APEC these three countries 
interact with the EU and Spain is member of the EU. These interaction are significant 
when migration data is exchanged with these regional organisations.  
 
4.4.6. Introduction of Biometric Systems: Regional Organisations. In the four 
countries study three main biometric systems were identified, two in Europe and one 
in Asia-Pacific. The following three examples of biometric systems for biometric 
travel documents discussed below. Also includes standards for interoperability, 
security and accuracy designed by ICAO.  
 
In 2009 at the APEC Business Mobility Group, Australia submitted as part of the 
Proposed Business Mobility Group Goals for 2009 that: “[t]he document ‘A guide to 
Biometric Technology in Machine Readable Travel Documents’ has already been 
recognized as a unique and valuable document by ICAO and the ISO, and also by 
the IOM, which now has permission from APEC to translate the document into the 
other languages to assist other governments adopt e-Passports”80. The following 
three examples of the biometric systems in the deployment and the process of 
collection and storage of biometric information. 
 
 EURODAC system81: In 2000, the EURODAC system was established and 
linked to the “Dublin Convention” to establish a centralized European 
database on asylum seekers and other non-European Union nationals 
                                            
79
 Van Krieken, Peter J. (ed), Terrorism and the International Legal Order, With special Reference to 
the UN, the EU and Cross-Border Aspects, (T.M.C. Asser Press, 2002), p. 441.  
80
 Australia Government “Consideration to the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) on the 
Proposed Business Mobility Goals for 2009”.  
81
 For further details, see Appendix E. Eurodac Introductory Information 
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apprehended while illegally crossing borders into EU territory. It includes 
fingerprints82.   
 
EURODAC Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS) was created by the 
company Steria83. Each Member State has national access points and works directly 
with individuals national administrations. The fingerprints taken are compared with 
the fingerprint data transmitted by other Member States already stored in the central 
database. If the EURODAC System detects that fingerprints have been already 
collected and stored the asylum seeker is redirected to the Member State where 
his/her fingerprints were originally collected and stored. 
 
 Schengen Information System84 (SIS II): For the operation of the border 
control free system among the Schengen member States, the SIS II provides 
the main support system. It contains a “list” of people who have committed an 
offence, are missing or are under observation.  
 
Member States feed the system with information through national networks which 
are connected to a central system and supplemented by the SIRENE network85 
made up of representatives from the national and local police, customs agencies and 
the judiciary86. This system was reviewed after the “Prüm Convention”87. The 
company Steria is leading the second generation of the Schengen Information 
System (SIS II)88. Its capacity was increased not only technologically, but also in 
relation to the information collected, stored and exchanged.  
                                            
82
 Idem. 
83
 This company was identified in Chapter 3. The Biometric Industry: An Illustrative Map of Players, 
Products and Partnerships http://www.steria.com/sharing-our-views/success-stories/?cr_uid=185 
(20/12/2012)  
84
 For further details, see Appendix F. Schengen Information System 
85
 SIRENE network is a system used by police authorities to exchange information in compliance with 
the Schengen Convention for the purposes of preventing and detecting criminal offences in Schengen 
zone by SIS II. For further details, see Appendix F. Schengen Information System 
86
 International Organization for Migration, “International Terrorism and Migration”, Background Paper, 
Immigration and National Security, (2003), 16 
http://www.iom.int/jahia/webdav/site/myjahiasite/shared/shared/mainsite/activities/tcm/Int_terrorism_m
igration.pdf   (20/12/2012) 
87
 For further details, see Appendix G. Prüm Convention 
88
 This company was identified in Chapter 3. The Biometric Industry: An Illustrative Map of Players, 
Products and Partnerships. Steria, “Steria successfully launches the second generation Schengen 
Information System for the European Commission (SIS II)” (Media Release, 8 July 2013) 
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 APEC Business Travel Card (ABTC): Using agreed regulations this card 
exchanges information through an online system in order to enhance the 
mobility of business people in the region. It contributes information on lost and 
stolen travel documents to the International Criminal and Police Organisation 
(ICPO-INTERPOL) database89.  
 
Member countries are in charge of issuing the Business Travel Card complying card 
eligibility criteria; service standards; and, card manufacturer standards90. It 
eliminates the application for visas when visiting APEC members. However, 
passports remain as the primary travel document. TBIF includes: requesting 
clearance in advance; receiving clearance; and, requesting card production. The 
TBIF is encrypted during transfer via a centralised database.  
 
In summary, regional organisations have been not only deploying centralised 
biometric systems, but also encouraging TBIF for immigration control. These three 
regional biometric systems are using ICAO’s and APEC’s technical security 
standards. However, the fact that these regional biometric systems are centralised 
databases poses a common question about technological vulnerability and privacy 
risks regarding the unauthorised access, hackers and back-ups. These privacy and 
data protection concerns are further discussed91. In addition, it is interesting to note 
that the same company, Steria was in charge of the two major biometric systems in 
Europe.   
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                       
http://www.steria.com/media/press-releases/press-releases/article/steria-successfully-launches-the-
second-generation-schengen-information-system-for-the-european-comm/ (11/09/2013) 
89
 http://www.businessmobility.org/travel/index.asp  (20/12/2012) 
90
  APEC Guiding Principles for PKI-Based Approaches to Electronic Authentication (2005) 
http://www.apec.org/Meeting-Papers/Ministerial-Statements/Telecommunications-and-
Information/2005_tel/annex_d.aspx (20/12/2012) 
91
 For further details, see Chapter 6. Transborder Biometric Information Flows: Legal Challenges 
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4.5. Immigration Policy Framework and Systems in the Four Countries Study  
 
The contexts of immigration information was included in the four countries study and 
immigration policy in Australia, Mexico, New Zealand and Spain was analysed. The 
results identified the legal problems, limitations and challenges in TBIF. In Chapter 7 
the legal problems, limitations and challenges are assessed for a proportional and 
harmonised legal framework in TBIF92.  
 
Mexico has two authorities, in one hand the Ministry of Interior through the National 
Institute of Migration (INM)93 managing arrivals; departures; and, settlement of 
migrants, and in the other the Ministry of International Affairs is in charge of 
managing passports issuing and protect Mexican human rights overseas. Spain has 
also two specific authorities94 managing arrivals, departures and settlement of 
migrants, this can be a result of being both Civil Law countries. However, there is a 
main difference between Mexico and Spain. In Mexico, the Ministry of Interior as 
many other federal countries is responsible for the general interior security of the 
country; these could be seen rare, but Mexico has some of the most complex 
immigration dynamics in the world95. Nevertheless, a distinguished characteristic 
between the two Common Law countries is that in New Zealand four authorities are 
involved in immigration96 whereas in Australia97 only one.  
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 For further details, see Chapter 7. Transborder Biometric Privacy Regimes: National Solutions 
93
 Mexico, National Institute of Migration (INM) 
http://www.inm.gob.mx/index.php/page/pagina_principal/en.html (20/12/2012) For further details, see 
see Appendix H. National Immigration Policy 
94
 Spain, General Minister for Migration and Immigration http://extranjeros.mtin.es/es/Organizacion/ 
(20/12/2012) For further details, see see Appendix H. National Immigration Policy 
95
 The flow of undocumented people from Mexico, Central and South America across the northern 
border to the United States continues while Mexico’s southern border is increasingly used by citizens 
from Central and South America as their way into the United States. “Some 200,000 Central 
Americans attempt to irregularly enter the US via Mexico’s southern border. Although 70 per cent of 
them are detained by Mexican migration authorities and returned to their countries of origin, an 
estimated 60,000–70,000 eventually reach the US or remain in Mexico”. IOM, Migration Initiatives 
Appeal 2010 (2010) http://publications.iom.int/bookstore/free/Migration_Initiatives_2010.pdf 
(20/12/2012) 
96
 New Zealand immigration area of responsibility http://www.dol.govt.nz/about/responsibilities/ 
(22/12/2012) For further details, see see Appendix H. National Immigration Policy 
97
 The Department of Immigration and Citizenship (DIAC) http://www.immi.gov.au/  (20/12/2012)  
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The following figure shows the four countries immigration policy, for a complete 
description on the four countries immigration policy see Appendix H98. 
 
Figure 12. Immigration Policy 
 
 
The immigration policy and legal framework in each country differs. Both Australia 
and New Zealand as Common Law countries have just one law99 dealing with 
immigration, whereas Mexico100 and Spain101 as Civil Law countries have more than 
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 For further details, see Appendix H. National Immigration Policy 
99
 Migration Act 1995 (Cth) and Immigration Act 2009 (New Zealand) 
100
 Ley de Migración, DOF 25/052011 [Migration Law] (Mexico) 
http://www.diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/pdf/LMigra.pdf (20/12/2012); Ley General de Población, 
DOF 07/01/1974 [General Population Law, last amendment 09/04/12] (Mexico) 
http://www.diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/pdf/140.pdf (20/12/2012) and Ley sobre Refugiados y 
Protección Complementaria, DOF 27/01/2011 [Refugees and Complementary Protection Law] 
(Mexico) http://www.diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/pdf/LRPC.pdf (20/12/2012) 
101
 Ley Orgánica 2/2009, de 11 de diciembre, de reforma de la Ley Orgánica 4/2000, de 11 de enero, 
sobre derechos y libertades de los extranjeros en España y su integración social,BOE-A-2009-19949 
[Organic Law 2/2009 amending Organic Law 4/200 on the Rights and Liberties for Foreigners in 
Spain and their Social Integration] (Spain), http://www.boe.es/buscar/doc.php?id=BOE-A-2009-19949    
(20/12/2012) and Real Decreto 1161/2009, de 10 de julio, por el que se modifica el Real Decreto 
240/2007, de 16 de febrero, sobre entrada, libre circulación y residencia en España de ciudadanos de 
los Estados miembros de la Unión Europea y de otros Estados parte en el Acuerdo sobre el Espacio 
Económico Europeo, BOE-A-2007-4184, [Royal Decree on the Entry, Free Movement and Residence 
in Spain of Citizens of the Member States of the European Union and Other States Party to the 
Agreement on the European Economic Area] (Spain) http://www.boe.es/buscar/doc.php?id=BOE-A-
2007-4184    (20/12/2012) 
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one piece of legislation. Nevertheless, Australia, Mexico and Spain have been active 
in amending or reforming their immigration framework in the recent years102.  
 
The four countries are active in developing their immigration policy in relation to the 
collection and processing of biometric information. In addition, all four countries are 
issuing ePassports103, through the implementation of ePassport technology in the 
four countries has been different. In the case of Spain, as a member of the EU, 
implementation is to follow and to adopt EU decisions. Australia and New Zealand 
are part of the Five Nations Passport Group104 and adopt the common consensus on 
ePassport technology. Mexico has been solely responsible for its immigration control 
strategies.   
 
In relation to the collection of biometric information for visas, the four countries differ 
significantly not only in their varieties of categories of visa but also in the countries  
listed to apply for a visa; however, the four countries share a common criteria on the 
collection of biometric data in refugee cases. The following figure shows the general 
asymmetries relating of categories of visas. 
 
Figure 13. Four Countries Type of Visa 
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 For further details, see Appendix H. National Immigration Policy 
103
 While Australia and New Zealand are issuing biometric passports with Basic Access Control 
(BAC), Spain is issuing biometric passport with Supplemental Access Control (SAC). Mexico is also 
issuing biometric passports but it was not possible to identify what type of ePassport technology has 
been implemented. For further details, see section 3.3.2. ePassport Technology: The New Generation 
104
 The Five Nations Passport Conference is a forum between the passport issuing authorities in 
Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States to "share best practices 
and discuss innovations related to the development of passport policies, products and practices" 
Australia Government, Department of Immigration and Citizenship, Annual Report (2010-2011)  
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An accurate and direct comparison between the terms used for categories of visa in 
the four countries is difficult to achieve as, the four countries used different terms. 
Mexico and Spain as Civil Law countries do not use same terms. Mexico uses the 
terms “visitors and residents”, Spain uses the terms “stays (estancias) and 
residence”. Australia and New Zealand, as Common Law countries, do not use the 
same terms. Australia uses the terms “permanent and temporary”, whereas New 
Zealand uses the terms “residence class and temporary entry class”105. 
 
Another asymmetry is the different number of categories and subcategories of visas. 
Australia has six categories of permanent visa and six categories for temporary visa. 
However, the categories of permanent and temporary visas have approximately 140 
visa subclasses with their own sets of eligibility criteria. The New Zealand residence 
class visa has two subcategories and the temporary entry class visa has four 
subcategories. However, these subcategories have an additional variety of eligibility 
criteria. The Mexican visa category of visitors has seven categories of visa and 
residents’ category has three types. The Spanish category of “stays” visa has seven 
categories and the residence visa has two subcategories. The four countries have 
complex categories of visas, none of them are exactly the same.   
 
This four countries study demonstrates a common, though not uniform, immigration 
policy on the deployment of biometric systems. It also demonstrates the diversity of 
practices, ePassport issuance and government structures in the context of 
immigration policy. In addition, in the four countries it was possible to identify 
common control strategies deployed in immigration106. 
 
4.5.1. The Implementation of Biometrics in Immigration as Policy.  At the national 
level it was possible to identify in the four countries study, the inclusion of biometric 
technology as part of immigration policy. In the four countries study, the immigration 
policies have common objectives related to: economy, national identity, opportunity 
                                            
105
 For further details, see Appendix H. National Immigration Policy. 
106
 For further details, see section 4.5.3. Common Control Strategies Deployed in Immigration at the 
International Level 
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for families and national security, as well as prevention of illegal immigration, cross-
border crimes and terrorism107. 
 
In general terms the deployment of biometric systems for immigration control is to 
provide an effective and efficient scrutiny at the border by examining passengers and 
crew and their movement information before their arrivals, departures and settlement 
of migrants. In addition, biometric systems provide identification and verification by 
matching TBIF108. The following figure presents the biometric systems implemented 
by the four countries study: 
 
Figure 14. Biometric Systems in the Four Countries Study 
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 New Zealand Government, Immigration Act Review (April 2006); Australia Government, 
Department of Immigration and Citizenship, Annual Report (2008-2009); Ley de Migración, DOF 
25/052011 [Migration Law] (Mexico) http://www.diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/pdf/LMigra.pdf 
(20/12/2012); Ley Orgánica 2/2009, de 11 de diciembre, de reforma de la Ley Orgánica 4/2000, de 11 
de enero, sobre derechos y libertades de los extranjeros en España y su integración social,BOE-A-
2009-19949 [Organic Law 2/2009 amending Organic Law 4/200 on the Rights and Liberties for 
Foreigners in Spain and their Social Integration] (Spain), http://www.boe.es/buscar/doc.php?id=BOE-
A-2009-19949    (20/12/2012) 
108
 Australia Government, Department of Immigration and Citizenship, Annual Report (2010-2011); 
Manual of Criteria and Migratory Proceedings of the National Institute of Migration. Acuerdo por el 
que se expide el Manual de Criterios y Trámites Migratorios del Instituto Nacional de Migración, DOF 
29/01/2010, [Criteria and Migratory Proceedings Manual of the National Institute of Migration of the 
Minister of Interior of 21 September 2010] (Mexico) 
http://dof.gob.mx/nota_detalle.php?codigo=5129775&fecha=29/01/2010 (20/12/2012); New Zealand, 
New IT System for Immigration New Zealand  
http://www.immigration.govt.nz/migrant/general/generalinformation/newitsystems/ (20/12/2012);  
OECD, Recent changes in Migration Movements and Policies: country notes (2010); see also IOM, 
Migration Initiatives Appeal 2010 (2010) 
http://publications.iom.int/bookstore/free/Migration_Initiatives_2010.pdf (20/12/2012). 
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In summary, Australia has an integrated data system allowing for cross-checking 
among a number of databases, such as Immigration, Passports, Taxation and Social 
Services. There are also data exchange provisions in Australia’s migration 
legislation, which permit information to be shared with agencies. In Mexico, the 
electronic system allows cross-checking of registered foreigners and refugees who 
hold of a valid visa and who want to change their status in Mexico. There are also 
provisions for APEC Business Travel Card data exchange. New Zealand’s 
immigration legislation enables specific biometric information to be collected, stored 
and used to verify a foreign national’s identity. There are also provisions, which 
permit sharing personal information, including biometric information, to national and 
international agencies. In addition, a foreign national’s personal information can be 
shared with other New Zealand agencies to check his or her eligibility for publicly-
funded services. Spain has EURODAC, Schengen System (SIS II) and Visa 
Information System (VIS)109. 
 
4.5.2. Current Biometric Systems and ePassports in the Four Countries Study. This 
section sets out the current operational biometric systems deployed in the context of 
immigration control in the four countries study. In addition, it provides the actual 
collection, storage and TBIF during the border control process. 
 
These current operational biometric systems deployed in the context of immigration 
control in the four countries study reveal the dynamic interaction between 
governments, citizens and biometric industry. For instance, the continuous 
immigration information flow of national travellers of Australia and national travellers 
of New Zealand force to both countries to find a remarkable collaboration and fast 
track process of their national passengers in both countries creating the programme 
SmartGate110. In addition, Australian and New Zealand have introduced an online 
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 For further details, see Figure 14 above p. 122 and see Appendix H. National Immigration Policy 
110
 This programme is a kiosk that checks whether Australian and New Zealand travellers are eligible 
for self-processing and the gate performs the identity check and clearance using Australian and New 
Zealand biometric passports with Basic Access Control (BAC). SmartGate is available at Sydney, 
Adelaide, Brisbane, Cairns, Melbourne, Perth, Gold Coast and Darwin international airports. In New 
Zealand, the SmartGate was implemented at Auckland International Airport for arriving passengers 
from Australia and New Zealand, in 2009. It is also operational for departing passengers from 
Australia and New Zealand at the Auckland, Wellington and Christchurch international airports. 
Australian Customs and Border Protection Service, SmartGate 
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immigration system for visas applications. This system in Australia is called Visa 
Entitlement Verification Online System111 and in New Zealand this system is known 
as Immigration Global Management System112.  
 
In Spain, there are three main regional systems in operation: EURODAC, Schengen 
System (SIS II) and Visa Information System (VIS). The first two examples are 
discussed above113 and the VIS is a centralised biometric database link to national 
systems that allows Schengen Member States to exchange visa data. It contains 10 
fingerprints and a digital photo collected from persons applying for a visa114. 
 
In Mexico, there are three operational biometric databases: for refugees; foreign 
holders of a valid visa who want to change their status in Mexico; and, temporary 
and/or definitive APEC Business Travel Card (ABTC). These biometric databases 
are operated by the National Institute of Migration (INM). These three biometric lists 
are interconnected with the Consular Management Integrated System (ACIS) 
verifying migration real-time alerts at the time issuing visas the Electronic System for 
Migration Procedures (SETRAM)115. The overall system is known as the Integrated 
Migration Operations (SIOM)116.  
 
                                                                                                                                       
http://www.customs.gov.au/site/page5552.asp   (20/12/2012); New Zealand, Customs Service 
website http://www.customs.govt.nz/features/bordersector/transtasmantravel/Pages/default.aspx 
(20/12/2012) 
111
 Australia, Visa Entitlement Verification Online System 
http://www.immi.gov.au/Services/Pages/immiaccount.aspx (20/12/2012) 
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 New Zealand, New IT System for Immigration New Zealand  
http://www.immigration.govt.nz/migrant/general/generalinformation/newitsystems/ (20/12/2012) 
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 For further details, see section 4.4.6. Introduction of Biometric Systems: Regional Organisations 
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 Schengen Member States and  Visa Information System http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-
affairs/what-we-do/policies/borders-and-visas/visa-information-system/index_en.htm (20/12/2012) 
115
 Mexican Government, National Institute of Migration, Action Lines in Sector Programs 
Accountability, Transparency and Fighting Corruption committed in 2009 Final Report (2008-2012) 
http://www.inm.gob.mx/static/transparencia/PND/Formatos_A_y_B.pdf (20/12/2012) 
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 The INM also launched the interconnection of the Integrated Migration Operations (SIOM by its 
Spanish acronym) with the INM’s Electronic Immigration Procedures (SETRAM by its Spanish 
acronym), the Consular Management Integrated System (ACIS by its Spanish acronym) of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (SRE by its Spanish acronym). This interconnection allows Mexican 
consulates to automatically verify migration real-time alerts at the time of issuing visas, in order to 
assess the issuance of the type of visa requested. The INM also informs the SRE of the permits 
granted to foreigners to obtain their visas at the corresponding consulates. Instituto Nacional de 
Migración, “Consolida INM simplificación de trámites migratorios”, (Press Release, 7 September 
2011) http://www.inm.gob.mx/index.php/blog/show/Consolida-INM-simplificaci%C3%B3n-de-
tr%C3%A1mites-migratorios.html (22/12/2012) 
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ePassports are a major component of biometric immigration systems. Generally, 
travellers are requested to present their ePassports and visas to the immigration 
officer. The following figures present the current border control process in these four 
countries for travellers.  
 
Figure 15. Traveller's Complete Border Process 
 
 
Where the data page of the ePassport is scanned and checked security features 
through the border control system. Then, the border control system using the optical 
recognition system117 reads the contactless chip from the ePassport and checks data 
authenticity.  
 
Figure 16. ePassport Border Control Process 
 
 
 
In addition, the border control officer requests to the traveller a face biometric 
verification where the officer takes a photograph118 and the border control systems 
                                            
117
 For further details, see Appendix C. How Biometric Systems Work 
118
 Sometimes fingerprints are also requested. 
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validates the photograph taken in that moment with the photograph template stored 
in the ePassport and runs facial biometric verification through checking national 
blacklists and Interpol’s databases119. 
 
Figure 17. Biometric Verification Border Control Process 
 
 
The four countries study reveals that, the information collected by the border control 
system is stored in their national centralised immigration information databases. 
Technically the information collected has a specific individual purpose120.  The use of 
ePassports and visas in border control process suggest that biometric travel 
documents are used as identity-based filters and not as a strategy to strengthen 
border control. The immigration information has a subsequent aggregated use within 
integrated data systems for cross-checking within a number of national agencies and 
international databases for national security and defence121. In Australia and New 
                                            
119
 Interview with David Philp, General Manager-Passport, Department of Internal Affairs (Wellington, 
25 October 2011); interview with Francisco Villanueva Díez, Deputy General Director of Information 
Systems and Communications for Security Matters, Spanish Minister of Interior (Madrid, 8 November 
2011); interview with Alejandro del Conde, Secretary of Data Protection, Instituto Federal de Acceso a 
la Información y Protección de Datos [Federal Access Information and Data Protection Institute] 
(Mexico City, 16 November 2011); interview with Jeremy Johnson, Director National Biometric and 
Child Protection Services, CrimTrac Agency (Canberra, 18 October 2011); interview with Alex 
Webling, Policy Director, Biometrics and Identity, Attorney General's Department (Canberra, 20 
October 2011) This component of the research project received approval from the University of 
Tasmania Human Research Ethics Committee. Approval Ethics Ref: H0012013 of 29/08/2011. 
120
 Here the purpose is related to the Data Protection Principles theory where “the collection of 
information is necessary for a specific purpose”. Kuschewsky, Monika (ed.), Data Protection and 
Privacy Jurisdictional Comparison, above n 16. 
121
 The subsequent aggregated use is prohibit in Data Protection Principles theory where “the 
personal information collected shall not be used for a purpose other than that for which it was 
collected”. Idem. 
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Zealand the TBIF in the context of immigration control is carried out generally by 
data exchange requests to specific authorities, whereas in Spain and Mexico 
generally have systematic data sharing. This TBIF affects privacy and data 
protection rights. This interference or restriction should be in accordance of the law 
and properly balance to decide whether privacy and data protection restrictions are 
necessary and justified in a democratic State.  
 
In summary, the four countries deployed biometric systems as a measure of 
immigration control and there is a current TBIF between countries and international 
organisations. There has been a lack of public debate regarding risks of centralised 
biometric databases for immigration purposes, the way of exchange or share 
immigration information and the linkages between immigration information and 
international criminal databases. In addition, the absence of public scrutiny and 
transparency on the management of biometric databases for immigration purposes, 
the lack of statistics related to the exercise of access, challenges and complaints to 
the processing of travellers’ biometric information and the way TBIF is carried out by 
countries and international organisations raises legal concerns not only related to 
possible breaches of civil liberties in general and travellers’ privacy and data 
protection rights, in particular. But, the deployment of biometric systems and TBIF in 
the context of immigration control restricts individuals’ privacy and data protection 
rights, in general. This situation needs to be assessed according to the 
proportionality principle to properly balance public and private interests122.    
 
4.5.3. Common Control Strategies Deployed in Immigration at the International 
Level. On an international level, it is possible to identify the intensification of the 
deployment of biometric systems and TBIF for immigration purposes. Internationally, 
the implementation of biometric systems in immigration policies was marked by 
combined international cooperation and the facilitation of cross-border information.  
  
There are three significant areas in which the four countries study revealed biometric 
control strategies “as a trade-off for faster immigration processing, passengers will 
have to accept a system which has the potential to generate a vast amount of 
                                            
122
 For further details, see Chapter 7. TransBorder Biometric Privacy Regimes: National Solutions 
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international traffic in their personal data”123. These three common areas are 
classified as follows: 
 
 Amount of transborder information flow, which includes passenger pre-
inspection at departing country and advance passenger information before 
arrival124.  
 
 Security civil aviation, which includes Immigration Liaison Officers (ILOS) 
working together with national and international law enforcement agencies to 
prevent irregular migration and help close down related criminal operations125 
and Airline Liaison Officers (ALOs) who are immigration inspection officers 
working together with airline staff in the prevention of the travel of persons 
with fraudulent travel documents126. 
 
 Carrier Sanctions within Civil Aviation Law. Nationally this legislation aims to 
make carriers co-responsible for embarking and delivering undocumented or 
improperly documented travellers with fake ePassports or without holding a 
                                            
123
 Davies, S., “The Brave new world of biometric identification” (1995) 2 Privacy Law and Policy 
Reporter 30.  
124
 Involves an agreement between countries, as well as between airlines and governments, 
permitting passenger manifests to be sent by the airlines ahead of flights to the immigration 
authorities of the country of destination for pre-checking before arrival. International Organization for 
Migration, “International Terrorism and Migration”, above n 86, p. 16. 
125
 Idem and Civil Aviation Legislation (Mutual Recognition with New Zealand) Act 2006 (Cth), Ley de 
Aviacion Civil, DOF 12/05/1996 [Federal Civil Aviation Law last amended on 21/05/2013] (Mexico) 
http://www.diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/pdf/25.pdf (21/12/2012), Civil Aviation Act 1990 (New 
Zealand) The most recent version of New Zealand Act excludes amendments that are not yet in force 
from 1992, 2007 and 2013 http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/1990/0098/latest/versions.aspx 
(21/12/2012) and Ley 21/2003, de 7 de Julio, de Seguridad Area, BOE-A-2003-13616 [Law 21/2003 
of 7 July, security aviation, last amended 1 March 2014] (Spain) 
http://www.boe.es/buscar/pdf/2003/BOE-A-2003-13616-consolidado.pdf (21/12/2012) 
126
 Idem. 
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visa127. In Australia and New Zealand these type of sanctions are an integral 
part of the pre-embarkation activities abroad128.  
 
With their long sea borders and distance from other countries, Australia and New 
Zealand have been able to capitalize more on offshore clearance processes than 
both Mexico and Spain. Each State considers its own circumstances and adopts the 
policies, administrative structures and legislative measures considered to best suit 
their needs in protecting sovereignty and guaranteeing security.  
 
4.6. Conclusions 
 
The illustrative map of the biometric industry demonstrated the interaction between 
the government and the biometric industry and highlighted the need for the industry 
itself to improve their self-regulation instruments129. This biometric industry has a 
great impact on public policies dealing with immigration, but is contrasted by a lack 
of public debate and civil engagement regarding these policies. This chapter 
explored TBIF in the context of immigration mainly because it is an extensive and 
active area for TBIF. The chapter considered two scenarios in which TBIF may give 
rise to possible short and long-term challenges: one scenario is among the four 
countries examined and the second is between the four countries examined and 
their interaction with international organisations. This TBIF in immigration information 
flow debate should not be confined to the technical aspects of the ways in which 
personal data are collected, updated, retrieved, analysed and exchanged in 
Australia, Mexico, New Zealand and Spain. TBIF in immigration context needs to 
                                            
127
 Civil Aviation Legislation (Mutual Recognition with New Zealand) Act 2006 (Cth), Ley de Aviacion 
Civil, DOF 12/05/1996 [Federal Civil Aviation Law last amended on 21/05/2013] (Mexico) 
http://www.diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/pdf/25.pdf (21/12/2012), Civil Aviation Act 1990 (New 
Zealand) The most recent version of New Zealand Act excludes amendments that are not yet in force 
from 1992, 2007 and 2013 http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/1990/0098/latest/versions.aspx 
(21/12/2012) and Ley 21/2003, de 7 de Julio, de Seguridad Area, BOE-A-2003-13616 [Law 21/2003 
of 7 July, security aviation, last amended 1 March 2014] (Spain) 
http://www.boe.es/buscar/pdf/2003/BOE-A-2003-13616-consolidado.pdf (21/12/2012) 
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 Australia and New Zealand link visa issuance abroad with entry clearance at the port of entry and 
departure, monitoring at the port of exit. For further details see 
http://www.infrastructure.gov.au/aviation/legislation/amendment/ (21/12/2012); International 
Organization for Migration, “International Terrorism and Migration”, above n 86, p. 16. 
129
 For further details, see Chapter 3. The Biometric Industry: An Illustrative Map of Players, Products 
and Partnerships 
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emphasize the lack of public engagement, transparency and scrutiny in the 
deployment of these biometric systems130.  
 
The absence of public debate; the lack of systematic studies on the biometric 
industry; the necessity to improve the biometric industry self-regulation; and, the 
current deployment of centralised biometric databases as well as the specific TBIF in 
immigration information control are exacerbated because the implementation of 
biometric systems is not adequately regulated at an international level. The roles of 
international (ICAO and IOM) and regional organisations (APEC and EU) are 
acknowledge as their established specifications and recommendations for biometric 
systems in travel documents and in border control systems for identification of 
travellers. These organisations are making efforts to create an international 
framework for the deployment of these biometric systems and TBIF. However, these 
attempts require the proactive participation for all sectors, including government, 
industry and social actors. An inclusive strategy is needed regarding more open 
public debate about technical (security) risks and limitations on civil liberties; the 
promotion of privacy and data protection rights; transparency and accountability on 
the management of these centralised national and international biometric databases.  
 
Biometrics are not new131, but what is new are the automated systems that allow a 
considerable volumes of information to be collected, stored, processed and 
exchanged, as discussed in preceding chapters. Even as biometric systems have 
been increasingly deployed, the comparative study of these four countries reveals 
asymmetries and convergences within TBIF in the immigration information flow 
context. All four countries have issued biometric passports132, have also biometric 
systems for issuing visas and electronic Border Control Systems operated most of 
them by a border control officer. The questions arise how biometric border control 
processes are working, who can access immigration information, whether 
immigration information is reliable (integrity of data), what are the risks of data 
protection in third countries, are misclassifications possible of travellers from 
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 For further details, see section 1.5. The Aim and Scope of the Research 
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 For further details, see Chapter 2. Biometric Systems: What is Biometrics? 
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 For further details, see section 3.3.2. ePassport Technology: the New Generation 
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immigration information flow, what are the data storage restrictions in immigration 
control, what are the subsequent automated uses of immigration information through 
the interoperability of dissimilar systems at national and international levels and, 
finally and legally most importantly, how does TBIF in the context of immigration 
information flow impact individual privacy and data protection rights133.    
 
The current interactions of TBIF in the context of immigration information flow require 
a common and harmonised framework with specific rules governing the subsequent 
use of biometric information, cross-border rights and cross-border challenges. In 
addition, countries should be capable of addressing these legal challenges by 
balancing public interests, such as national security and defence, and individuals’ 
privacy and data protection rights134. 
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 For further details, see Chapter 6. Transborder Biometric Information Flows: Legal Challenges 
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CHAPTER 5.  
 
BIOMETRICS IN CRIMINAL DATABASES: CURRENT TRANSBORDER INFORMATION FLOW  
 
 
5.1. Current Biometric Criminal Databases Sketch 
 
In addition to the study of immigration information flow, a study of the challenges of 
Transborder Biometric Information Flows (TBIF) arising within information flow in 
biometric criminal databases was also included. This part of the study has two aims, 
namely: to assess the accuracy of TBIF within the four countries’ criminal database 
legal frameworks and also the adequacy of the privacy and data protection legal 
frameworks implemented in each country.  
 
The comparative four countries study demonstrates that there are legal problems, 
limitations and challenges of TBIF in Australia, Mexico, New Zealand and Spain1. 
The analysis of TBIF involving criminal databases demonstrates that the four 
countries are not only collecting names, physical descriptions and different 
categories of offences but are also collecting biometric characteristics such as DNA, 
face images and fingerprints for entry on their criminal databases. Secondly, this 
study has revealed that reclassifications of crime on these databases have 
expanded to terrorism, cross-border crimes and illegal immigration. Thirdly, in order 
to facilitate the exchange of information, under bilateral or multilateral agreements, 
government agencies are allowing increasing linkage between international and 
national biometric criminal databases.  
 
The four countries study confirms the existence of asymmetries and convergences in 
the operation and practices in relation to TBIF between criminal databases2. 
Australia, Mexico, New Zealand and Spain are collecting different types of biometric 
criminal information and targeting different people for inclusion. Furthermore, the 
types of crimes or offences are also different in each country and most legislation on 
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 For further details, see Chapter 1. Transborder Biometric Information Flows: Legal Challenges 
2
 For further details, see Chapter 6. Transborder Biometric Information Flows: Legal Challenges 
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the limit of time data may be kept varies in different ways from country to country. 
The development of biometric criminal databases policy is in transition with each 
country implementing it at a different pace, trying to make their priorities compatible 
with globalization demands.  
 
Arguably, the operation of Interpol’s databases represents best practice standards 
for biometric criminal databases on processing and exchanging information through 
their standardization of systems and methods. However, the asymmetries among 
national biometric criminal databases pose long and short-term challenges for a 
uniform TBIF at an international level. In addition, the four countries study also 
confirms that a poor level of scrutiny and a lack of public debate have accompanied 
the implementation of biometric criminal databases3. TBIF in the context of criminal 
databases needs to be developed with transparency, scrutiny and citizen 
engagement with input from the range of interests in civil society, including the 
biometric industry itself and supervisory authorities4. The biometric industry needs to 
improve its self-regulation and its engagement with ethical commitments5. These key 
points are underpinned by the theoretical requirements of Habermas and Jasanoff6.    
 
Furthermore, the legal challenges in the deployment of biometric systems and TBIF 
in criminal databases7 requires a balance between any restrictions on individual 
human rights and civil liberties and any public benefits from the use of these modern 
scientific techniques. The proper balance between private and public interests are 
analysed in further chapters8. 
 
This chapter examines the legal and policy aspects of current biometric criminal 
databases. It identifies Interpol´s worldwide databases with particular reference to 
the four countries study. Finally, the chapter highlights the necessity to increase the 
                                            
3
 For further details, see Chapter 1. Transborder Biometric Information Flows: Legal Challenges 
4
 Habermas, Jürgen, “Sfera pubblica (Una voce di enciclopedia)”, Cultura e Critica, (Einaudi, 1980); 
Jasanoff, Sheila, Designs on Nature, Science and Democracy in Europe and the United States, 
(Princeton University Press, 2007). 
5
 For further details, see Chapter 3. The Biometric Industry: An Illustrative Map or Players, Products 
and Partnerships 
6
 Habermas, Jürgen, “Sfera pubblica (Una voce di enciclopedia)”, above n 4; Jasanoff, Sheila, 
Designs on Nature, Science and Democracy in Europe and the United States, above n 4. 
7
 For further details, see Chapter 6. Transborder Biometric Information Flows: Legal Challenges 
8
 For further details, see Chapter 7. Transborder Biometric Privacy Regimes: National Solutions 
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level of transparency and accountability surrounding the expansion of biometric 
criminal databases. 
 
5.2. Debates and Justifications for Transborder Biometric Information Flow and 
Criminal databases 
 
Despite the deployment of biometric databases and TBIF for crime prevention, there 
has been little public political and legal debate or discussion9 as compared with 
privacy debates related to ordinary national criminal databases. This lack of public 
discourse on the creation of biometric criminal databases may be interpreted as the 
consequence of the day-to-day conduct of society by elites10 and fails to fulfil the 
theoretical requirements of Jasanoff and Habermas for public discourse on such 
major developments.  Groups of experts can be identified, who control or advise 
parliaments and governments, and who hold the technical biometric “elite 
knowledge” without making this knowledge available to their own citizens11.  
 
“State policies, correspondingly, are geared more and more toward nurturing 
and exploiting knowledge, with scientific knowledge and technical expertise 
commanding the highest premiums”12. 
 
In the contexts of the four countries study of Australia13, Mexico14, New Zealand15 
and Spain16, there has been little public debate about criminal databases and most 
                                            
9
 This is because most of the debate has been in official discourse, seminar papers, conference 
presentations slides and government reports. 
10
 Jasanoff, Sheila, Designs on Nature, Science and Democracy in Europe and the United States, 
above n 4; Habermas, Jürgen, “Sfera pubblica (Una voce di enciclopedia)”, above n 4. 
11
 Idem. 
12
 Ibidem, p. 4. 
13
 Since September 11, 2001, the Australia national security agenda has emphasised counter-
terrorism arrangements and developed tools needed to fight crime and provide law enforcement with 
DNA databases. This allows police and forensic scientists from all nine police jurisdictions to compare 
DNA profiles across borders and exchange information held in every state and territory. See Australia 
Government, CrimTrac, Full Report (Annual Report for 2009-10) 
14
 The Mexican government’s priorities are to fight crime, decrease corruption, and increase security. 
In 2004, 2008, 2010 and 2012, the Mexican Political Constitution was reformed to articulate the 
National System of Public Security (SNSP) and outline the characteristics of the competent authorities 
of the Federation, the Federal District –Mexico City-, 31 states and the municipalities in the National 
Public Security Council (CNSP).  
15
 In 2003, the Criminal Investigations (Bodily Samples) Act 1995 was amended and came into force. 
The Act’s purpose is to expand the DNA criminal databank. The New Zealand government recognised 
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of the decision-making processes are dominated not only by domestic concerns, but 
also by international security considerations that highlight the “prevention of cross-
border crimes and combat terrorism agenda”17.  
 
On an international level, the justification for criminal database TBIF can be 
summarised as follows: to solve unsolved cases by identifying persons in the DNA or 
Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS) database of another country; to 
link unsolved crimes to unsolved crimes in different countries to the same –yet 
unidentified- persons; to establish the true identity of persons in different countries; 
and, to issue arrest warrants and request information regarding the whereabouts of 
persons18. In addition, following various highly publicised terrorist attacks around the 
world, a new argument was emerged, namely to prevent terrorism. Criminal 
database TBIF between countries and international agencies has become crucial not 
only for migration but also inter-jurisdictional police co-operation. 
 
While biometric criminal databases may be used for TBIF to facilitate cross-border 
cooperation, it is important that citizens have freedom to decide their own destiny 
                                                                                                                                       
that some inmates convicted prior to the commencement of the Act may be responsible for the 
commission of earlier unsolved crimes. Two committees of the New Zealand Parliament, the Justice 
and Electoral Committee and the Law and Order Committee, examined the 2003 Amendment Act and 
recommended it be passed with amendments. See Criminal Investigations (Bodily Samples) 
Amendment Act 2009 (09/46); (10 February 2009) 652 NZPD 1125; Criminal Investigations (Bodily 
Samples) Act 1995 No. 55 (as of 01 October 2010)  
16
 There was a lack of coordination between the national and autonomous community police agencies 
and the proliferation of local and national criminal databases, as well as the commitments acquired by 
the Schengen zone and Prüm convention. Therefore, Spain was forced to reorganize its police 
agencies and its national information systems. See the Preamble of the Ley Orgánica 10/2007, de 8 
de octubre, reguladora de la base de datos policial sobre identificadores obtenidos a partir del ADN, 
BOE-A-2007-17634 [Organic Law 10/2007 regulating the police database on identifiers obtained from 
DNA] (Spain) http://www.boe.es/diario_boe/txt.php?id=BOE-A-2007-17634 (21/12/2012) 
17
 Multinational declarations, such as those emerging from G-7 summits, have expanded their scope 
and include talks concerning terrorism, the drug trade, and recently, money laundering. The G-7 
Summit is an annual meeting of the heads of government of the leading seven industrial nations –the 
United States, Italy, France, the United Kingdom, Japan, Canada and Germany. Its agenda is 
predominantly economic, and is prepared by representatives of the various governments. 
Traditionally, a statement is released at the end of each summit that contains the agreements 
reached on policies. Zagaris, Bruce and Aguilar, Álvaro, “Enforcement of Intellectual Property 
Protection Between Mexico and the United States: A Precursor of Criminal Enforcement for Western 
Hemispheric Integration?” (1994) 1(5) Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law 
Journal 42-123. 
18
 Uthmani, Omair, et. al., “Crime risk evaluation within information sharing between the police and 
community partners”, (2011) 20(2) Information & Communication Technology Law 57-81; Tupman, 
W.A, “Cross-National Criminal Databases: The ongoing search for safeguards”, (1995) 4(3) 
Information & Communication Technology Law 261-275. 
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and interests as an essential part of social and political interaction. Aragón argues 
that “popular sovereignty rests on the notion of political consensus”, so in this case 
the sovereign collectively follows “the rule of the majority”19. However, the absence 
of open public debate dilutes any political consensus and the rule of the majority. In 
the modern concept of democracy, the principles of majority, constitutionalism and 
political representation are incorporated20. Similarly, Nino argues that government 
can justify a solution when all those affected by a decision have participated in 
discussion and have had equal opportunity to express their interests21. In this same 
sense, Águila has stated, “participation serves, at the same time, for: 1) 
guaranteeing collective self-governance, and 2) achieving the creation of citizens 
who are informed and committed to public welfare. Collective deliberation in the 
scope of public affairs thus generates both self-government and civility”22. For 
Habermas23 and Jasanofff24, public debate is essential to provide a theoretical basis 
for planning and to emphasize public participation, public information sharing, 
consensus through open and public dialogue, and avoiding or privileging experts and 
bureaucrats.  
 
In Australia, New Zealand and Spain, two types of concerns were identified in 
national level debates. The first related to the potential of databases to affect privacy, 
self-determination and data protection rights; the second related to the greater 
benefits of linking databases and TBIF in the context of information flow in criminal 
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 Aragón, Manuel, Constitución, Democracia y Control, (Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas de la 
UNAM, 2002), p. 17. 
20
 Thus, there is a reference to representative democracy, a regime that comes along with the 
formation of a liberal-constitutional State. There are several tints, according to the treatment that 
several authors give to democracy, we may say that the modern concept of democracy, “liberal 
democracy”, refers to a political system based on popular power in the sense that the ownership of 
power belongs to demos while the exercise is entrusted to representatives elected on a periodic basis 
by the people. Therefore, the exercise of popular power resolves, to a great extent, electoral power. 
On the other hand, the classical theory of liberal democracy assumes that the existence of a market 
and individual freedoms in economic aspects is a condition for the existence of political democracy; 
that is, that there is a country and a market with borders. 
21
 Nino, Carlos, La constitución de la democracia deliberativa, (Gedisa, 1997), p. 166. 
22
 Águila, Rafael del  Manual de Ciencia Política (Editorial Trotta, 5
th
 ed, 2008). 
23
 Habermas argues that the attempt to interpret popular sovereignty in procedural terms must be 
“carefully defined so as not to divest popular sovereignty of its radical-democratic content”. He 
restates the principle of popular sovereignty in terms of discourse theory: “all political power derives 
from the communicative power of citizens”. Jürgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, 
(Thomas McCarthy trans, Beacon Press, 1984). 
24
 Jasanoff, Sheila, Designs on Nature, Science and Democracy in Europe and the United States, 
above n 4. 
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databases in order to prevent terrorism, to enhance border security and to fight 
organised crime25. 
 
By contrast, in Mexico, three opportunities for national public debate were identifiable 
but were not realised. Debates were possible but did not eventuate.  In Mexico, there 
was no public discussion or debate about linking databases nationally or 
internationally26. The three possible opportunities of public discussion were: 
 
1) First, in 2007, the Mexican government proposed the design of procedures, 
manuals and standards, as well as of the architecture for the development of 
biometric data27. No public debate accompanied this proposal.   
 
2) Secondly, the Ministry for Public Security (SSP)28 developed a National Program 
of Public Security (PNSP) for 2008-2012, with seven strategic objectives, one of 
which was called “Platform Mexico”29. This Ministry was dissolved in December 
2012 when a new Government administration assumed power. All the powers 
and projects of the former SSP were reassigned to the Ministry of Internal Affairs. 
 
                                            
25
 Interview with Charlotte Epstein, Professor, University of Sydney (Sydney, 26 October 2011); 
Interview with Katina Michael, Associate Professor, University of Wollongong (Sydney, 21 February 
2012); Interview with Pilar Nicolas, Professor, University of Deusto (Bilbao, 10 November 2011) This 
component of the research project received approval from the University of Tasmania Human 
Research Ethics Committee. Approval Ethics Ref: H0012013 of 29/08/2011. 
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 Interview with Ernesto Villanueva Villanueva and Issa Luna Pla, Professors, Instituto de 
Investigaciones Jurídicas de la Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México [Legal Research Centre of 
the National Autonomous University of Mexico] (Mexico City, 23 November 2011) This component of 
the research project received approval from the University of Tasmania Human Research Ethics 
Committee. Approval Ethics Ref: H0012013 of 29/08/2011. 
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 It is possible to conclude this from the Mexican State of the Nation address. Mexico Government, 
Presidential Office, First Report regarding the Application of the National Development Plan 2007-
2012, Rule of Law and Security (2007) 
http://pnd.presidencia.gob.mx/pdf/PrimerInformeEjecucion/1_3.pdf (21/12/2012) 
28
 The Secretariat for Public Security (SSP) was the Federal Civil Service body which aimed to 
preserve freedom, order and public peace, and to safeguard the integrity and rights of the people by 
preventing the commission of crimes. This Secretary or Minister no longer exists as of 1 December 
2012.   
29
 Conectividad a la Plataforma México [Connectivity Platform Mexico] (April 2010) 
http://portal.secretariadoejecutivosnsp.gob.mx/webfiles/pdf/cni-cpm-10_1.pdf  (21/12/2012) 
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3) Thirdly, in February 2008, the Mexican government applied to the Inter-American 
Development Bank for technical cooperation to develop the strategic plan for 
“Platform Mexico Project” (ME-T1094)30. Again, no debate ensued. 
 
However, it is possible to find media releases promoting the “Platform Mexico 
Project”31 and the advantages of this linkage between Mexico and Interpol32. From 
papers presented at seminars and conference presentation slides presented by the 
Mexican authorities, it is possible to identify an official policy position. Nevertheless, 
there have been no critics of the Platform Mexico nor any public debates or 
academic discussions about TBIF between Mexican biometric criminal databases 
and international criminal databases. 
 
In essence, the four countries examined share a comprehensive lack of public 
debate and a poor level of scrutiny on TBIF in the context of information flow in 
criminal databases. These countries share the same objective to “improve 
international cooperation”.  The failure to foster a robust public discussion about the 
implementation of biometric criminal databases, and the relative exclusion of key 
actors from different areas from participating in the development of regulatory 
frameworks is a major deficiency. By comparison and in stark contrast, privacy and 
data protection regime debates have been very different and openly discussed with 
public participation, reaching consensus for guidelines and ethical commitments 
nationally and internationally. 
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 The technical cooperation requested for “Platform Mexico” also included a budget for internal 
organisation of the Ministry of Public Security. Mexico Government, Minister of Public Security, 
Platform Mexico, 1
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 Report of Duty 2006-2007 (2007) 
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Release, 3 June 2008) http://www.interpol.int/News-and-media/News-media-
releases/2008/N20080603 (21/12/2012) 
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5.3. Policy Development: The Transition to biometric criminal databases 
 
There has been a steady transition from the use of traditional criminal databases 
towards the implementation of biometric criminal databases. Biometric criminal 
databases were the essential foundation for international linkages and TBIF. During 
this transition stage, it is possible to track three key elements in the actual policy 
development: the biometric information collected; the reclassification of crimes; and, 
the actual exchanges and linkages between databases. 
 
5.3.1. Information Collected. The first element in this transition is the information 
collected in criminal databases: from nominal or textual characteristics to biometric 
characteristics. The purposes for which biometric information is collected is also 
relevant to this discussion. 
 
Nowadays, criminal databases not only collect names, dates of birth, sex, physical 
descriptions and categories of offences, but also include some biometric 
characteristics like DNA, face images, fingerprints, iris patterns or voice. 
 
Each country’s national criminal legislation sets the criteria for collecting, accessing, 
storing and deleting information and database management. As criteria are set at the 
national level, it is possible to find asymmetries among criminal databases reflected 
at the international level. Information collection criteria are not determined by 
scientific or technological standards, but by these national legal prescriptions. At this 
point, countries are collecting biometric information: a) related only to crimes; b) 
related to crimes and other biometric data; or c) related to crimes, biometric data and 
more information as a result of the linkage among biometric criminal databases. A 
distinct and common characteristic related to the varied information collected, during 
this transition phase is that different countries are collecting biometric data but then 
start to use it for other purposes33. 
 
                                            
33
 For further details, see Chapter 6. Transborder Biometric Information Flows: Legal Challenges 
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Accordingly, the development of national criminal database frameworks, as well as 
and international linkages, should be negotiated with the highest degree of 
transparency and the involvement of data protection authorities34. 
 
5.3.2. Reclassification of Crimes. The second element in this transition stage is the 
reclassification of crimes. Because of the need to combat terrorism, cross-border 
crimes and illegal immigration, countries require international co-operation. This 
requires a consistent classification of crimes at a national level.  
 
In Europe, for example, the Schengen Information System II35 is a biometric list of 
wanted and unwanted persons designed to prevent cross-border crimes and illegal 
immigration. The Prüm Convention36 authorised the expansion of the classifications 
of information collected to create a more extensive database of biometric 
characteristics compiled to tackle not only cross-border crimes, but also terrorism 
and illegal immigration.  
 
 Terrorism 
 
After terrorist attacks in 2001, countries developed a “unique global instrument to 
enhance national, regional and international efforts to counter terrorism”37. 
International cooperation is continuing and expanding at an international level38.  
 
At a national level, countries introduced amendments to their criminal laws and 
prosecution systems to include terrorism as a transnational crime and terrorism-
related offences. For example in New Zealand, terrorism-related offences include 
terrorist bombing, financing of terrorism, recruiting members of terrorist groups, 
participating in terrorist groups, hijacking, other crimes relating to aircraft, crime 
                                            
34
 For further details, see Chapter 8. Conclusions 
35
 For further details, see Appendix F. Schengen Information System 
36
 For further details, see Appendix G. Prüm Convention 
37
 United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, GA Res 60/288, UN GAOR, 116
th
 sess, 117
th
 
plen mtg, Agenda Item 46, UN Doc A/Res60/288 (20 September 2006, adopted 8 September 2006).  
38
 There are 13 international conventions http://www.un.org/terrorism/instruments.shtml (21/12/2012) 
These instruments were developed under the auspices of the United Nations, its specialized agencies 
and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and are open to the participation of all Member 
States. 
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relating to international airports, and wrecking39. In Mexico, the definition of terrorism, 
as a crime, embodies an historical aspect related to treason. The Mexican Federal 
Criminal Code classifies the crimes of national terrorism and international terrorism40. 
 
Terrorism and counter-terrorism have been widely debated, but a legal classification 
problem arises when discussion turns to ‘terrorist activity’. This type of activity is 
included in criminal databases because it encompasses ‘crime prevention’ 
justifications41.  But the term is not specific and precise and the current definition of 
‘terrorist activity’42 depends on individual assessment. Habermas might explain this 
as “the intent to legitimate political decisions in a less rational way”43. Such 
assessments affect civil liberties. 
 
 Cross-border crimes 
 
Cross-border crimes are classified as ‘transnational organised crimes’44 and are 
treated as domestic criminal offences. These offences may directly or indirectly 
threaten individuals but also social, cultural, economic and political regimes. 
Activities considered cross border crimes are: drug trafficking, people trafficking, 
trafficking in firearms, smuggling of migrants; money laundering45 and terrorism, 
                                            
39
 Criminal Investigations (Bodily Samples) Amendment Act 2003 (New Zealand) 
40
 Therefore, since 1917, all crimes related to treason to homeland like terrorism, sabotage, 
conspiracy, rebellion, mutiny, sedition or insurrection are considered as serious offence by the Código 
Penal Federal, DOF 14/08/1931 [Federal Criminal Code, last amendment 14/06/2012] (Mexico) 
http://www.diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/pdf/9.pdf (21/12/2012) 
41
 Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth); the Ley Orgánica 10/1995, de 23 de noviembre, del Código Penal, 
BOE-A-1995-25444 [Organic Law 10/1995 Criminal Code] (Spain) 
https://www.boe.es/buscar/doc.php?id=BOE-A-1995-25444 (21/12/2012); Criminal Investigations 
(Bodily Samples) Amendment Act 2003 (New Zealand) and Código Penal Federal, DOF 14/08/1931 
[Federal Criminal Code, last amendment 14/06/2012] (Mexico) 
http://www.diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/pdf/9.pdf (21/12/2012) 
42
 Reviewing the Australian, Mexican, New Zealand and Spanish criminal legislation, it is possible to 
define terrorist activity as situations in which “groups or individuals operate entirely inside a country, 
attempting to influence the government or population to effect political or social change”.   
43
 Habermas, Jürgen (1980), “Sfera pubblica (Una voce di enciclopedia)”, above n 4. 
44
 There is no single accepted definition of transnational organised crime. Mueller, Gerhard O. W.  
“Transnational Crime: Definitions and Concepts,” (1998) 4 Transnational Organized Crime 13-21; 
Williams, Paul D. Security Studies. An Introduction, (Routledge, 2008); Collins, Alan, Contemporary 
Security Studies, (Oxford University Press, 2007); Barkawi, Tarak and Laffey, Mark (eds.) “The post-
colonial moment in security studies” (2001) 32(2) Review of International Studies 329-352.  
45
 United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, opened for signature on 15 
November 2000 (entered into force on 29 September 2003). 
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among others transnational crimes46. These are the typical offences that trigger 
inclusion in international criminal databases.  
 
However, as noted, there is no consistent international classification. Each country 
decides which criminal offences should be included in their criminal databases and 
what information will be exchangeable. Policy making is undertaken at a national, 
rather than an international level.  
 
 Illegal immigrants 
 
Migration, including illegal immigration, is a complex issue47 that has an impact on 
the economy and social life of any countries. Most countries are designing their 
migration policies based on economic and social benefit48 with little open and public 
dialogue consensus through real deliberative democracy49. Migration discourse 
centres on two areas: the first relates to combating people smuggling50, and the 
second to border security in terms of avoiding the threat of terrorists entering a 
country. Many countries place illegal immigration in the same policy debates about 
terrorism and cross-border crimes, in this transition stage of policy making. In this 
context, if countries continue to strengthen their migration policies, there is a 
possibility that some countries could categorize illegal immigration as criminal 
activity.    
 
 
                                            
46
 Intellectual property crime, cybercrime, maritime piracy, stolen motor vehicles, environmental crime, 
counterfeit medical products, firearms trafficking, stolen works of art and stolen travel documents. 
47
 For further details, see Chapter 4. Biometric Systems in the Context of Transborder Immigration 
Flow 
48
 Like Weber’s “bureaucratic domination” concept in which bureaucracy is impersonal and “depends 
upon regular income, and hence at least a portion on a money economy and money taxes”. Gerth, H. 
H. And Wright Mills, L. (ed.) From Max Webber, Essays in Sociology, (Rutledge, 2009). 
49
 Habermas, Jürgen, “Sfera pubblica (Una voce di enciclopedia)”, above n 4; Jasanoff, Sheila, 
Designs on Nature, Science and Democracy in Europe and the United States, above n 4. 
50
 For Interpol “people smuggling simply implies the procurement, for financial or material gain, of the 
illegal entry into a state of which the individual is neither a citizen nor a permanent resident. 
Trafficking is distinct from smuggling insofar as the traffic of human beings involves the exploitation of 
the migrant, often for purposes of forced labour and prostitution” http://www.interpol.int/Crime-
areas/Trafficking-in-human-beings/Trafficking-in-human-beings (21/12/2012). 
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5.3.3. Exchanging and Linking Databases to enable Transborder Biometric 
Information Flow (TBIF). The third element of this transition is the way in which TBIF 
is carried out, the exchange of information by specific request and the actual linkage 
of databases by systematic sharing data between countries for international 
cooperation.  
 
In both cases of TBIF, the exchanging or linking of national criminal information with 
any international agency or country means not only sharing information, but also its 
processing personal information. In the last two decades, TBIF has been possible, 
mainly in Europe51 through Interpol52 with background checks, for example based on 
textual information searches by name, aliases, date of birth and sex. Nowadays, 
TBIF is a reality everywhere, and searches can be performed, not only on textual 
information but on DNA, fingerprints, iris, face images and other biometric 
characteristics.   
 
Concerning international cooperation and assistance, there are challenges in 
consistency of criteria and creating open and representative procedures in specific 
institutional contexts. There are different forms of international cooperation and 
assistance: bilateral or multilateral treaties, and/or cooperation with international or 
regional organizations or agencies that facilitate the TBIF by exchanging specific 
information or linking different databases. In the global era, the TBIF should to be 
possible via the Internet, across the world using biometric systems without any 
problems posed by the range of the Roman alphabet, the Cyrillic alphabet or 
Chinese characters. Biometric characteristics should be insensitive to text characters 
or language translation. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
51
 At that time, systems included the Schengen Information System, SIRENE, EUROPOL, 
EURODAC, Customs Information System (CIS) and the Visa Information System (VIS).  
52
 Since 1987, Interpol has operated its own Criminal Intelligence Database or Criminal Information 
System (ICIS). 
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5.4. Criminal Databases: A Comparison of Standards and  Consistency 
 
Criminal databases have been studied for a long period and some of the policy 
issues considered include: a) people registered by type of crimes or offences, b) 
limitations on the period of time the data may be kept, c) authorised user access 
profiles, d) how often information can be accessed and for what purposes, e) 
interoperability between databases, and f) data protection at a different pace than 
that of how the information actually flows53.  
 
Nowadays, many international agencies and organisations with different aims but 
related roles, such as Europol and Interpol operate criminal databases. There are 
also different systems, with similar objectives but different structures, which manage 
criminal information for crime prevention and migration purposes, such as 
EURODAC54, and the Schengen Information System II55, expanded by the Prüm 
Convention56. There has not been widespread debate on how do these organisations 
and systems work; how recommendations are made and implemented; or, how 
specifications for biometric criminal databases are established57. In this section, the 
implementation of biometric criminal databases is examined through the lens of 
Interpol’s databases and a comparison of national cases, in the four countries study, 
to identify the differences between countries and Interpol in terms of what and how 
information is collected.  
 
                                            
53
 Romeo Casabona, Carlos Maria (ed), Bases de datos de perfiles de ADN y criminalidad, (Cátedra 
Interuniversitaria, Fundación BBVA-Diputación Foral de Bizkaia de Derecho y Genoma Humano, 
2002). 
54
 For further details, see Appendix E. Eurodac Introductory Information  
55
 For further information, see Appendix F. Schengen Information System  
56
 For further information, see Appendix G. Prüm Convention. Member States have direct access to 
the databases of another Member States. Authorities responsible for immigration and administration 
of aliens have direct access.  In addition, Prüm DNA database and AFIS database are compatible 
with INTERPOL databases. Council Decision 2008/615/JHA on the stepping up of cross-border 
cooperation, particularly in combating terrorism and cross-border crime, [2008] OJ L 210/1. 
Also, it will be possible to link with the Platform Mexico because of the interoperability of Mexican 
databases and INTERPOL databases.  
57
 Most of the literature explains the EU treaties that creates these databases in general, but 
regarding the management, operation and statistics of these international biometric systems are 
minimal. 
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5.4.1. Interpol Databases with Worldwide Coverage. Interpol performs an important 
function as the only police organisation with worldwide coverage58. The Interpol 
intelligence System (ICIS) differs from other systems, as it is international in nature 
while others are European systems59. Interpol does not have teams of detectives 
with supranational powers to travel around investigating cases in different countries. 
Interpol officers are bound by the laws of each nation and Interpol itself respects 
national sovereignty that permeates the execution of its tasks and operations60. 
However, the TBIF is governed by Interpol’s own structures and procedures. 
 
Each Member State of Interpol provides and maintains a national Interpol office as a 
National Central Bureau (NCB). Interpol has developed the I-24/7 Global Police 
Communication System to connect National Central Bureaus to the Interpol General 
Secretariat61. This in turn creates a global network for exchanging police information 
and providing member country law enforcement authorities with instant and direct 
access to a wide range of criminal information through a variety of databases and 
other services62.  
 
All databases, except one with child sexual abuse exploitation images, are 
accessible through the I-24/7. The main databases available are: nominal data, 
notices, stolen and lost travel documents, stolen administrative documents, stolen 
                                            
58
 Interpol has 190 member countries. For its purpose, policy aims, legal bases and organisational 
overview, see the official web site at http://www.interpol.int/ (21/12/2012). Another important reason 
for choosing Interpol and not Europol can be found in the observation made by the European Union 
Committee of the House of Lords: “Europol has only recently established its own information system, 
after extensive delays. Neither agency has sufficient relevant expertise in managing large-scale 
information systems. In the case of Europol there might be a conflict of interest, or at least a 
perception of one, between its role as a user of the service and as a service provider, particularly 
since it is supposed to have access only to limited categories of data”. European Union Committee, 
House of Lords, Schengen Information System II (SIS II), 9
th
 Report of Session 2006-07 (2007).  
59
 Since 1987, Interpol has operated its own Criminal Intelligence Database or Criminal Information 
System (ICIS). The aim was to improve methods of storing and retrieving information on crimes and 
criminals, to speed up replies to Interpol National Central Bureau (NCB) inquiries, and give the 
Interpol Police Division immediate, direct access to the computerised files. 
60
 For example, the Mexican Constitution has embodied a concern for Mexican sovereignty 
throughout its history. 
61
 Located in Lyon, France. 
62
 Interpol’s overview website http://www.interpol.int/INTERPOL-expertise/Overview (21/12/2012) 
151 
 
motor vehicles, stolen works of art, DNA profiles, fingerprints, fusion task force63, fast 
disaster victim identification64 and counterfeit payment cards65. 
 
Countries can exchange not only nominal data, but also DNA, fingerprints and 
palmprints. Interpol rules on processing and exchanging information66 were revised 
in 2009 and Interpol launched the “I-link”, the first operative system developed to 
improve the exchange of information between member countries67. “I-link” is a 
technological tool that ensures data consistency. It includes an option for storing 
queries in the database and receiving an alert if a match is found on the data at a 
later date.  
 
The international DNA database and the Automated Fingerprints Identification 
Systems (AFIS) used by Interpol are centralised databases68. For example, these 
Interpol biometric criminal databases are compatible with the Combined DNA Index 
System software (CODIS)69 used by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 
Schengen Information System II and the Platform Mexico70. 
 
 
 
                                            
63
 Interpol Fusion Task Force website http://www.interpol.int/Public/FusionTaskForce/default.asp 
(21/12/2012) 
64
 Interpol Fast and Efficient International Disaster Victim Identification website 
http://www.interpol.int/INTERPOL-expertise/Databases/FASTID/FAST-and-efficient-international-
disaster-victim-IDentification (21/12/2012) 
65
 Interpol counterfeit Payment Cards website http://www.interpol.int/Crime-areas/Financial-
crime/Payment-cards (21/12/2012) 
66
 For example, the requirements for fingerprints, palmprints and also DNA. 
67
 Interpol Data Exchange website http://www.interpol.int/INTERPOL-expertise/Data-exchange/I-link 
(21/12/2012)  
68
 The requirements for fingerprints and palmprints are: to adopt and adhere to the standard 
ANSI/NIST (Type 4 images if it is for ten print processing, and type 7 or 15 if it is palmprint 
processing), use the Acquisition Guidelines for National AFIS, use the international fingerprint or 
palmprint matching tool (INT-1), use the fingerprint image capture system, and use the fingerprint 
image compression (WSQ Gray Scale). 
69
 The CODIS version 5.7.3., called “Interpol Export Tool”, will facilitate member countries’ extraction 
of DNA profiles ready for data input through the Interpol DNA Gateway. 
70
 In 2008, Mexico linked their national criminal databases with Interpol by connecting Platform 
Mexico to Global Police Communications System I-24/7. This means that when a Mexican police 
officer updates a national criminal database, it will automatically update Interpol data. At the same 
time, it will also record, store, organise, consult and use Interpol databases on wanted persons, stolen 
and lost travel documents and stolen motor vehicles as it updates its own databases. Interpol, 
“Mexico to link its databases with INTERPOL’s in unique new partnership”, above n 32 and Otero, 
Silvia, “Conectarán Plataforma México con Interpol”, El Universal, above n 31. 
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Regarding Stolen and Lost Travel Documents (SLTD), the Interpol database holds 
information about travel documents and identity cards reported lost or stolen in 161 
countries71. A significant characteristic of the SLTD databases is that most of the 
travel documents are biometric travel documents. For example: APEC Business 
Travel Cards, Schengen Zone Visas, Interpol personnel ePassports and the four 
countries study. This database allows immigration and border control officers to 
validate a suspect travel document in a matter of seconds72.   
 
In 2010, Interpol launched a new database called Fast and Efficient International 
Disaster Victim Identification (FastID), which is a centralised database to identify and 
link missing people and unidentified bodies by means of decentralised access 
available through “I-link” 73. 
 
5.4.2. Interpol Database Best Practices. Interpol rules on processing and exchanging 
information allow countries to exchange not only nominal data, but also DNA, 
fingerprints and palmprints74.  Interpol’s biometric criminal databases are capable of 
use as identification systems when used to search for and compare sample profiles. 
For security reasons, Interpol operates a system of standardized methods, loci and 
systems75. Interpol has developed rules on conditions and basic procedures 
according to which information must be processed in accordance with Article 2 of 
Interpol’s Constitution and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.   
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
71
 Interpol Stolen and Lost Travel Documents (SLTD), http://www.interpol.int/INTERPOL-
expertise/Databases (21/12/2012) 
72
 For further details, see Chapter 4. Biometric Systems in the Context of Transborder Immigration 
Flow 
73
 Interpol Data Exchange website http://www.interpol.int/INTERPOL-expertise/Data-exchange/I-link 
(21/12/2012). 
74
 For example, the requirements for fingerprints and palmprints, as well as for DNA.  
75
 Interpol actively participates with international standards committees focusing on forensic DNA and 
other biometric characteristics, for example the European Network of Forensic Science Institute 
(ENFSI) http://www.enfsi.eu/index.php  (21/12/2012) and International Organization for 
Standardization (ISO) http://www.iso.org/iso/home.html (21/12/2012) 
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 Standardisation of methods.  
 
Interpol has been a leader in standardization of data. There are four main documents 
that standardise the information that Interpol collects, stores, retrieves and 
exchanges. These documents are the “[r]ules on the processing of information for 
the purposes of international police co-operation”76, “[i]mplementing rules on the 
processing of information for the purposes of international police co-operation”77, the 
“[r]ules governing access by an intergovernmental organization to the Interpol 
telecommunications network and databases”78 and the “[r]ules on the Control of 
Information and access to INTERPOL's files”79. 
  
Standardisation includes the purposes for which information is processed80, the role 
of the General Secretariat81, the role of entities in the processing of information82, the 
organization’s databases83, the right to process information, confidentiality of 
information, processing security, general conditions for processing information84, 
general procedure for processing information, cases in which the General Secretariat 
must consult the source of an item of information, deadline and postponement of the 
deadline for examining the need to hold on to certain information, the provision on 
modifying, blocking or destroying a piece of information85 and their consequences86. 
It includes also the conditions and instances in which an item of information may be 
                                            
76
 Rules on the Processing of Information for the purposes of international police cooperation (RPI) 
(2008). 
77
 Implementing rules on the processing of information for the purposes of international police co-
operation (2009). 
78
 Rules governing access by an intergovernmental organization to the Interpol telecommunications 
network and databases http://www.interpol.int/en/About-INTERPOL/Legal-materials/Fundamental-
texts (21/12/2012) 
79
 Rules on the Control of Information and access to INTERPOL's files (2010). 
80
 This includes processing for international police co-operation purposes, as well as for any other 
legitimate purpose. 
81
 This includes the request for information and conclusion of co-operation agreements. 
82
 This includes the role of National Central Bureaus in their relations with the authorized national 
institutions, provisions of information, control of information by the information source and the use of 
information.  
83
 This includes different categories of databases in addition to conditions for setting up and deleting 
databases. 
84
 This includes provisions relating to particularly sensitive information, to extracted information, to 
processing information for other legitimate purposes and to the processing of notices.  
85
 This includes the initiative of an entity other than the source of an item of information and provisions 
specifically concerning notices.  
86
 This includes action taken by the General Secretariat and the retention of elements of an item of 
information.  
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provided, methods of providing information, the retention of requests for information 
received and of the communications themselves. 
 
Interpol has also developed rules for direct access, downloading and 
interconnection; provisions for an authorised entity to directly record information on 
an autonomous database; requisitioning and providing information in urgent 
situations; provisions related to monitoring the processing of information in Interpol 
files; and, access to such information. 
 
 Standardisation of loci.  
 
Interpol has also developed a set of standardized loci which are used by 185 
member countries to exchange biometric information. This Interpol set is called the 
Interpol Standard Set of Loci (ISSOL). While the ISSOL is identical to the European 
Standard Set (ESS)87, the ISSOL is recommended for easier international 
comparison as the minimum requirement for entry is 6 of the 24 STR (Short Tandem 
Repeat) plus the gender marker Amelogenin88.  
 
 Standardisation of system.  
 
In the case of DNA databases, Interpol encourages countries to use the “I-link” as 
their main operative system to run the I-24/7 portal on which all databases are 
accessible online89. The “I-link” is accessible to all member countries upon 
acceptance of: the Communication Security Charter90, the use of the international 
DNA matching tool91 and compliance with the international data exchange format 
                                            
87
 The requirements for DNA databases are to: use the international DNA standard (ISSOL - This is 
the standard set of loci that Interpol recommends for easier international comparison. Locus [pl. loci] 
is the physical location of a gene [or DNA region of interest] on a chromosome), to accept Interpol 
DNA charter, use the international DNA matching tool (©IPSG Lyon), use the international data 
exchange format (IPSG .xsd / .xml) and use the Secure Telecommunication Network (I-24/7). 
88
 Interpol (2009), Interpol Handbook on DNA Data Exchange and Practice, Appendix 1: Interpol 
Standard Set Of Loci: ISSOL, p. 84    http://www.interpol.int/INTERPOL-expertise/Forensics/DNA 
(21/12/2012) 
89
 Except the database on child sexual abuse exploitation images. 
90
 Rules on the Control of Information and access to INTERPOL's files (2010) 
http://www.interpol.int/en/About-INTERPOL/Legal-materials/Fundamental-texts (21/12/2012) 
91
 Interpol (2009), Interpol Handbook on DNA Data Exchange and Practice 
http://www.interpol.int/INTERPOL-expertise/Forensics/DNA (21/12/2012) 
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programme92. In the case of fingerprints and palmprints databases, all member 
countries must adopt and adhere to the ANSI/NIST standard and use the Acquisition 
Guidelines for National AFIS. Countries also must use the international fingerprint or 
palmprint matching tool, the fingerprint image capture system and fingerprint image 
compression. 
 
In the view of this study, Interpol, through these three standardization processes of 
methods, loci and systems, represents the current international best practices for 
criminal databases in the ways Interpol collects, stores, retrieves and exchanges 
criminal information in TBIF. 
 
5.4.3. National Criminal Databases: A Case Study. The Interpol system stands in 
contrast to national criminal databases. Each country’s particular criteria for the 
collection, access, storage, deletion of information and database management is set 
by its national criminal law.  
 
The asymmetries among criminal databases are reflected on an international level. 
This section will give a brief description of criminal databases in Australia93, 
Mexico94, New Zealand95 and Spain96. The aim is to identify how countries use their 
                                            
92
 Rules on the Processing of Information for the purposes of international police cooperation (RPI) 
(2008) http://www.interpol.int/en/About-INTERPOL/Legal-materials/Fundamental-texts (21/12/2012) 
93
 The Australian government, in co-operation with state and territory governments, has established a 
DNA criminal investigation system. These criminal databases are hosted by CrimTrac, which was 
established on 1 July 2000 to develop the technology required to give police ready access to 
information needed to solve crimes. http://www.crimtrac.gov.au/about_us/index.html (21/12/2012) 
Australia has eight national criminal systems, but only two share DNA and Biometric information with 
the Department of Immigration and Citizenship (DIAC).  
The eight national criminal systems are: the National Criminal Investigation DNA Database, the 
National Automated Fingerprint Identification System, the Australian National Child Offender Register, 
the National Police Reference System, National Vehicles of Interest, the National Firearm Licence 
and Registration System, the National Police Checking Service, and the National Name Index. 
94
 In 2009, Mexico modernised its National Communication Network and restructured its National 
Information System, linking fifteen national databases and centralising information from states and 
municipalities onto eight new systems, which includes four biometric criminal databases. This project 
is known as “Platform Mexico”. The databases are : the Unified Criminal Information System (SUIC), 
the Unified Penal Institution Administration System (SUAP), Global Policing Operations System 
(SIOP), Geographic Information System (SIG), Automated System for Organized Crime Analysis 
(SAADOM), Comprehensive Organized Crime Information System (SIICDO), Uniform Statistical 
System for Analyses on Drug Manufacturing and Trafficking (SEUNAD), National Call Centre for 
Crime Reports (CND).  
Mexico Government, Inter-American Development Bank, Strategic Planning Project "Platform Mexico, 
Technical cooperation profile (2008) 
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biometric criminal databases and to emphasize the need to move to greater 
standardization. 
 
For the purposes of this four countries study national comparison, four issues are 
taken into account: targeted people and types of crimes, duration of time for data 
storage, user access profiles and exchanges of data through TBIF. 
 
 Targeted people: type of crimes or offences  
 
The inclusion of specific categories of targeted people is based on particular types of 
crime. Government agencies may believe that the “greater the amount of individuals 
included in the database, the better results will be obtained in the resolution of 
criminal cases”97. Most legislation bases inclusion on the number of years in prison 
(5 years) rather than on the crime itself, for example, robbery, homicide or sexual 
abuse98. In Spain, for example, is a combination of both the crimes itself and 
“serious” crimes99. 
                                                                                                                                       
http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=1397559 (21/12/2012) or 
http://www.iadb.org/en/projects/project,1303.html?id=ME-T1094 (21/12/2012) The technical 
cooperation of “Platform Mexico” had a total cost (historical) of USD $275,280.  
95
 Criminal Investigations (Bodily Samples) Amendment Act 2003 (New Zealand) governs police and 
Environmental Science Research (ESR) working methods for DNA sampling and testing, including the 
taking of reference samples for specific investigations and the taking of samples from individuals for 
inclusion in the National DNA Databank. The National DNA databank has two databases and by 
comparing the two databases, possible suspects can be identified and crimes can be linked. 
http://www.esr.cri.nz/competencies/forensicscience/dna/Pages/DNAdatabank.aspx (21/12/2012) 
96
 In 2007, the Organic Law 10/2007, which governs the comprehensive police database on identifiers 
obtained from DNA, came into force. This new database Comprehensive DNA Criminal Database is 
based on the Combined DNA Index System developed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 
which includes samples of DNA or other body tissues taken from convicted offenders, arrestees, legal 
detainees, forensic or unidentified human remains and missing persons. Articles 3 and 4 of the 
Organic Law 10/2007 regulating the comprehensive database police on identifiers obtained from the 
DNA. Ley Orgánica 10/2007, de 8 de octubre, reguladora de la base de datos policial sobre 
identificadores obtenidos a partir del ADN, BOE-A-2007-17634 [Organic Law 10/2007 regulating the 
police database on identifiers obtained from DNA] (Spain) 
http://www.boe.es/diario_boe/txt.php?id=BOE-A-2007-17634 (21/12/2012) Before 2007, there was no 
specific legal provision in Spain for regulating evidentiary DNA in the criminal law system. 
97
 Romeo Casabona, Carlos Maria (ed.), Bases de datos de perfiles de ADN y criminalidad, above n 
53.  
98
 Idem and Directive 2002/58/EC concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of 
privacy in the electronic communications sector (Directive on privacy and electronic communications) 
of the European Parliament and of the Council, [2002] OJ L 201/37, Communication from the 
Commission to the Council and the European Parliament - Towards enhancing access to information 
by law enforcement agencies (EU information policy), [2004] COD 2004/0429. 
99
 Article 3.1.a of the Organic Law 10/2007, “serious” crimes and “in case those affecting life, liberty, 
indemnity or sexual freedom, integrity of the people, and property, provided those crimes were 
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Australia allows DNA registration from suspects, serious offenders, convicted 
persons and volunteers100; New Zealand allows DNA registration from any suspect 
and for any recordable offence –total of 78 offences101, serious offenders, convicts 
and volunteers; and Spain allows DNA registration from convicts, serious offenders 
and volunteers. The following figure shows the people included in national biometric 
criminal databases currently in use. 
 
Figure 18. People Targeted for Criminal Databases 
 
 
The Mexican regime allows the registration not only of suspects, serious offenders, 
convicted persons and volunteers, but it also includes random voice samples 
obtained, even without the consent of the people recorded over the phone who utter 
key words that trigger the voice biometric identification system developed by the 
company Speech Technology Center102.   
 
 
                                                                                                                                       
committed using force on things, or violence or intimidation in persons, as well as in cases of 
organized crime”. Ley Orgánica 10/2007, de 8 de octubre, reguladora de la base de datos policial 
sobre identificadores obtenidos a partir del ADN, BOE-A-2007-17634 [Organic Law 10/2007 
regulating the police database on identifiers obtained from DNA] (Spain) 
http://www.boe.es/diario_boe/txt.php?id=BOE-A-2007-17634 (21/12/2012 
100
 Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) 
101
 Examples of these 78 crimes in New Zealand include: smuggling migrants, terrorist bombing, 
financing of terrorism, recruiting members of terrorist groups, participating in terrorist groups, 
hijacking, other crimes relating to aircraft, crime relating to international airports, wrecking, attempting 
to wreck. Criminal Investigations (Bodily Samples) Amendment Act 2003 (New Zealand). 
102
 This company was identified in Chapter 3. The Biometric Industry: An Illustrative Map of Players, 
Products and http://www.software-russia.com/ (20/12/2012) 
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 Duration of Time for Data Storage 103 
 
A country’s retention of biometric information is frequently controversial, and there 
may be more concerns surrounding linkages with international biometric databases. 
National legislation set different limits on the time during which data may be retained. 
In Australia, the information collected for the National Criminal Investigation DNA 
Database (NCIDD) may be held for as long as deemed necessary104. In New 
Zealand, DNA profile will be held on the database on any person convicted of a 
serious offence105. In Mexico, the General Act on the National Public Security 
System establishes the regime for criminal databases and does not include any 
provision on the destruction or retention of samples, nor for deletion of information 
held in criminal databases106. Finally, Spain specifies times for retention of data, 
dependent on the seriousness of the crime107. The following figure illustrates the 
duration of DNA data retention: 
 
Figure 19. Duration of DNA Stored 
 
 
                                            
103
 Romeo Casabona, Carlos Maria (ed), Bases de datos de perfiles de ADN y criminalidad, above n 
53. 
104
 Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), s 23YDAE.  
105
 Criminal Investigations (Bodily Samples) Act 1995 No 55 (as at 01 October 2010), Public Act, s 
2(1), s 7(b)(xiii). 
106
 Ley General del Sistema Nacional de Seguridad Pública, DOF 02/01/2009 [General Act on the 
National Public Security System, last amended on 28/12/2012] (Mexico) 
http://www.diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/pdf/LGSNSP.pdf (21/12/2012) 
107
 Article 9 of Ley Orgánica 10/2007, de 8 de octubre, reguladora de la base de datos policial sobre 
identificadores obtenidos a partir del ADN, BOE-A-2007-17634 [Organic Law 10/2007 regulating the 
police database on identifiers obtained from DNA] (Spain) 
http://www.boe.es/diario_boe/txt.php?id=BOE-A-2007-17634 (21/12/2012) 
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 User access profiles 
 
It is essential to have legislative provisions regulating authorised access to criminal 
databases. Legislation should specify which national authorities have access, their 
corresponding clearance levels to search data, the recording of these searches and 
purpose of these searches. In most cases, regulation should include practices and 
procedures for training staff.  This type of regulation is in operation in Australia, New 
Zealand and Spain. 
 
In Australia’s National Criminal Investigation DNA Database (NCIDD), only the state 
or territory that supplied the DNA profile can identify the person to whom the profile 
belongs. However, for the National Automated Fingerprint Identification System 
(NAFIS), the police as well as the Department of Immigration and Citizenship (DIAC) 
have access to manage and identify unlawful non-citizens and to aid in the 
processing of onshore protection visa applications. 
 
In New Zealand, the 2003 Criminal Investigations (Bodily Samples) Amendment Act 
allows access to the National DNA Database, the Crime Sample Database and the 
Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS) by authorities responsible for 
immigration and administration of foreign nationals108. 
 
In Spain, the Unified DNA Criminal Database109 allows nationwide access by 
national and local (autonomous communities) police agencies and the National 
Centre of Intelligence. At an international level, judicial, prosecutor or police 
authorities will be authorised to make access applications110. 
 
 
                                            
108
 Storage of more than 430,000 original sets of fingerprints. 
109
 This database includes DNA or other body tissue samples taken from convicted offenders, 
arrestees, detainees, forensic scenes, unidentified human remains and missing persons. Articles 3 
and 4 of the Ley Orgánica 10/2007, de 8 de octubre, reguladora de la base de datos policial sobre 
identificadores obtenidos a partir del ADN, BOE-A-2007-17634 [Organic Law 10/2007 regulating the 
police database on identifiers obtained from DNA] (Spain) 
http://www.boe.es/diario_boe/txt.php?id=BOE-A-2007-17634 (21/12/2012) 
110
 Ibidem, article 7 a), b) and c) of the Ley Orgánica 10/2007, de 8 de octubre, reguladora de la base 
de datos policial sobre identificadores obtenidos a partir del ADN This provision was included in  
anticipation of the issue being addressed in international treaties. 
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In Mexico, the Platform Mexico contains criminal information databases111, the 
national voice biometric database112 and the Police and Security Staff Member 
Database113. All the technical protocols related to these databases are publicly 
available at the Manual for Information Collection and Exchange114; the Connectivity 
Platform Mexico115; the Integration, Consultation and Updating of Fingerprint 
Records116, Logical Security Platform Mexico117 and People Identification System 
Using Voice Analysis118. It is important to note that the Manual for Information 
Collection and Exchange applies to the federal public administration, including law 
enforcement areas. 
 
 
 
                                            
111
 The Criminal Biometric Fingerprints database and DNA Database contain information of individuals 
who were suspects, were arrested, are in prison, were released or had escaped as set forth in two 
laws: Ley General del Sistema Nacional de Seguridad Pública, DOF 02/01/2009 [General Law of 
National System of Public Security, last amendment 28/12/2012] (Mexico) 
http://www.diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/pdf/LGSNSP.pdf (21/12/2012) and Ley de la Policía 
Federal, DOF 25/05/2011 [Federal Police Law] (Mexico) 
http://www.diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/pdf/LPF.pdf (21/12/2012) 
112
 Speech Technology Center, “World’s first nationwide Voice Identification System deployed in 
Mexico by Speech Technology Center (Russia)” (Media Release, 4 June 2010) 
http://speechpro.com/media/news/2010-06-03 (21/12/2012) this company was identified in Chapter 3. 
The Biometric Industry: An Illustrative Map of Players, Products and Partnerships 
113
 This contains information on members of public security institutions at all levels and jurisdictions. 
The information includes the identity and adscription of public officials, such as biometric fingerprints, 
biometric photographs, biometric handwriting, DNA, educational background, employment history and 
professional qualifications. Mexico Government, Minister of Public Security, Platform Mexico, 1
st
 
Report of Duty 2006-2007 (2007) 
http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Security/citizensecurity/Mexico/evaluaciones/InformeLabores-
plataformamexico.pdf (21/12/2012) 
114
 Acuerdo por el que se dan a conocer el Manual de Captura de Información y el Manual de 
Intercambio de Información, DOF 21/09/2006 [Manual for Information Collection and Exchange] 
http://www.normateca.gob.mx/Archivos/32_D_1092_07-11-2006.pdf (21/12/2012) 
115
 Conectividad a la Plataforma México [Connectivity Platform Mexico] (April 2010) 
http://portal.secretariadoejecutivosnsp.gob.mx/webfiles/pdf/cni-cpm-10_1.pdf  (21/12/2012) 
116
 Integración, Consulta y Actualización  del Registro de Huellas Dactilares [Integration, Consultation 
and Updating of Fingerprint Records] (April 2010) 
http://portal.secretariadoejecutivosnsp.gob.mx/webfiles/pdf/cni-rehd-10_1.pdf (21/12/2012) 
117
 Seguridad Lógica de la Plataforma México [Logical Security Platform Mexico] (April 2010) 
http://portal.secretariadoejecutivosnsp.gob.mx/webfiles/pdf/cni-slpm-10_1.pdf (21/12/2012) 
118
 Sistema de Identificación de Personas Mediante Análisis de Voz [People Identification System 
Using Voice Analysis] (April 2010) http://portal.secretariadoejecutivosnsp.gob.mx/webfiles/pdf/cni-sav-
10_1.pdf (21/12/2012) 
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 Transborder of information (interoperability / linkage) 
 
In Australia, New Zealand and Spain, there are privacy principles related to cross 
border data flows; avoiding the disclosure of personal information when collecting 
information from third countries. However, there are no published reports available 
on the privacy norms governing criminal databases. In Mexico, the Manual of 
Procedure for Collection and Exchange of Information for Mexican Public 
Administration Agencies, which governs criminal databases119, is publicly available. 
  
In the four countries study, neither protocols nor reports on TBIF involving criminal 
databases were available at the time of writing. This thesis argues that biometric 
criminal databases regulatory frameworks should involve robust public policy 
debates.  
 
5.5. Conclusion 
 
Crime prevention is one of the critical areas where it is legally permissible for 
governments to limit privacy and data protection rights, but the question is how far it 
is permissible to do so and with what justification120. This chapter explored the 
current operation of biometric criminal databases, which collect not only names, 
physical descriptions and categories of offence, but also some biometric 
characteristics such as DNA, face images and fingerprints. This chapter presented 
an overview of two scenarios in which TBIF may arise in the short and long-term: 1) 
between each of the four countries, and 2) between the countries examined and their 
interaction with international organisations. This chapter analysed Interpol databases 
with world coverage and best practices through Interpol’s standardisation in methods 
and systems. Interpol databases are the most significant because of the 190 
countries that interact with them. The comparative four countries study revealed 
asymmetries and convergences in TBIF between criminal databases and the lack of 
public scrutiny or debate about these developments. 
                                            
119
 Acuerdo por el que se dan a conocer el Manual de Captura de Información y el Manual de 
Intercambio de Información, above n 112. 
120
 For further details, see Chapter 7. Transborder Biometric on Privacy and Data Protection: National 
Solutions 
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This chapter demonstrated the distinct civil liberty concerns in relation to the growth 
of these databases. Despite these concerns, for and against linkage between 
criminal databases, most tend to favour linkage121. Nevertheless, TBIF in the context 
of crime prevention needs to be assessed in terms of the lack of public debate and 
secrecy surrounding the deployment of biometrics and TBIF. The current information 
flow in biometric criminal databases confirms two modes of transborder information 
in the four countries study: the exchange of specific information and linkage of 
biometric databases. In addition, the lack of public available statistics related to the 
exercise of access, rectification, cancellation and opposition to the processing of 
TBIF in the context of crime prevention, the absence of transparency and 
accountability in the management of biometric criminal databases strongly supports 
the need for proper supervisory and accountability measure in the deployment of 
biometric systems and TBIF in the context of crime prevention to secure individuals´ 
privacy and data protection rights122. 
                                            
121
 An important characteristic regarding the kind of sources consulted on linkage databases and the 
exchange of information is that most of the discussion has taken place in seminar papers, conference 
presentations slides, government reports, a few submissions or opinions and journal articles.  
122
 For further details, see Chapter 1. Transborder Biometric Information Flows: Legal Challenges 
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CHAPTER 6.  
 
TRANSBORDER BIOMETRIC INFORMATION FLOWS: LEGAL CHALLENGES  
 
 
6.1. Outline of Legal Challenges of Transborder Biometric Information Flows 
 
This thesis has examined and identified the legal challenges, limitations and 
concerns of Transborder Biometric Information Flows (TBIF) in the contexts, of 
immigration and criminal databases. The comparative four countries study has 
demonstrated that the deployment of biometric systems in immigration control and in 
crime prevention is essentially concerned with greater efficiency in border 
processing, stopping illegal immigrants, fighting cross border crimes and preventing 
terrorism1.   
 
This chapter discusses the challenges identified in both immigration information flow2 
and information flow in criminal databases3 contexts. Through the comparative four 
countries study, critical short and long-term controversies are presented in this 
chapter as common legal challenges for TBIF in individual countries and the world at 
large. 
  
A uniform and harmonised TBIF was expected to be found in both immigration 
information flow and information flow in criminal databases; however, the TBIF in the 
four countries examined is not consistent with respect to the information collected, 
stored, processed and exchanged. In addition, the comparative study also showed a 
lack of common practices for TBIF in immigration information flow and information 
flow in criminal databases. These legal challenges are: who can access, data 
reliability (integrity), data protection in third party countries, the classification of 
individuals, data storage restrictions, subsequent use of the information through 
                                            
1
 For further details, see Chapter 1. Transborder Biometric Information Flows: Legal Challenges 
2
 For further details, see Chapter 4. Biometric Systems in the Context of the Transborder Immigration 
Flow  
3
 For further details, see Chapter 5. Biometrics in Criminal Databases: Current Transborder 
Information Flow  
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interoperability and its impact on privacy. Six of these legal challenges have been 
studied since the 1980s and have yet to be resolved.  
 
The subsequent automated use of information through interoperability is a recent 
legal challenge instigated by the biometric industry in November 20114. 
Nevertheless, this thesis argues that the subsequent chain of linkages to other 
databases involving different agencies from different fields, nationally and 
internationally, challenges and undermines individuals’ privacy and data protection 
rights5. International privacy and data protection regime considers that personal 
information should only be collected for a specific purpose and be used solely for 
that specific purpose6. 
 
From the beginning, this thesis has argued the development of biometric systems 
and TBIF has lacked public scrutiny from three perspectives: first, the lack of public 
debate regarding the introduction of biometric systems in public sector; second, the 
necessity to improve the self-regulatory instruments of biometric industry; and, 
finally, the need to implement transparency and accountability jointly with the 
deployment of biometric databases. These will help not only to reduce legal 
challenges, but also to improve the level of privacy and data protection frameworks.  
 
This chapter sets the legal challenges of TBIF in the two contexts of immigration and 
criminal databases. The chapter analyses and assesses these immigration and 
criminal databases scenarios for TBIF and identifies common national and 
international legal challenges in these contexts. This chapter argues that the 
absence of a robust framework of transparency and accountability is a major 
common legal challenge for TBIF. This chapter calls for a balance between private 
and public interest in TBIF7.  
 
                                            
4
 This is the date when the ANSI/NIST-ITL standard was release by the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology.  
5
 For further details, see section 1.4 Hypothesis 
6
 Kuschewsky, Monika (ed.), Data Protection and Privacy Jurisdictional Comparison, (Thomson 
Reuters, 2012). 
7
 For further details, see Chapter 7. Transborder Biometric Privacy Regimes: National Solutions. 
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6.2. Transparency and Accountability as Control Mechanism  
 
This section focuses more closely on the lack of transparency and accountability 
surrounding the deployment of biometric systems in immigration and criminal 
databases. This thesis proposes the use of transparency and accountability as a 
mechanism to control the deployment of any biometric system, especially for use in 
immigration control and crime prevention8. As Jasanoff has argued “It is no longer 
possible to deal with such staple concepts of democratic theory as citizenship or 
deliberation or accountability without delving into their interaction with the dynamics 
of knowledge creation and use”9.  
 
This thesis discussed, the way in which the legal, ethical and political discourse 
justifying the use of biometric systems for immigration control and crime prevention 
has been handled in the four countries studied are not consistent with the minimum 
standards expected in constitutional democratic States10. Furthermore, according to 
the theoretical requirements (public debate, transparency, scrutiny) set by Jasanoff11 
and Habermas12, the governments of these four countries have failed not only to 
openly discuss this topic, but also have failed to involve different actors and agencies 
in the discussion and deployment of biometric systems and TBIF.  
 
Citizens’ participation has been insignificant because they cannot easily access 
publicly available biometric technology information deployed against them. In 
addition, the relative exclusion of various actors from collaborating in the 
development of regulatory frameworks, such as supervisory authorities, the biometric 
industry itself, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), academic privacy groups 
and data protection activists. 
 
                                            
8
 For further details, see Chapter 1. Transborder Biometric Information Flows: Legal Challenges 
9
 Jasanoff, Sheila, Designs on Nature Science and Democracy in Europe and the United States, 
(Princeton University Press, 2007), p. 6. 
10
 For further details, see Chapter 4. Biometric Systems in the Context of Transborder Immigration 
Flow and Chapter 5. Biometrics in Criminal Databases: Current Transborder Information Flow 
11
 Jasanoff, Sheila, Designs on Nature, Science and Democracy in Europe and the United States, 
above n 9.  
12
 Habermas, Jürgen, “Sfera pubblica (Una voce di enciclopedia)”, Cultura e Critica, (Euinaudi, 1980). 
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For a long time, secrecy has been the approach of most countries’ governmental 
activities. However, transparency and accountability have recently expanded around 
the world with the introduction of Freedom of Access Information Acts (FOIA). In 
addition, transparency and accountability improves trust and credibility between 
citizens and governments. In Mexico, for instance, the Federal Transparency and 
Access to Governmental Public Information13 (known as Mexican FOIA) is used by 
civil society organisations to fight corruption14. Transparency and accountability 
policies, supported by FOIA, are essential to address and reduce national and global 
challenges in the deployment of biometric system and TBIF policies15. It is essential 
for citizens to have the information needed to guarantee effective control in the 
exercise of their rights. In this way, citizens can exercise their power of control, an 
essential element in any democratic constitutional State. 
 
Control must be understood as the exercise of public offices: “the term ‘control’ 
focuses on the revision, supervision, surveillance, prevention and correction 
measures that countries have provided through its several regulations”16. Through 
transparency17  and accountability18, citizens should learn about the issues on which 
they are to decide, as well as become, to a certain extent, more knowledgeable 
about the issues assigned to their competence19. 
                                            
13
 Ley Federal de Transparencia y Acceso a la Información Pública, DOF 11/06/2002 [Federal 
Transparency and Access to Governmental Public Information last amended on 08/06/12] (Mexico) 
http://www.diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/pdf/244.pdf (21/12/2012) 
14
 Ackerman, John and Sandoval Ballesteros, Irma, “The global explosion of freedom of information 
laws” (2006) 58 Administrative Law Review 85-130.  
15
 For further details, see section 6.3. Mapping Common Challenges of Transborder Information Flow  
16
 Nieto, Santiago, et. al., Control externo y responsabilidad de los servidores públicos del Distrito 
Federal, (UNAM, 2005), p. 23. 
17
 Villanueva, Ernesto, Derecho de la información, Porrua-Camara de Diputados-Universidad de 
Guadalajara, 2006), pp. 69-72. 
18
 Accountability has a historical explanation that can be found in Article 15 of the Declaration of the 
Rights of the Man and of the Citizen of 1789, in which the social right to accountability and the 
obligation of public officers to be accountable are provided: “The community has the right to demand 
an account of his administration to every public agent”. Déclaration des droits de l'homme et du 
citoyen [Declaration of the Rights of the Man and of the Citizen] (France) According to Luis Carlos 
Ugalde, accountability is nowadays defined as the permanent obligation from authorities or agents to 
inform the people under their authority, the acts they carry out as a result of the authority delegation 
performed through a formal or informal agreement, and which implies penalties due to failure to 
comply with it. Ugalde, Luis Carlos, La rendición de cuentas en los gobiernos estatales y municipales, 
(Auditoría Superior de la Federación, 2002). 
19
 Sartori, Giovanni, Homo Videns, la sociedad teledirigida, (Taurus, 2004), p. 163; Aragón, Manuel, 
Constitución, Democracia y Control, (Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas de la UNAM, 2002); Nino, 
Carlos, La constitución de la democracia deliberativa, (Gedisa, 1997), p. 166; Habermas, Jürgen The 
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In the context of immigration information flow, it should be possible to access 
information related to the public entities and organisations themselves, their 
management and budgets. In the four countries study, only Mexico updates its 
immigration statistics on a monthly basis and provides statistics on the number of 
requests regarding the exercise of the right to access, to rectify (correct), to delete 
(cancel or block) or object (oppose) the processing of personal data20. By 
comparison, Spain updates its immigration information every three months, while 
Australia and New Zealand only update after every census. These three countries do 
not have publicly available statistics on the exercise of rights to access personal 
data21.  
  
In the context of criminal databases, the four countries studied allow access to 
information related to the public entities and organisations themselves and their 
management. Mexico, however is the only country that posts its budget on a website 
while the other three countries make their budgets available in their annual reports. 
These reports tend to focus more on organisational activities, database performance 
and statistical trends in the number of searches deployed by agencies rather than on 
the number of requests to access the stored information and the number of requests 
to exercise the right to rectify, cancel or oppose personal data in criminal databases. 
Importantly, of the four countries, Mexico and Spain require that any databases 
created or handled by any governmental agencies or bodies, including national 
security databases, must be registered with and/or by their respective privacy 
agencies22.  
 
                                                                                                                                       
Theory of Communicative Action (Thomas MCCarthy trans, Beacon Press, 1984); Habermas, Jürgen 
Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy (William 
Rehg trans, MIT Press, 1996).  
20
 Individuals’ exercising their ARCO rights, which give individuals to control effectively their personal 
information. Kuschewsky, Monika (ed.), Data Protection and Privacy Jurisdictional Comparison, 
above n 6. 
21
 For further details, see Chapter 4. Biometric Systems in the Context of Transborder Immigration 
Flow 
22
 For further details, see Chapter 5. Biometrics in Criminal Databases: Current Transborder 
Information Flow  
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A constant feature in the four countries study was the lack of public debate about the 
biometric systems deployed in the context of immigration control and crime 
prevention. 
 
Internationally, the lists of national authorities authorised to search for data reflect 
the divergences and differences identified in the four countries study23. There are 
few statistics on the operation of European databases and the numbers and types of 
alerts are poorly organized and not very revealing24. 
 
In summary, in order to promote trust and reduce concerns between citizens 
regarding these technologies, biometric systems should be implemented in 
conjunction with transparency and accountability policies and with the introduction of 
Freedom of Access Information Acts (FOIA). It is important to publicly discuss the 
deployment of these technologies, including their benefits and risks. 
 
6.3. Mapping Common Challenges of Transborder Biometric Information Flow 
 
This section examines national and international legal concerns within the context of 
TBIF in immigration information flow and information flow in criminal.  
 
It was possible to identify four common biometric databases deployed in both 
contexts for immigration control and crime prevention. These biometric databases 
are used by border control agencies in the four countries examined. Border controls 
are placed at seaports, airports and land crossing ports. Mexican and Spanish 
immigration departments access facial image and fingerprint databases whereas 
Australian and New Zealand immigration departments access iris pattern and facial 
image databases. The figure below shows the biometric databases exchange 
between agencies at a national level25. 
                                            
23
 Kabera, Stephen, Transparency and Proportionality in the Schengen Information System and 
Border Control Co-operation, (Nartinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2008), p. 222. 
24
 Council of European Union, “SIS and SIRENE statistics-Guidelines to Collect Data” (2010) 
http://www.statewatch.org/news/2011/jan/eu-council-guidelines-data-sis-sirene-17436-10.pdf 
(22/12/2012) 
25
 This chart is based on the current operational biometric systems identified in the four countries 
study. 
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Figure 20. Biometric Databases 
 
 
TBIF comprises two types of scenarios with the same domestic legal concerns but 
on a global scope. The first scenario is the linkage or exchange of biometric 
information between the requesting country and another country. The figure below 
shows the first scenario where cross border biometric databases between four 
countries examined. 
 
Figure 21. TBIF between Four Countries Study
26
 
 
 
The second scenario is the deployment of regional and international biometric 
databases linked to national biometric databases. The figure below shows the 
second scenario in which cross-border international biometric databases exchange 
information among the four countries examined, Interpol, Eurodac, the Schengen 
Information System and APEC.  
                                            
26
 Figure elaborated from diagrammatic illustration from Shoniregun, Chalres A., and Crosier, 
Stephen, Securing Biometrics Applications (Springer, 2008) p. 132 
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Figure 22. TBIF between Countries and International Databases
27
 
 
 
On a national level, the deployment of biometric databases raises legal challenges 
about who can access the information, the reliability of the data (integrity), data 
protection for third parties, the classification of individuals, data storage restrictions, 
its subsequent use and its impact on privacy. On an international level, legal 
challenges are magnified because the impact on privacy and data protection affects 
a wider range of people compared to those listed in national databases. The levels of 
TBIF for purposes of immigration control and crime prevention in a globalised world 
is increasing.  
 
6.3.1. Who Can Access the Information? A major challenge relates to who can 
access the data at national and international levels. Within a country, it is important 
to provide an effective legal and ethical regulatory framework. A national regulatory 
framework should clearly and coherently specify who can access database 
information, the type of information different people can access, how often 
information can be accessed and for what purposes the information can be 
accessed28. Worldwide related agreements on processing and exchanging personal 
information are often brief and generalized, but should cover the same issues. In 
fact, there are recommendations about establishing a registry of those who access 
this data and a record of the purposes for which the information was accessed, 
                                            
27
 Figure elaborated from diagrammatic illustration from Shoniregun, Chalres A., and Crosier, 
Stephen, Securing Biometrics Applications (Springer, 2008) p. 133. 
28
 Romeo Casabona, Carlos Maria (ed), Bases de datos de perfiles de ADN y criminalidad, (Cátedra 
Interuniversitaria, Fundación BBVA-Diputación Foral de Bizkaia de Derecho y Genoma Humano, 
2002). 
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including a public list of national and international authorities who are allowed to 
access it and the circumstances under which they do/did so29. 
 
In the four countries examined, the legal framework specified which border control 
agencies have access to biometric databases30. It is important to note that in the 
case of Mexico, the provisions are established at a regulatory level. However, its 
legal framework does not mention the staff position (person) who has access, to 
what information and how often that information can be accessed.  
 
The regulatory framework should be comprised of protocols or manuals for all border 
control agencies with access clearance. However at the time of writing this thesis, 
only one of the four countries examined has these types of procedural rules for 
immigration control and crime prevention public available for public viewing.  
 
Mexico’s manuals of procedures, standards and protocols developed for the criminal 
databases31 are available to the public, as are its manuals of procedure for the 
collection and exchange of information for Mexican public administration agencies32. 
These include the following criminal protocols: Connectivity Platform Mexico33; 
Integration, Consultation and Record Updating Fingerprint34; Logical Security 
Platform Mexico35 and People Identification System Using Voice Analysis36. 
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 Directive 2002/58/EC concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in 
the electronic communications sector (Directive on privacy and electronic communications) of the 
European Parliament and of the Council, [2002] OJ L 201/37 and Communication from the 
Commission to the Council and the European Parliament - Towards enhancing access to information 
by law enforcement agencies (EU information policy), [2004] COD 2004/0429. 
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 For further details, see Chapter 4. Biometric Systems in the Context of Transborder Immigration 
Flow  
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 For further details, see Chapter 5. Biometrics in Criminal Databases: Current Transborder 
Information Flow  
32
 Acuerdo por el que se dan a conocer el Manual de Captura de Información y el Manual de 
Intercambio de Información, DOF 21/09/2006 [Manual of Collection and Exchange of Information] 
http://www.normateca.gob.mx/Archivos/32_D_1092_07-11-2006.pdf (21/12/2012) 
33
 Conectividad a la Plataforma México [Connectivity Platform Mexico] (April 2010) 
http://portal.secretariadoejecutivosnsp.gob.mx/webfiles/pdf/cni-cpm-10_1.pdf  (21/12/2012) 
34
 Integración, Consulta y Actualización  del Registro de Huellas Dactilares [Integration, Consultation 
and Record Updating Fingerprint] (April 2010) 
http://portal.secretariadoejecutivosnsp.gob.mx/webfiles/pdf/cni-rehd-10_1.pdf (21/12/2012) 
35
 Seguridad Lógica de la Plataforma México [Logical Security Platform Mexico] (April 2010) 
http://portal.secretariadoejecutivosnsp.gob.mx/webfiles/pdf/cni-slpm-10_1.pdf (21/12/2012) 
36
 Sistema de Identificación de Personas Mediante Análisis de Voz [People Identification System 
Using Voice Analysis] (April 2010) http://portal.secretariadoejecutivosnsp.gob.mx/webfiles/pdf/cni-sav-
10_1.pdf (21/12/2012) 
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Meanwhile, in Australia, New Zealand and Spain, the only documents of this type 
that are made public are the annual reports posted on their respective official 
websites37. But some of these reports simply contain information about the 
organisation itself, its management, database performance and statistical trends 
related to the number of searches deployed by agencies while other reports include 
the operational budget. Hence, it is impossible to know who has access to the 
biometric databases and how such access is regulated.  
 
These protocols should be publicly available not only because it will increase trust 
between citizens and governments, but citizens will also be informed and it will 
shape public opinion on biometric systems38.  
 
In addition, knowing who has access, how often biometric databases are accessed 
and for what purposes they can be accessed improves the protection of privacy and 
data at both national and international levels. It also works as a control mechanism in 
instances of interagency co-operation. As mentioned, border control entails work 
between various agencies, including immigration, police, taxation and social services 
departments. Domestically and globally, the ideal scenario would be to have a 
proper balance between border control agencies. 
 
6.3.2. Data Reliability and Integrity. The second major challenge centres on the 
exchange of information and its reliability at national and international levels. On a 
national level, it is vital for the collection, storage and classification of personal data 
to be accurate, complete and up-to-date. These elements are essential if 
governments want to generate confidence and trust between the competent 
authorities and citizens. However, these aspects are even more important on an 
international level because there are higher expectations of facilitating cross-border 
co-operation between countries and international agencies39.   
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 For further details, see Chapter 5. Biometrics in Criminal Databases: Current Transborder 
Information Flow  
38
 As argued by Habermas, Jürgen, “Sfera pubblica (Una voce di enciclopedia)”, above n 12 and 
Jasanoff, Sheila, Designs on Nature Science and Democracy in Europe and the United States, above 
n 9. 
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 For Europol, for example, the Member State or third parties supplying such data shall notify Europol 
of the purpose for which they are supplying the information and of any restriction on use of that 
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In immigration, for example, the implementation of passenger identification systems 
requires fast and seamless TBIF to ensure that details of arriving passengers are 
received in advance (in the case of arriving flights)40 and linked with the 
corresponding biometric travel documents to allow border control agencies to 
determine their response.  
 
Mexico uses the Manual for Information Collection and Exchange and Spain uses 
the European Commission common standards for information exchange in 
immigration41 whereas the procedures for Australia and New Zealand were not 
publicly available at the time of writing.  
 
The regulatory framework consists of protocols or manuals for any border control 
agency that collects, stores, retrieves, classifies and updates biometric databases for 
the national and international exchange of biometric information. In both contexts, 
the integrity and consistency of biometric databases are basic requirements.   
 
6.3.3. Data Protection in Third Party Countries. The third major challenge involves 
procedures for data protection in third party countries at any level. In relation to data 
protection, third party means any person, public authority, agency or body other than 
the data subject, controller, processor or other person authorised to process 
                                                                                                                                       
information, its deletion or destruction, including possible access restrictions in general or specific 
terms. However, the Europol Convention established the provision that transfers should only be made 
to third parties –countries and bodies- that provide an adequate level of data protection. Interestingly, 
Australia interacts with Europol. Agreement on Operational and Strategic Cooperation between 
Australia and the European Police Office, signed 20 February 2007, ATS (entered into force 
according article 22). 
40
 This information is provided by airlines, websites or tourism agencies when travellers book their 
ticket. There are some joint recommendations from the World Customs Organization (WCO), 
International Air Transport Association (IATA) and the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) 
about advance passenger information (API). See Chapter 4. Biometric Systems in the Context of 
Transborder Immigration Flow  
41
 Regulation (EC) 1030/2002 laying down a uniform format for residence permits for third-country 
nationals, [2003] OJ L 157/15; Regulation (EC) 1683/95 laying down a uniform format for visa, [2003] 
OJ L164/14; Regulation (EC) 333/2002 on a uniform format for forms for affixing the visa issued by 
Member States to persons holding travel documents which are not recognised by the Member State 
drawing up the form, [2002] OJ L 53/23; Regulation (EC) No 444/2009 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council amending Council Regulation (EC) No 2252/2004 on standards for security 
features and biometrics in passports and travel documents issued by Member States, [2009] OJ L 
142/6; Resolution (74)29 related to the protection of individuals vis-à-vis electronic data banks, 
adopted 20 September 1974. 
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biometric information. The sequence of this biometric information process carried out 
by third parties poses risks related to the misuse or disclosure of information. 
 
It is important to note that biometric information flows are possible through two 
methods of exchanging information or linking databases nationally and 
internationally. Australia and New Zealand exchange information between them by 
specific requests whereas Mexico and Spain have linked their databases exchanging 
systematic information. In the four countries examined, the privacy and data 
protection legal framework considers limitations for collecting data from third parties. 
An assessment of the privacy and data protection legal frameworks of these 
countries will be given in later chapter42. 
 
Therefore, this challenge should be taken into account both countrywide and 
worldwide since data protection practices must be consistent to achieve an adequate 
level of privacy and personal data protection, and even more so when third parties 
are involved.    
 
6.3.4. Classification of Individuals. The fourth major challenge relates to the 
classification of individuals at national and international levels. It is important to note 
that travellers and criminals have been previously classified in order to be listed and 
enrolled in national databases. This challenge extends worldwide. Thus, the 
classification of travellers will be discussed, followed by the classification of 
criminals.  
 
Travellers are generally classified according country categories or type of visas43. 
However, the classification of travellers is implemented when travellers arrived at the 
border control and show their travel documents for identification. Border control 
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 For further details, see Chapter 7. Transborder Biometric on Privacy and Data Protection: National 
Solutions 
43
 For further details, see Chapter 4. Biometric Systems in the Context of Transborder Immigration 
Flow  
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systems at seaports, airports or land crossing ports are organised by classification 
for identification of travellers44.  
 
The classifications of travellers in the four countries examined are completely 
different. The following figure shows how the countries examined organise the 
identification of travellers based on the type of travel documents. This classification 
should not be confused with the different types of visas (tourist, business, student 
and so on).  
 
Figure 23. Summary of the Classification of Travellers 
 
 
It is important to note that Australia is the only country that operates a universal visa 
scheme45; in other words, for Australia it does not matter whether travellers hold a 
biometric or an electronic travel document.  
 
The classification of travellers raises two types of debate. The first highlights the 
argument of possible discrimination by identifying travellers according to their 
classification46. However, countries have already established immigration legal 
frameworks and rules concerning the issuance of different types of visas in 
accordance with their national security policies. In addition, countries have the right 
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 Kabera, Stephen, Transparency and Proportionality in the Schengen Information System and 
Border Control Co-operation, above n 23, p. 363. 
45
 Australia deploys different systems at several points to ensure the traveller is properly authorised to 
enter: Universal Visa System (UVS), the Airline Liaison Officer (ALO) network, Advanced Passenger 
Processing (APP) and border processing at entry points at Australian airports and seaports. It is 
important to note that Australia’s PP Advanced Passenger Processing System Check-in Guide is 
publicly available. Department of Immigration and Citizenship, Australia’s PP Advanced Passenger 
Processing System Check-in Guide, (October 2008).  
46
 Chelowinsky, Ryszard, Borders and discrimination in the European Union, ILPA- Immigration Law 
Practicioners’ Association (2002). http://www.ilpa.org.uk/data/resources/13281/ilpa_mpg_borders.pdf 
(22/12/2012) 
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to exclude a person’s entry to the country in the case of possible threats to personal 
safety and/or national security47.   
 
The second claim is that biometric passports and visas are used as identity-based 
filters and not as a strategy to strengthen border control. Considering that countries 
have implemented common control strategies for passenger identification systems, 
this presents an undue impact on privacy if biometric characteristics are requested 
from travellers in order for them to enter. This argument will be analysed under the 
Civil Law principle of proportionality and its equivalent Common Law reasonableness 
standard in the following chapter48. 
 
In the case of criminals, governments generally seek the inclusion of criminals based 
on the number of years in prison rather than on the crime itself. However, the 
challenge revolves around three national concerns: the volume of people included or 
listed; the interpretation of the offence and the use of different profiling systems. In 
the four countries examined, more asymmetries were found than similarities. 
 
It is important for common practices in the classification of individuals to be apply 
both nationally and internationally. 
   
6.3.5. Data Storage Restrictions. The fifth major challenge concerns the restrictions 
on how long data may be stored at national and international levels. Three of the four 
countries examined have clear provisions on their restrictions on the storage, 
deletion and destruction of personal information kept in national centralised 
databases. It is important to recall that Mexican criminal legal framework does not 
contain provisions regarding data storage restrictions. In the four countries 
examined, more asymmetries than similarities were found49.  
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 Heath Wellman, Christopher and Cole, Phillip, Debating the Ethics of Immigration, Is there a Right 
to Exclude? (Oxford University Press, 2011). 
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 For further details, see Chapter 8. Conclusion 
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 For further details, see Chapter 5. Biometrics in Criminal Databases: Current Transborder 
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Each country is responsible for ensuring that the data collected for or exchanged 
from its national databases to other countries or international agencies is not 
retained longer than necessary, either in the country or abroad. The ideal would be 
to have standardized practices on biometric data storage restrictions or deletion. 
 
6.3.6. Subsequent Automated Use of Information. The sixth major challenge consists 
of the subsequent automated use of information through the interoperability of 
dissimilar systems at national and international levels. This challenge is not about 
technology itself. However, interoperability is only possible by using a common 
standard. A standard is a common format that provides quality, security and 
durability in the exchange of information between similar systems. In other words, a 
standard makes it possible to exchange information between different systems50. 
  
Before 2011, there were six common standards developed by the biometric industry 
for compatible systems and used for specific purposes. Most of these common 
standards were also required by international agencies. These six common 
standards were: ICAO, INTERPOL, FIPS201, ISO, ANSI, NIST, ITL and NCITS. At 
that time, interoperability between databases was only possible by using one of 
these standards with compatible systems.  
 
Linkages between compatible systems are allowed because they are used for similar 
activities. The European Union called it the “principle of availability” and “equivalent 
access”, invoking key elements for exchanging information51. However, there are 
restrictions to link civilian databases with law enforcement databases nationally and 
internationally. One example of this is the Europol Convention, which establishes 
that the Europol processing system must under no circumstances be linked to any 
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 Wing, Bradford, “Future of ID, Developments in Standards & Critical Projects”, in Wise Media, 
(Paper presented at the Tenth ID World International Congress, Milan, 3 November 2011). 
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 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament – The Hague 
Programme: ten priorities for the next five years. The Partnership for European renewal in the field of 
Freedom, Security and Justice, [2005] OJ C 236/24. See also, Communication from the Commission 
to the Council and the European Parliament - Towards enhancing access to information by law 
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other automated processing system, except for the automated processing systems 
of the national units52. 
 
The standards were classified according to civilian activities and law enforcement or 
military activities. Therefore, travel documents and national identity cards use ICAO 
and ISO standards53, whereas the police use ANSU, NIST, ITL and NCIST54. The 
figure below shows the different standards used for immigration and criminal 
databases. 
 
Figure 24. Biometric Standards for Databases
55
 
 
 
In November 2011, a new standard was released: the ANSI/NIST-ITL 1-2011. This 
standard allows not only the interoperability between dissimilar systems like 
immigration databases and criminal databases, but also the storage, transmission 
and process of geographical data (position locations), associated contextual images 
and audio and visual data56. The figure below shows the subsequent automated use 
of biometric information. 
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 Directive 95/46/EC on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data 
and on the free movement of such data, [1995] OJ L 281/31. 
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 The format allows specific biometric modality for facial, iris, fingerprints and signature biometric 
characteristics. 
54
 The format allows specific biometric modalities for identifying marks, tattoos, DNA, fingerprints, iris, 
face, signature and voice biometric characteristics. 
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 Figure elaborated from diagrammatic illustration from Shoniregun, Chalres A., and Crosier, 
Stephen, Securing Biometrics Applications (Springer, 2008) p. 84. 
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 National Institute of Standards and Technology http://www.nist.gov/itl/iad/ig/ansi_standard.cfm 
(22/12/2012) 
179 
 
Figure 25. Subsequent Automated use of information
57
 
 
 
This standard may pose a future challenge because it facilitates the subsequent 
automated use of biometric information and other types of personal data between 
different agencies from different fields nationally and internationally, as this thesis 
argues58. In addition, this challenge may have an impact on other challenges such as 
access of data, data reliability and data protection in third party countries, noting that 
the information collected from third parties too must also be accurate and up-to-date. 
It is possible that the information collected for subsequent use may not be complete 
or up-to-date.  
 
Furthermore, as this thesis argues, one major principle for the international privacy 
regime should be that personal information should be collected for a specific purpose 
and only used for that purpose. Most countries have embedded this principle into 
their domestic legislation. The national privacy frameworks of the four countries 
examined establish this provision. Thus, the subsequent automated use of 
information breaches this principle of international and national privacy regimes. This 
will be analysed further under the principle of proportionality59.  
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 Figure elaborated from diagrammatic illustration from Shoniregun, Chalres A., and Crosier, 
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 For further details, see section 1.4 Hypothesis 
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6.3.7. Impact on Privacy and Data Protection. The last major challenge deals with 
the main impact on privacy and data protection at national and international levels. 
These concerns are related to privacy and issues of intrusiveness, disclosure, 
purpose, misuse and consent, among others.  
 
The previous chapter discussed the capacity of biometric systems to obtain an 
individual’s sample without his or her consent60 and to request additional personal 
information61. It is important to highlight that while not all biometric systems are 
physically intrusive62, all biometric systems can undermine privacy and data 
protection rights. 
 
The intensification and diversification of biometric technology increases privacy 
concerns nationally and internationally. It is now possible to deliver personal services 
or online interactions, such as e-Commerce, e-Government, e-Health, e-Education 
and other electronic activities by means of interactive platforms. While personal data 
is collected, stored, analysed and exchanged, in most cases, to grant access to 
multiple electronic identification systems (eID) both on and off the Internet, other 
cases do so for law enforcement, commercial, social or marketing purposes, or 
simply for convenience.  
 
These interactive platforms facilitate TBIF by assisting governments in establishing 
stronger and more accurate identifications63. Furthermore, the advances in storage 
capacity of personal information and the simplification of TBIF create legal concerns 
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 Facial features can be obtained with CCTV and fingerprints, with sensors. Some biometric systems 
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related to the purpose and misuse of information. The figure below shows interactive 
platforms facilitating TBIF between countries using a unique smart card.  
 
Figure 26. Transborder Biometric Smart Cards
64
 
 
 
Thus, it is important to enact an adequate privacy and data protection legal 
framework at national and international levels even though most countries already 
have provisions governing these privacy and data protection concerns within their 
borders. An assessment of privacy and data protection legal frameworks will be 
given in the following chapter65. 
 
It should be noted that there is, for example, asymmetry in the exercise of the right to 
access to personal information because this affects personal data protection 
nationally and internationally. The privacy and data protection legal framework in the 
four countries examined establish specific procedures for the right to access 
personal information, however, internationally these procedures are different. These 
privacy and data protection legal framework also establishes restrictions regarding 
national security issues and these restrictions prevent privacy commissioners from 
being able to properly monitor and supervise these databases.  
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Nationally, two scenarios surface with the exercise of the right to access to personal 
information: the first scenario is when certain privacy and data protection regimes set 
a direct procedure to be followed by national agencies when requesting access to 
personal information. In this case, citizens exercise their right by making their 
requests directly to the authority or agency. The second scenario is when privacy 
and data protection regimes set an indirect procedure for requests through a privacy 
commissioner, an ombudsman or a specific body. This situation means that citizens 
cannot directly access their information because the request is presented to the 
privacy commissioner, who then proceeds to request the information from the 
corresponding agency on the citizen’s behalf.  
 
At an international level, some agencies have internal provisions governing the right 
of access to information. Interpol, for example, has developed internal rules for the 
protection of the personal data collected and processed by its General Secretariat66. 
The Joint Supervisory Authority of Schengen has developed guidelines for exercising 
the right of access67. Interpol permits any request to be presented directly to the 
agency whereas with the Schengen, the request is governed by the national regime 
of the citizen requesting the personal information. The privacy principle of access to 
personal information, at an international level differs from agency to agency.  
 
Nationally and internationally, the exercise of the right of access to personal 
information is contradictory and the protection of data is not very user-friendly with all 
the different procedures and practices.   
 
In summary, seven domestic and global legal challenges can be identified, which 
pose risks to TBIF. Appropriate models of TBIF should be undertaken with integrity 
and consistency not only in terms of information, but also in compliance with privacy 
principle practices. A strict privacy and data protection legal framework is essential to 
reduce concerns in this area. In addition, a suitable legal regime for TBIF will ensure 
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 Rules on the Processing of Information for the purposes of international police cooperation (RPI) 
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effectiveness but more importantly address these national and international 
challenges. This assessment of privacy and data protection in the four countries is 
given in the next chapter68. 
 
6.4. Conclusions 
 
This thesis argued that the deployment of biometric systems and TBIF in both 
contexts, in immigration information flow and information flow in criminal databases 
for security reasons raises legal challenges. This chapter has provided an 
assessment of the central research problem by examining the common legal 
challenges for TBIF in the contexts of both immigration information flow69 and 
information flow in criminal databases70. This chapter should not be viewed solely in 
terms of trying to lay down the results of the research. In contrary, it sets out the 
common legal challenges of TBIF and their impact to privacy and data protection 
rights71. The chapter assessed old common legal challenges that need to be 
resolved and identified recent common legal challenges. The subsequent use of 
biometric information is a new common legal challenge originated by the rapidly 
developing biometric industry. All these common legal challenges arise at both 
national and international levels. This is important because the expectation for TBIF 
in both for immigration control and crime prevention was to find harmonised national 
integrity and consistency on biometric information and common practices72.  
 
Jasanoff and Habermas analyse governments and regulations in terms of their 
differing reception of technology73, however, these differences occur despite state 
policies, national priorities, global movements, and the role of key actors.  
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Finally, the next chapter discusses privacy and data protection in international and 
national legal frameworks on TBIF in the four countries examined. While countries 
examined have some differences in their privacy and data protection legal 
framework, it is possible to address an adequate regime for TBIF. A strengthened 
common legal privacy and data protection framework is needed to protect individual 
rights, as well as to facilitate the TBIF.  
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CHAPTER 7.  
 
TRANSBORDER BIOMETRIC PRIVACY REGIMES: NATIONAL SOLUTIONS 
 
 
7.1. Introduction 
 
The preceding chapters examined a rapidly developing industry with a lack of 
adequate self-regulation1 and the convergences and asymmetries for TBIF within the 
four countries study in the contexts of immigration control and crime prevention and 
the emerging, international regulatory frameworks for TBIF for immigration 
information flow2 and for information flow in criminal databases3. The thesis has also 
emphasised the lack of public debate and lack of official information about 
biometrics4. The previous chapter identified the common legal challenges of TBIF in 
the context of immigration information and information in criminal databases5. 
 
The four countries study identified two major contexts in which individual privacy and 
data protection rights may be affected by restricted public interests, namely in the 
contexts of defence and national security. Restrictions in these two contexts are 
considered as major concerns for human rights activist and academics who agreed 
that “governments have increased their coercive powers to detriment privacy and 
data protection”6. Concerns about the restrictions on privacy and data protections in 
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are increasing significantly in the contexts of defence and national security, because 
of the intensification on the deployment of biometric systems, particularly in TBIF. 
The justifications for restrictions on individual rights to privacy and data protection 
frequently refer to common international concerns about threats of terrorism and 
illegal immigration.  
 
This chapter considers national and international privacy and data protection and 
recommendations for an achievable legal framework for TBIF and proposes practical 
and achievable recommendations to address these challenges. These 
recommendations recognise the emergence of some international organisations in 
this field. However, these are not official international organisations and their 
recommendations are not binding. Nevertheless, these international organisations 
are making valuable contributions to address some of the legal challenges of TBIF, 
but their recommendations are advisory only and without jurisdiction or authority to 
address specific domestic problems7. Recognising that privacy and data protection 
operate at national levels, the proposed recommendations acknowledge the 
adoption of a best practice model must include mechanisms to achieve greater 
transparency and public accountability within an integrated, a reasonable 
standardise legal framework. 
 
Importantly, this chapter also discusses the principle of proportionality in relation to 
the proposed recommendations as a means of balancing the costs and benefits of 
TBIF and assessing the recommendations themselves. As an analytical and 
synthetic tool, the “principle of proportionality” enables the assessment of biometric 
systems in relation to human rights and whether TBIF in immigration control and 
crime prevention are strictly necessary in a constitutional democratic States. This 
chapter also assesses international privacy and data protection framework and sets 
out the current four countries study symmetries, asymmetries and legal gaps in 
privacy and data protection framework for TBIF. This chapter examines the balance 
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between public and private interests by the Civil Law proportionality test and the 
Common Law reasonableness standard. Finally, this chapter presents proposals to 
address the required level of privacy and data protection for TBIF within any 
jurisdiction. 
 
7.2. International Privacy and Data Protection Regimes 
 
There are no specific international treaties on biometric information flow generally or 
TBIF in particularly. The emerging international privacy and data protection regime 
has been developed by a number of organisations that range from regional forums to 
official regional organisations. On this unofficial to official range are the Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC), non-mandatory, Privacy Framework; the Economic 
Cooperation and Development’s (OECD) Privacy and Security Guidelines; the 
Council of Europe conventions and the mandatory Directives of the European Union 
on data protection8.  
 
7.2.1. The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Privacy Framework. APEC is 
primarily a forum to promote cooperation in the Asia Pacific region in economic 
affairs.  This regional Asia-Pacific organisation has considered privacy issues in 
relation to economic cooperation and developed a framework for the constituent 
members. The APEC Privacy framework is not mandatory or binding on members 
but may informed policy and legislation for members. The APEC framework is 
relevant to this thesis, as three of the four countries study are members of APEC. 
 
Importantly, the APEC Privacy framework is a formal advisory but non-binding set of 
guidelines for members. APEC first considered privacy in 1998, when the APEC 
issued the Blueprint for Action on Electronic Commerce. It was not until 2004 that the 
APEC group agreed on the APEC Privacy Framework; which outlines privacy 
principles. The 21 member countries may implement these principles in their national 
legislation, but such implementation is entirely voluntary. Accordingly, the APEC 
                                            
8
 It is important to note that various countries have created different regional forums to discuss privacy 
and data protection issues. An example of the importance of these regional forums is the Resolution 
on International Enforcement Coordination (2013) of the annual International Data Protection and 
Privacy Commissioner´s Conference. 
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framework is optional and its implementation has not been consistent among 
member countries9.  
 
It should be noted that the APEC framework protects cross-border flow of personal 
information, even outside the APEC region, through the accountability principle10. 
The APEC Privacy Framework includes a mechanism for reporting domestic 
implementation of the framework, guidance for international implementation 
(information sharing among member economies) and cross-border cooperation in 
investigation and law enforcement11. However, at the time of writing, no report on its 
implementation was available. 
 
In 2007, APEC issued a pilot programme for the implementation of the privacy 
framework called, Data Privacy Pathfinder12. As a result of the Privacy Pathfinder 
working plan, in 2012, the APEC issued the Cross-Border Privacy Rules System, 
which is a voluntary certification based system13. 
 
In summary, the APEC Privacy Framework is concise, sufficiently general for 
international implementation and suitably broad for cross-border cooperation for 
investigations and the enforcement of privacy laws. However, the APEC Privacy 
Framework is not mandatory and requires domestic legislation to be enacted. In 
addition, the APEC Privacy Framework does not impose strict controls and 
safeguards on privacy and data protection in member countries. It is therefore 
concluded that the APEC Privacy Framework provides a reasonable framework of 
guidelines, but does not required regulatory implementation or effectiveness on a 
national level. 
 
 
                                            
9
 APEC Privacy Framework (2004) http://www.apec.org/Groups/Committee-on-Trade-and-
Investment/~/media/Files/Groups/ECSG/05_ecsg_privacyframewk.ashx (23/12/2012) 
10
 The accountability principle was first established in the OECD Guidelines. 
11
 For Australia, Mexico and New Zealand as members of APEC. 
12
 The Pathfinder sets objectives for businesses and Privacy Agencies.  
13
 APEC Cross-Border Privacy Rules System (2012) http://www.apec.org/Groups/Committee-on-
Trade-and-Investment/~/media/Files/Groups/ECSG/CBPR/CBPR-PoliciesRulesGuidelines.ashx 
(27/09/2012) 
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7.2.2. The Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Privacy and Security 
Guidelines. These OECD Privacy guidelines were drafted in 1980 and marked a 
watershed in the development of personal data protection. Although these guidelines 
are not mandatory and require national legislation to be implemented, the foundation 
for the subsequent national privacy and data protection laws of all the member 
countries. These guidelines were principally concerned with the protection of 
personal data held by financial organisations and governments within national 
borders. The guidelines did recognise the international transfer of business and 
commerce data14. At that time, the flow of personal information across national 
borders increased and thus the protection of personal information flow was 
considered crucial. The OECD expert group, chaired by Michael Kirby not only 
focused on the protection of privacy, but also centred its attention on challenges 
related to cross-border data15. These guidelines originally applied for banking and 
commerce and now have application for cross-border data in general and extended 
to the emerging concerns about security with the 2002 Security Guidelines.  
 
Almost thirty five years ago, the OECD Privacy Guidelines, which are not binding, 
were the universal foundation and starting point for national privacy and data 
protections laws. These guidelines encompass eight principles, which are interpreted 
as the minimum standards that countries should incorporate into their privacy and 
data protection legislations for TBIF. These eight principles are characterised by 
flexibility of application: all media, all types of processing and all categories of data -
included biometrics-. For our research, three important sections from the OECD 
Privacy Guidelines are taken into account. The first section is related to the basic 
principles of international application: free flow and legitimate restrictions. The 
second section is about national implementation, and the third section is related to 
international cooperation16.  
 
                                            
14
 Kirby, Michael, “The History, Achievement and Future of the 1980 OECD Guidelines on Privacy” 
(2010) 20(2) Journal of Law, Information and Science 1-14. 
15
 Idem. 
16
 Idem. 
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In 2002, the OECD issued Security Guidelines17, a set of nine high level policy and 
operational principles that aim to set a minimum level of security for personal 
information that flows internationally.    
 
It is clear that the OECD Guidelines were a significant achievement and have been 
an essential basic formula and benchmark for international data protection 
regulations around the world. However, these OECD Guidelines require direction on 
how to apply them. Besides, the volume of personal data now being exchanged, 
collected, retrieved, processed, used and stored cannot compare to the volume of 
personal data of three decades ago. Thus, it brings up not only the question of 
whether domestic regimes have been laid down with sufficient precision to protect 
individuals’ private interests against the public interests, but also about the quality of 
the law in question and the individuals’ private interest in the facilitation of linkages of 
many databases nationally and internationally. 
 
7.2.3. The OECD and Biometrics Technology. The OECD continued to consider 
privacy and data protection on their agenda and consider the development of 
methods of biometric data. In 2004, the issue of biometric data exchanges was 
formally considered and the OECD issued a report on biometric recognition 
technology18. In this report, the OECD gave an overview of national policies and 
legal frameworks, listed international organisations working in the field, identified 
existing and pilot systems and detected some concerns. These concerns can be 
classified as pertaining to four areas: first, the potential for encryption; second, the 
risk that biometric recognition systems can be used for surveillance; third, that the 
principles of consent and transparency are optional in some implementations and 
fourth, their susceptibility to security attacks19. 
 
 
                                            
17
 OECD Guidelines for the Security of Information Systems and Networks: Towards a Culture of 
Security, OECD Council, 1037
th
 sess (25 July 2002)  
http://www.oecd.org/internet/interneteconomy/15582260.pdf (23/12/2012) 
18
 OECD, Biometric-based Technologies, Report 101 (2004) http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/232075642747 
(22/08/2012) 
19
 Idem. 
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The report recommended that all biometric systems be guided by both the OECD 
Privacy Guidelines and the Security Guidelines. Moreover, the OECD report also 
proposed recommendations to the biometric industry in order to ensure that 
biometric technology complies with privacy and security requirements, as discussed 
in preceding chapters20. The report also highlighted the risks of relying on biometrics 
as the only security measure, as well as the lack of public independent biometric 
performance reports. 
 
However, the report did not examine the quality of the domestic laws of their 
members or require, for example, that the measures implemented to protect 
personal data should be accessible to the person concerned. It also did not examine 
whether the law was sufficiently clear in its terms of giving an adequate indication of 
every circumstance related to cross-border privacy risks or cross-border complaints, 
in which the authorities are empowered to exchange information with overseas 
authorities and the procedures to do so. 
 
7.2.4. The OECD and Cross-Border Privacy Concerns. The technical cross-linking of 
data bases prompted the OECD to turn its attention to the increasing rate of TBIF. 
The OECD formally consider this issue and in 2006 published its Report on the 
Cross-Border Enforcement of Privacy Law21. The report shows asymmetries and 
similarities among 23 member countries and one non-member country in matters of 
international cross-border data flows, privacy risks and law enforcement co-
operation. It turned its attention to domestic privacy law enforcement issues and 
cross-border aspects of privacy law enforcement. However, it did not provide any 
solutions to problems related to effective co-operation, cross-border privacy risks 
and/or cross-border complaints. 
 
                                            
20
 For further details, see Chapter 3. The Biometric Industry: An Illustrative Map of Players, Products 
and Partnerships 
21
 OECD, Report on the Cross-Border Enforcement of Privacy Law, Report 121 (2006) 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/231304814207 (23/12/2012) 
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The following year, the OECD adopted the Recommendation of the Council on 
Cross-border Co-operation in the Enforcement of Laws Protecting Privacy.22 
Recently, in 2011, the OECD issued the Report on the Implementation of the OECD 
Recommendation on Cross-border Co-operation in the Enforcement of Laws 
Protecting Privacy23. These documents reveal an increase in the number of countries 
with privacy or data protection legislation and some improvements related to cross-
border co-operation done by some privacy agencies. However, the report also 
recognises that the actual instances of co-operation are still limited24. Furthermore, 
the report did not provide any solutions to the problems of restrictions on sharing 
information with overseas authorities, cross-border privacy risks or cross-border 
complaints. 
 
In 2011, the OECD issued a report on a review their guidelines governing the 
protection of privacy and transborder data flows of personal data25. This document 
identified seven privacy-related challenges and highlighted geographic restrictions 
on data flows. But once again, it did not provide any solutions or guidance on how to 
solve these issues. 
 
In summary, the flow of major OECD reports on privacy from 1980 to 2011 confirmed 
the continuing concerns about individual privacy in the face the technological 
changes. The more recent reports from 2004 focus on the specific concerns address 
in this thesis in relation to TBIF in the contexts of immigration and criminal 
databases. These OECD reports confirm the existence of gaps between the 
emerging international regulatory framework, like the OECD Privacy and Security 
Guidelines and the national privacy and data protection laws. These gaps are very 
apparent in the two contexts of this thesis. Both the OECD Privacy and the Security 
Guidelines apply to TBIF, but these guidelines have not been generally enacted 
                                            
22
 OECD Recommendation of the Council on Cross-border Co-operation in the Enforcement of Laws 
Protecting Privacy (2007) http://www.oecd.org/internet/interneteconomy/38770483.pdf (23/12/2012) 
23
 OECD, Implementation of the OECD Recommendation on Cross-border Co-operation in the 
Enforcement of Laws Protecting Privacy, Report 178, (2006) 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5kgdpm9wg9xs-en (23/12/2012) 
24
 Idem. 
25
 OECD Terms of Reference for the Review of the OECD Guidelines Governing the Protection of 
Privacy and Transborder Data Flows of Personal Data (2011) http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5kg2b7l7pljk-
en (23/12/2012) 
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within national jurisdictions. In addition, there is a practical lack of co-operation in 
privacy law enforcement within countries and a lack of willingness of privacy and 
data protection authorities to co-operate with overseas authorities. Both sets of 
OECD Privacy and Security Guidelines are brief and could apply to all biometric 
systems in general. However, the OECD Guidelines do not impose sanctions or 
controls for data protection standards. Nevertheless, both sets of OECD Guidelines 
can provide a reasonable international framework for standards provided these 
standards are implemented, with sanctions, at a national level. 
 
7.2.5. The Council of Europe (CE)26 Data Protection Framework. Influenced by the 
work of the OECD the CE, in 1981, developed the first European convention on 
processing personal data and standards of privacy and data protection: the 
Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of 
Personal Data (also known as Convention 108). The CE is an important regional 
organisation27 that is principally concerned with human rights. The CE includes a 
wider membership of 47 States than the European Union with its 28. In 2001, the CE 
issued a protocol regarding privacy agencies and transborder data flows28.  
 
Convention 108 strengths the individual’s rights of data protection with regard 
automatic techniques of processing, storing and exchanging personal data, but 
concerns arise to what extent national data protection laws afford adequate 
protection to individuals when data concerning them flow across borders. Therefore, 
the CE issued an additional protocol to Convention 108 which recognised that 
Privacy Commissioners play a critically central role in the effective protection of 
individuals in cross-border data flows. 
                                            
26
 An international organisation in Strasbourg which comprises 47 countries of Europe. It was set up 
to promote democracy and protect human rights and the rule of law in Europe. For further details of 
legal instruments, see the Council of Europe legal instruments website 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/dataprotection/legal_instruments_en.asp (23/12/2012) 
27
 The Council of Europe http://www.coe.int/aboutCoE/index.asp?page=quisommesnous&l=en 
(23/12/2012) 
28
 Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data, 
opened for signature 28 January 1981, ETS No. 108 (entered into force 1 October 1985), as 
amended by The Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty 
establishing the European Community, opened for signature 15 June 1995, (entered into force after 
acceptation by all Parties), as amended by the Protocol to Convention ETS No. 108, opened for 
signature 8 November 2001, ETS No. 181 (entered into force after acceptation by all Parties). 
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Two recommendations and one resolution are particularly significant in Convention 
108. The recommendations and resolution are non-binding but represent a 
significant advance in an attempt to create a framework for TBIF in Europe since 
they address specific issues regarding automated techniques for the storage, use 
and exchange of personal data and they respond to actual concerns related to 
privacy and data protection principles. These are: Recommendation No. R (91) 10 
on the communication to third parties of personal data held by public bodies; 
Recommendation CM/Rec (2010) 13 on the protection of individuals with regard to 
automatic processing of personal data in the context of profiling and Resolution (74) 
29 related to the protection of individuals vis-à-vis electronic data banks in the public 
sector. 
 
 Recommendation No. R (91) 10 on the communication to third parties of 
personal data held by public bodies29.  This recommendation recognises the 
increasing trends of automatic data processing, storing and exchanging 
personal information by public bodies and its exploitation for commercial 
advantages by the private sector. Therefore, this recommendation establishes 
Data Protection Principles (DPP) based on the Convention 108 that can be 
implemented by national legislation to implement these safeguards.   
 
 Recommendation CM/Rec (2010) 13 on the protection of individuals with 
regard to automatic processing of personal data in the context of profiling30. 
This Recommendation establishes 13 conditions for the collection and 
processing of personal data, the rights of data subjects, remedies, data 
security and supervisory authorities. However, there are exceptions and 
restrictions are broad and may limit individual privacy. These exceptions are: 
security, public safety, monetary interests of the State or the prevention and 
suppression of criminal offences. 
                                            
29
 Recommendation No.R(91) 10 on the communication to third parties of personal data held by public 
bodies, adopted 9 September 1991. 
30
 Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)13 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on the 
protection of individuals with regard to automatic processing of personal data in the context of 
profiling, adopted 23 November 2010. 
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 Resolution (74) 29 related to the protection of individuals vis-à-vis electronic 
data banks in the public sector31. This resolution established specific common 
DPP as a guide to member States to ensure harmonised and uniform 
implementation of these principles. The aim was to avoid asymmetries 
between the data protection legislation introduced in the member States.  
 
These CE recommendations and the resolution are not binding unless implemented 
in national legislation. Nevertheless, these Data Protection Principles have promoted 
privacy and data protection rights through Europe, in partnership with the European 
Union (EU). Many members have signed the Convention 108 and implemented it in 
their respective national legal frameworks.   
 
7.2.6. European Union and Their Data Protection Legal Framework. Apart from 
these three organisations, the European Union (EU) has developed a mandatory 
regime for privacy and data protection. The EU includes Spain as a member state 
and is one of the four countries examined in the four countries study. Spain provides 
an illustration of the mandatory EU legal framework. The EU requires countries 
dealing with the EU, to comply with their legal framework and can undertake an 
assessment on the adequacy of a country’s privacy standards and remedies32.  
 
The EU legal framework includes different types of legal documents: conventions, 
protocols, directives, recommendations and resolutions, all of which are binding for 
all member countries. However, the most important binding Directives33 in relation to 
data protection issued by the EU are the Directive 95/46/EC34 (known as the Data 
Protection Directive) and the Directive 2009/136/EC35: 
                                            
31
 Resolution (74)29 related to the protection of individuals vis-à-vis electronic data banks, adopted 20 
September 1974. 
32
 Article 25.6 EU Directive 95/46/EC on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of 
personal data and on the free movement of such data, [1995] OJ L 281/31. 
33
 A Directive is a legal act where the EU which normally leave member States a certain amount of 
leeway to enact rules to be adopted. Folsom, Ralph and Lake, Ralph B. (eds.), European Union law 
after Maastricht: a practical guide for lawyers outside the common market (Kluwer, 1996), p. 5. 
34
 Directive 95/46/EC on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data 
and on the free movement of such data, [1995] OJ L 281/31.  
35
 Directive 2009/136/EC (2009) amending Directive 2002/22/EC on universal service and users’ 
rights relating to electronic communications networks and services, Directive 2002/58/EC concerning 
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 Directive 95/46/EC. On the protection of privacy and data protection this 
Directive is the main reference text at European level. This Directive applies 
to data processed and storage in any non-automated and automated 
databases. Its aim is to set the cross-border regulatory framework balancing 
the individuals’ interests and the public interests for personal data flow in 
Europe36. 
 
 Directive 2009/136/EC. Amends the actual mandatory EU legal framework for 
electronic communications networks and services, as well as five directives. 
These directives embody a breakthrough in regulating personal data 
processing and the protection of privacy. First, they address a number of 
issues relating to data processing systems. Second, they were updated after 
the European Commission (EC)37 presented its findings on the review of the 
EU regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and 
services in 200638.  
 
Directive 95/46/EC prohibits the transborder information flow to countries that have 
inadequate data protection regimes (including European members)39. The aim of this 
prohibition is “to ensure that the cross-border flow of personal data is regulated in a 
consistent manner”40. For the EU, an adequate data protection regime is based on 
the following requirements: 
 
                                                                                                                                       
the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector 
and Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 on cooperation between national authorities responsible for the 
enforcement of consumer protection laws, [2009] OJ L 337/11. 
36
 Directive 95/46/EC on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data 
and on the free movement of such data, [1995] OJ L 281/31. 
37
 The executive organ of the European Union, based in Brussels, which monitors the proper 
application of the Union treaties and the decisions of the EU institutions. 
38
 Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, on the Review of the EU 
regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services, [2006] COD 2006/334. 
39
 Directive 95/46/EC on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data 
and on the free movement of such data, [1995] OJ L 281/31, article 25(1). 
40
 Ibidem, paragraph 8. 
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a) “Principles of privacy and data protection reflected in the obligations imposed on 
persons, public authorities, enterprises, agencies or other bodies for 
processing”41; 
 
b) “Circumstances under which processing can be carried out; including nature of 
the data, the purpose, duration of the proposed processing operation, data 
quality, the rules of law –both general and sectoral- in force in the third country, 
professional rules, technical security and notification to the supervisory 
authority”42; 
 
c) “Rights conferred on individuals; including to be informed of cross-border data 
flow, to access to the data transferred, to request corrections and to object to the 
transfer in specific circumstances”43.  
 
These important Directives have been supplemented with binding recommendations 
and resolutions specifically applying to biometric systems. However, comparative 
studies conducted by the EC44 have indicated that the operational of the privacy and 
data protection laws within the borders of EU members have asymmetries. Some of 
the member countries differ in the scope of their implementation of the Directive and 
in the functions and powers of their privacy agencies. In addition, some academic 
studies and reports have also highlighted this lack of harmonisation in terms and 
rules45. 
 
                                            
41
 Ibidem, paragraph 25. 
42
 Ibidem, Article 25(2).  
43
 Ibidem, paragraph 25. 
44
 As it was mentioned earlier the EC is the executive organ of the EU, for further detail above n 38. 
45
 Korff, Douwe, “EC Study on Implementation of Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC” (2002). 
Available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1287667  (23/12/2012); Bygrave, Lee, “Privacy Protection in a 
Global Context -A Comparative Overview”, (2004) 47 Scandinavian Studies in Law 319-348; Kuner, 
Christopher, “Regulation of Transborder Data Flows under Data Protection and Privacy Law: Past, 
Present, and Future”, Tilbrug Institute for Law, Technology and Society, (2010) 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1689483 (23/12/2012); Korff, Douwe, “Comparative Study on Different 
Approach to New Privacy Challenges, in Particular in the Light of Technological Developments” 
(2010). 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/studies/new_privacy_challenges/final_report_working
_paper_2_en.pdf (23/12/2012) 
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The EU legal framework of transborder data facilitates the free flow of personal data 
among European members. Nevertheless, some challenges may arise when 
personal information flows out of the European region with different approaches to 
regulation are applied, because countries outside this region must adjust their 
national laws to EU legal framework in order to transfer personal data legally. 
 
In summary, in contrast to the APEC Privacy Framework, the OECD Guidelines and 
the Council of Europe Convention 108, the European Union Directives embodies a 
mandatory legal framework. The mandatory EU Directives establishes a regional 
regime and imposes strict controls and safeguards on data protection. The EU 
mandatory data protection legal framework extends to countries outside the EU as 
these countries must have equivalent protections on data protection46. The EU legal 
framework provides a best practice gold standard for the protection of privacy and 
data protection and ensures regulatory effectiveness at a national level but also for 
TBIF. 
 
7.3. National Privacy and Data Protection Legal Frameworks: The Four Countries 
Study 
 
In the absence of a mandatory international privacy regime or binding regional 
agreements, like the Directives of the EU, privacy and data protection relies on 
national regulatory regimes. Similarly, TBIF between immigration and criminal 
databases is primarily regulated by national privacy and data protection laws. The 
four countries study identified areas of symmetries and asymmetries in the privacy 
and data protection frameworks in the four countries examined. Before any 
proposals can be made to better integrate national privacy and data protection 
regimes, these symmetries and asymmetries must be assessed and their 
significance balanced. This section focuses on TBIF where data collection and 
exchanges are carried out by government agencies involved in border control or 
criminal law enforcement activities. 
                                            
46
 In Australia for example amendments were introduced to the Privacy Act to comply with the EU, 
Australia Law Reform Commission, For Your Information: Australian Privacy Law and Practice, Report 
No 108 (2008) vol. 1-3. 
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7.3.1. Outline of Privacy and Data Protection in The Four Countries Study. 
Nationally, the legal framework starts from a constitutional level. Comparative 
research was undertaken in the four countries study that reveals that the three of the 
four countries examined, the recognition of privacy or data protection rights starts at 
this level. Australia is the only country, in the four countries study, that does not have 
a Bill of Rights. The next level is found in a country’s legislation. All four countries 
have national laws on privacy or data protection.   
 
The Australian Privacy Act 1988 is the main statute governing privacy at the federal 
level and has 13 Australian Privacy Principles (IPPs), which apply to federal 
government agencies and private sector47. Meanwhile, in New Zealand, the 1993 
Privacy Act has 12 privacy principles that govern public and private sectors. Like 
Australia’s Privacy Act, the New Zealand’s 1993 Privacy Act follows the principles 
embedded in the OECD Guidelines48.  
 
Spanish Organic Law 15/1999 of 13 December on the Protection of Personal Data49 
embraces not only the OECD Guidelines, but also the EU legal framework. The 
Mexican legal data protection framework is governed by two piece of legislation, the 
Federal Data Protection in Possession by the Private Sector Act50 and the Federal 
Transparency and Access to Governmental Public Information Act51. Under the 
                                            
47
 The Australian Privacy Principles replace both the Information Privacy Principles (IPPs) that applied 
to government agencies and the National Privacy Principles (NPPs) that applied to some private 
sector. This new Australian Privacy Principles come into force in March 2014.  
48
 The Office of the Federal Privacy Commissioner of Australia stated that Australia’s privacy laws and 
principles “reflect the ideas that have been developed internationally and, in particular, the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development’s (OECD) Guidelines Governing the 
Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows or Personal Data (1980). A growing number of other 
countries, including New Zealand, Hong Kong, Canada, and many European nations, have also 
adopted privacy laws”. Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Australia, Guidelines to the National 
Privacy Principles (2001) http://www.privacy.gov.au/materials/types/guidelines/view/6582 
(23/12/2012)  
49
 Ley Orgánica 15/1999, de 13 de diciembre, de Protección de Datos de Carácter Personal, BOE-A-
1999-23750 [Organic Law 15/1999 of 13 December, on the Protection of Personal Data] (Spain) 
http://www.boe.es/buscar/doc.php?id=BOE-A-1999-23750 (21/12/2012) 
50
 Ley Federal de Proteccion de Datos Personales en Posesion de los Particulares, DOF 5/07/2010 
[Federal Data Protection in Possession by the Private Sector Act] (Mexico) 
http://www.diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/pdf/LFPDPPP.pdf (21/12/2012) 
51
 Ley Federal de Transparencia y Acceso a la Información Pública, DOF 11/06/2002 [Federal 
Transparency and Access to Governmental Public Information last amended on 08/06/12] (Mexico) 
http://www.diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/pdf/244.pdf (21/12/2012) 
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Federal Transparency and Access to Governmental Public Information Act, Mexico 
regulates personal data in possession by the public sector.  
 
The Mexican Federal Transparency and Access to Governmental Public Information 
Act has one chapter on data protection, which consists of nine articles. It is important 
to note that since the research for this thesis focuses on legal issues of biometric 
systems implemented by governments, this legislation is the only significant 
legislation on data protection in the case of Mexico. For Mexican privacy experts, this 
kind of regulation raises a number of questions related to the adequate protection of 
personal data in Mexico52. 
 
7.3.2. Symmetries in the Four Countries National Laws. The research assessment 
on the four countries study has identified twelve symmetries that may be seen as 
common strengths in dealing privacy and data protection for TBIF53. These 
symmetries are as follows:  
 
 The four countries have all developed and published formal privacy guidelines 
or national privacy principles under powers in their national legislation. 
 
 The four countries have agencies powers to publish standard codes of 
conduct for good practices and these must be deposited with the privacy 
agencies. In Mexico, these are known as guidelines. 
 
 The four countries have imposed privacy and of data protection obligations on 
persons, public authorities, enterprises, agencies and other data processing 
bodies. 
 
                                            
52
 Interview with Ernesto Villanueva Villanueva and Issa Luna Pla, Professors, Instituto de 
Investigaciones Jurídicas de la Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México [Centre for Legal 
Research of the National Autonomous University of Mexico] above note 11 and Interview with Lina 
Ornelas, Instituto Federal de Acceso a la Información y Protección de Datos [Federal Institute for 
Access to Information and Data Protection] This component of the research project received approval 
from the University of Tasmania Human Research Ethics Committee. Approval Ethics Ref: H0012013 
of 29/08/2011. 
53
 For further details, see Appendix I. Four Countries Privacy Regime (Comparative Table) 
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 In the four countries, the formulation of the principles of privacy and data 
protection have been influenced by the OECD Privacy Guidelines but using 
different legislative terms in the drafting of their laws. 
 
  In the four countries examined, the legislative definition includes biometric 
information within the category of protected personal information.  
 
 The four countries have revised their domestic law to provide legal remedies 
for unauthorised access, disclosure or misuse of information. The four 
countries allow the communication of data between official public authorities 
under specific conditions. 
 
 The four countries have provisions for communication of transfers of data 
between national agencies. 
 
 Three countries (excluding Mexico) have legislative provisions related to the 
international transfer and flow of data. 
 
 The four countries examined all have national privacy agencies (Privacy 
Commissioners) whose main role is to ensure that the legal data protection 
framework is enforced. 
 
 The four national privacy agencies have the following common powers 
established in their legislation: to investigate breaches under their legislations; 
review complaints; to approve agency and industry privacy and data 
guidelines; to review the operation of such guidelines; to supervise, promote, 
monitor and report privacy and data protection under their jurisdiction; to 
examine regularly the national legislation and propose amendments to the 
legislation; to conduct research and studies into privacy and data protection 
under their jurisdiction; to oversee developments in and to cooperate with 
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national and international bodies or other governmental agencies dealing with 
privacy and data protection54.  
 
 The four privacy agencies in each country have resources to investigate, 
review, supervise and monitor public bodies in response to access request in 
the course of their normal operations. 
 
 The four privacy agencies have powers to conduct Privacy Impact 
Assessments (PIA) to examine or measure the privacy risks of any project. 
 
 Three countries (excluding Spain) have exceptions related to defence and 
national security in their privacy and data protection laws. The Spanish 
legislation allows to the Privacy Commissioner to inspect security forces 
databases.  
 
7.3.3. Asymmetries in National Laws. In contrast the research assessment identified 
seven asymmetries55 for a common and harmonised TBIF, which are:  
 
 The New Zealand legislation is the only one that considers “information 
matching agreements”56, agreement which allow information matching 
programmes between agencies through written agreements, which should 
incorporate the information matching rules.  
 
 New Zealand legislation is the only one that considers the prohibition of 
“unique identifiers” as a principle57.  
                                            
54
 In the four countries, the privacy and data protection agencies generally have extensive powers to 
engage in and perform different tasks, from administrative functions to quasi-legislative functions, 
quasi-judicial functions to enforcement, including the imposition of administrative fines. 
55
 For further details, see Appendix I. Four Countries Privacy Regime (Comparative Table) 
56
 These information matching agreements sets the specific terms and conditions governing 
disclosures of personal records, information or data. This specific terms and conditions ensure that 
the public entity make such disclosures of data and uses such disclosed data in accordance with the 
requirements of the privacy or data protection law. 
57
 Its legislation defines the term “unique identifier” as an “identifier that is assigned to an individual by 
an agency for the purposes of the operation of the agency; and uniquely identifies that individual in 
relation to that agency, but does not include an individual’s name used to identify that individual”. 
Privacy Act 1993 (New Zealand), Article 2. 
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 The Spanish and Mexican legislation include provisions that databases 
created or operated by the government58, must be registered with the relevant 
Spanish and Mexican privacy agencies.  
 
 The Spanish legislation is the only one that has special provisions of 
inspection security force databases. 
 
 The Spanish and Mexican privacy agencies have powers of inspection of the 
place of data storage and hardware and software used to process these data 
whereas in Australian and New Zealand, the privacy agencies have more 
limited powers. 
 
 Mexico is the only country where the legislation does not have provisions on 
the international movement of data. However, the Mexican privacy agency 
has powers to prohibit the transfer of personal information outside Mexico. 
 
7.3.4. Gap Analyses: Procedural Barriers for TBIF Harmonisation. The research in 
the four countries study revealed four practical and procedural inconsistencies in the 
area of TBIF. An assessment of these four inconsistencies leads to a conclusion that 
these are significant barriers against a harmonised and standardised privacy and 
data protection TBIF framework59. The four identified inconsistencies are the 
following:  
 
1. Three of the four countries in the study have specific legislative provisions 
related to transborder information flows to countries with equal privacy and 
data protection laws60 whereas Mexico the legislative provision is not 
clear.  
                                            
58
 The Spanish legislation includes also the private sector. In the case of Mexico the private sector is 
also included but under the Ley Federal de Protección de Datos Personales en Posesión de los 
Particulares, DOF 05/07/2010 [Federal Data Protection for the Private Sector] (Mexico) 
http://www.diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/pdf/LFPDPPP.pdf (20/12/2012) 
59
 For further details, see Appendix I. Four Countries Privacy Regime (Comparative Table) 
60
 This term is used generically to mean Common Law Acts in Parliament and in Civil Law the 
equivalent term is Law. The term “laws” is used by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and 
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2. In Australia and New Zealand the method for transborder data is carried 
out by data exchange requests to specific authorities (known as ad hoc or 
one off request) whereas Spain and Mexico generally have linked national 
databases to automated international systems (known as systematic data 
sharing)61. 
 
3. Spanish law has a “general rule” allowing international transborder of data; 
however, the Spanish Constitutional Court had made specific ruling two 
articles in their Organic Law on the Protection of Data62 unconstitutional63.  
 
4. In all four countries the relevant TBIF legislation does not provide rights to 
individual access information about personal data transfer or complaints 
about TBIF to foreign countries. 
 
In relation to the first inconsistency, Australia, New Zealand and Spain apply a strict 
test and require to which data will transfer to have adequate and equivalent 
protection.  The rationale for this strict test is well articulated in the report by the 
State Services Commission of New Zealand, namely: 
 
 The inability to guarantee the protection of personal information in countries 
without privacy or data protection laws. 
 
                                                                                                                                       
refers as a: “a legal norm passed by the Legislature and promulgated by the Executive Branch in the 
manner prescribed by the Constitution or whether, on the other hand, it is used `in the material 
sense’, as a synonym for the entire body of law [Legal System], without regard to the procedure 
followed in creating such norms and the normative rank assigned to it within the hierarchical order of 
the particular legal system”. Advisory Opinion OC-6/86 (1986) 6 Inter-American Court HR (ser A) at 
paragraph 15. 
61
 For further details, see Chapter 6. Transborder Biometric Information Flow: Legal Challenges.  
62
 Ley Orgánica 15/1999, de 13 de diciembre, de Protección de Datos de Carácter Personal, BOE-A-
1999-23750 [Organic Law 15/1999 of 13 December, on the Protection of Personal Data] (Spain) 
http://www.boe.es/buscar/doc.php?id=BOE-A-1999-23750 (21/12/2012) 
63
 The Spanish Constitutional Court ruled these provisions unconstitutional “because they were too 
broad and could lead to abuse of powers, and failed to meet the principles of accessibility, 
foreseeability, pressing social necessity and proportionality”. Recurso de Inconstitucional [Spanish 
Constitutional Court Complaint Number] 292/2000, 20 November 2000, 4 January 2001) published in 
BOE. http://www.boe.es/boe/dias/2001/01/04/pdfs/T00104-00118.pdf (23/12/2012) 
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 Conflicts between different jurisdictions: overseas legislations which come in 
conflict with national law.  
 
 The inability of privacy agencies to investigate or enforce the law; 
 
 The unauthorised release of personal information:  possible misuse of 
information 
 
 Possible access to data by foreign governments; 
 
 Overseas judicial decisions that might require the disclosure of data64; 
 
The second inconsistency is about the method use for transborder data. All four 
countries have integrated systems that allows cross-checking among of number of 
national databases, such as immigration, passports, taxation, social services, 
criminal records, often used to check individuals eligibility for publicly-funded 
services. However, Australia, New Zealand and Spain have clear legal provisions 
which permit exchange information or linkage databases for international 
cooperation to international agencies whereas in Mexico the legal provision is not 
clear. Nevertheless, the mode in which Australia and New Zealand transfer personal 
data, including biometric information, is carried out by exchanging specific data from 
a formal and well detailed request to a specific entity. This type of exchange requires 
a pre-planned and routine way to share personal information by established rules 
and procedures. Spain and Mexico have linked their national databases to 
international automated systems. Generally, in this case Mexico and Spain are 
connected to international automated systems and can access to all the information 
storage and share personal data in real time65. However, in Spain, the Privacy 
Commissioner must grant the approval prior the authorisation for the transfer. This 
type of data sharing raises concerns about inappropriate disclosure of personal data. 
                                            
64
 New Zealand Government, States Services Commission, Communication Government Use of 
Offshore Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) Service Providers: Advice on Risk 
Management (2009) at 26. 
65
 For further details, see 5.4.3. National Criminal Databases: A Case Study 
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The Mexican Platform and the Schengen System II (Schengen Zone) are illustrative 
examples of these international automated systems and linkages of databases66.  
  
In relation to the third inconsistency the Spanish Organic Law 15/1999 of 13 
December on the Protection of Personal Data had two legal provisions (Articles 21.1 
and Articles 24.1 and 2) that were against its Constitution. First, these legal 
provisions allowed transfers of data between public authorities for purposes other 
than those for which they collected. Second, that the holder of such data is not 
informed, when was collected, about the possibility of such a transfer, not being 
under the rule that creates and regulates the database. Third, the transfer itself is 
done without the consent of the affected. And that the authorization of such 
assignments can be contained in a standard range under their organic law67. The 
Spanish Constitutional Court reasoned that rights of those affected to be informed 
and consent as well as the rights of access, rectification and cancellation, comprise 
the fundamental right of citizens to control the collection and use of personal data 
which may possess both public entities and individuals. The consent to transfer 
personal data is a necessary guarantee of the right to privacy of the individuals, 
because, without such recognition it would be impossible to control the collection, 
storage and exchange of personal information requested by governments, so 
weakening the protection offered to those personal data in the Constitution. And this 
would happen if public authorities are authorized to organize transfer of personal 
data without the knowledge and consent of the persons concerned by the 
Administration standards that are not even established in legislation68. 
 
The fourth inconsistency is a significant challenge to privacy and data protection in 
TBIF. There is a little public debate about TBIF and there is little information about 
how to make complaints as part of individual’s rights to privacy and data protection. 
The right to access information about personal data transfer or complaints about 
                                            
66
 For further details, see 4.4.3. Regional Organisations 
67
 Ley Orgánica 15/1999, de 13 de diciembre, de Protección de Datos de Carácter Personal, BOE-A-
1999-23750 [Organic Law 15/1999 of 13 December, on the Protection of Personal Data] (Spain) 
http://www.boe.es/buscar/doc.php?id=BOE-A-1999-23750 (21/12/2012) 
68
 Recurso de Inconstitucional [Spanish Constitutional Court Complaint Number] 292/2000, 20 
November 2000, 4 January 2001) published in BOE. 
http://www.boe.es/boe/dias/2001/01/04/pdfs/T00104-00118.pdf (23/12/2012) 
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TBIF to foreign countries differs in specific terms in each of the countries examined. 
In Mexico, requests for information for TBIF are accepted by telephone, whereas 
Australia does not accept the use of telephone. This means that requests have to be 
in writing. In New Zealand, the Privacy Commissioner cannot consider an 
information access request from a foreigner unless they are in New Zealand. The 
New Zealand Privacy Commissioner initially has the power to investigate complaints 
and attempts to resolve the matter, when the Privacy Commissioner is unable to 
resolve the issue, the Director of Human Rights (Proceedings0 or the Human Rights 
Review Tribunal can issue a decision. In Spain, the Data Protection Agency can 
provide information about TBIF and provides greater protection because of the 
Spanish Constitutional ruling and the EU framework. The Spanish Data Protection 
Agency can restrict information for foreign data controllers. By contrast, in Australia, 
the Privacy Commissioner cannot investigate a foreign data controller. In Mexico and 
in New Zealand, this situation is unclear. 
 
In summary, considering the emerging international framework for TBIF and the 
requirement of privacy and data protection, TBIF requires a harmonised and 
standardised privacy and data protection framework. This thesis acknowledges the 
foundational importance of the OECD Guidelines and their influence in the 
development of the international framework for privacy and data protection. The 
research assessment in the four countries study demonstrates that the national 
standards for privacy and data protection should be extended to TBIF. However, 
there are critical inconsistencies in areas such as law enforcement, privacy risks for 
TBIF and limited co-operation among privacy agencies. However, the similarities 
between these four countries are more significant than the asymmetries. Overall, the 
gap analysis revealed some procedural barriers in relation to TBIF, particularly in 
relation to individual information and complaints in relation to TBIF. These procedural 
barriers affect negatively individual privacy and data protection rights. Therefore, 
national legislation must address the TBIF in a standardised and harmonised fashion 
as proposed in this chapter69.  
 
                                            
69
 For further details, see section 7.6. Options for a Common Framework for Transborder Biometric 
Information Flow 
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7.4. The Principle of Proportionality: Legitimate Restrictions on Privacy and Data 
Protection 
 
Rights to privacy and data protection are not absolute rights and may be qualified by 
restrictions that are reasonably justified. This section considers the necessary 
balance of public and private interests and the measures that may be reasonable to 
justify restrictions on individual privacy and data protection for the protection of public 
interests. This section examines how and to what extent the Civil Law principle of 
proportionality and the partner Common Law standard of reasonableness can be 
applied to address the balance between individual privacy and data protection and 
public interests, such as national security and defence. These exceptions work as 
restrictions on or interference with privacy and data protection rights. This balance 
was apparent in the four countries study in which Spain and Mexico apply the 
proportionality test and Australia and New Zealand the reasonableness standard.  
 
7.4.1. The Principle of Proportionality. There are general principles of law, in Civilian 
Law countries and in European Law countries, which are applied by national courts 
when determines the lawfulness of legislative and administrative measures. These 
general principles are proportionality, legal certainty and legitimate expectations70. 
These general principles are used as a control over the exercise discretionary 
powers of public authorities. The principle of legal certainty balances the consistent 
relationship of legislation to the surrounding legal system and its rational justification. 
The principle of legitimate expectations balances the public interest and the 
behaviour of authorities in the light of the actual circumstances of a particular case. 
The principle of proportionality is concerned with balancing of public and private 
interests71. 
 
 
                                            
70
 General principles of law should be distinguished from rules of law as principles are more general 
and open-ended in the sense that they need to be honed to be applied to specific cases with correct 
results. Thomas, Robert, Legitimate Expectations and Proportionality in Administrative Law, (Hart 
Publishing, 2000). 
71
 Idem. 
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The principle of proportionality must be derived from a legal bases and be 
“necessary or reasonable limits that can be demonstrably justified in a democratic 
society”72. Accordingly, a strict justification for an interference with individual privacy 
or data protection must be necessary and legally justified in a democratic society. 
The principle of proportionality is found in most Civil Law tradition systems. From its 
German origins, it spread across Europe and Latin America, but also to some 
Common Law systems like England, Canada, New Zealand and mixed systems like 
South Africa73. In addition, this principle is also applied by the European Court of 
Human Rights74 and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights75.  
 
7.4.2. The Reasonableness Standard. The reasonableness standard applies in 
Common Law countries but still there are some questions about its formal 
recognition of this standard and its equivalency to the proportionality principle. 
Michaelsen argues that “Australia still awaits formal recognition [of reasonableness] 
in constitutional law and administrative law”76. On the other hand, Downes accepts 
the relationship of reasonableness and proportionality in Australia77 and points to the 
lack of adoption of the principle of proportionality78. Canada has formally recognised 
the proportionality test and that test has been applied by the Supreme Court79. It has 
been referred to as the “Oakes test”80. This test has replaced by the “reasonableness 
standard”. In 2012, the Supreme Court of Canada considered that an administrative 
action which affected human rights should be assessed by the Oakes test. In the 
                                            
72
 Nicholas, Emiliou, The Principle of Proportionality in European Law: A Comparative Study, (Kluwer 
Law International, 1996); Sanchez Gil, Ruben, El Principio de Proporcionalidad, (UNAM, 2007). 
73
 Nicholas, Emiliou, The principle of proportionality in European law: A comparative study, above n 
73. 
74
 For information on the European Court of Human Rights 
http://www.echr.coe.int/ECHR/homepage_en (23/12/2012) 
75
 For information related to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights see 
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/index.cfm?&CFID=1489195&CFTOKEN=37930864 (23/12/2012) 
76
 Michaelsen, Christopher, “The Proportionality Principle, Counter-terrorism Laws and Human Rights: 
A German-Australian Comparison”, (2010) Berkeley Electronic Press, 2:1. 
http://law.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1230&context=unswwps-flrps10 (23/12/2012) 
77
 South Australia v Tanner (1989) 166 CLR 161 and Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) 
170 CLR 321. 
78
 Downes, Garry, “The relationship between reasonableness, proportionality and merits reviews in 
Australia”, (Paper presented at New South Wales Young Lawyers Seminar Issues of Administrative 
Law, Sydney, 24 September 2008). 
79
 Dieter, Grimm “Proportionality in Canadian and German Constitutional Jurisprudence” (2007) 57 (2) 
University of Toronto Law Journal 383-397. 
80
 R v Oakes, [1986] 1 SCR 103. 
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later Dore case81, the Canadian Supreme Court acknowledged the difficulty of 
applying the Oakes test in an immigration context, where it is often an administrative 
process rather than a formal court/tribunal proceeding. 
 
In the two contexts of immigration control and crime prevention data exchanges, 
individual rights privacy and data protection frequently collide with public interests in 
national security and defence. The principle of proportionality and the Common Law 
reasonableness can determine, in specific cases, the State’s rights to restrict 
individual rights providing reasonably justified restrictions in a democratic society. 
The principle of proportionality defines the legal limits to individual rights82.   
 
In summary, biometric systems deployed in the two contexts of immigration control 
and crime prevention are not all physically intrusive83, however, all may undermine 
privacy and data protection rights, in some cases. National and international 
exchanges of personal information should be for specific purposes and those 
purposes justified. In addition, this TBIF and subsequent use of biometric information 
raise legal challenges, and the question arises whether this flow of information is 
reasonably necessary in a democratic society under the proportionality standard84. 
 
7.4.3. Applying the Principle of Proportionality: in International Courts. The 
proportionality test has not been only applied in national courts but also in 
international courts. In the Argentinean case, the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights has decided that the solution to the conflict between human rights and public 
interest “requires examining each case in accordance with its specific characteristics 
and circumstances, considering the existence of elements and the extent thereof on 
which the consideration regarding proportionality are to be based”85.  
 
                                            
81
 D v Barraeu du Quebec, [2012] SCC 12. 
82
 Tor-Inge, Harbo, “The function of the Proportionality Principle in EU Law” (2010) 6(2) European 
Law Journal 158-185.  
83
 For further details, see Chapter 2. Biometrics Systems: What is Biometrics? 
84
 For further details, see section 1.4 Hypothesis 
85
 Kimel v. Argentina (2008) 177 Inter-American Court HR (ser C) at paragraph 51.  
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Similarly, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in considering the 
proportionality test takes account of the “particular context in which information is 
obtained and stored, the nature of the information and the way in which it is used”86.  
The ECHR has emphasised the importance of an individual’s enjoyment of the right 
to respect for private and family life87. The features of a private life include privacy of 
communications, security and privacy of mail, telephone, email and other forms of 
communication. These features include the privacy of access to databases. The 
ECHR has also held that the legal concept of private life includes elements related to 
an individual’s right to his or her own image88 and an individual’s voice89. This is an 
important decision in relation to the storage of biometric face images and voice 
recognition systems deployed in immigration control and criminal databases. In 
relation to data storage, the ECHR has stated “the State has a positive obligation to 
ensure an effective deterrent against grave acts to an individual’s personal data 
sometimes by means of efficient criminal law provisions”90.  
 
In other cases, however, the ECHR has recognises the power of law enforcement 
authorities to restrict individuals’ right regarding the compiling, storing, using and 
disclosing of personal information in a police file91.  The subsequent use of stored 
information is allowed in accordance of the law and is necessary in a democratic 
society to achieve the legitimate aims of national security and public safety92. These 
cases demonstrate that the public purpose, use and deployment of biometric 
information in TBIF require an application of this test to decide whether privacy and 
data protection measures introduced are necessary and justified in a democratic 
society.  
 
                                            
86
 Peck v the United Kingdom (2003) 36 EHRR 41, EMLR 287. 
87
 Marper v. The United Kingdom (European Court of Human Rights, Grand Chamber, Application 
Nos 30562/04 and 30566/04, 4 December 2008) at paragraph 41.   
88
 Sciacca v. Italy (European Court of Human Rights, Application No 50774/99, 11 January 2005) at 
paragraph 29. 
89
 P.G. and J.H. v. The United Kingdom (European Court of Human Rights, Application No 44787/98, 
25 September 2001) at paragraph 59-60. 
90
 X and Y v. The Netherlands (1985) 91 Eur Court (ser A) at paragraph 23-24 and 27.  
91
 Leander v. Sweden (1987) 116 Eur Court (ser A) at paragraph 48. 
92
 Amann v. Switzelard (European Court of Human Rights, Grand Chamber, Application No 27798/95, 
16 February 2000) at paragraph 69.   
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The ECHR assesses restrictions put in place for reasons of national security and 
public safety to decide whether measures go beyond what is strictly necessary. In 
this regard the ECHR accepts that “domestic legislature enjoys discretion, and it is 
not for the Court to substitute their assessment for those of national authorities. 
Nevertheless, the ECHR has stressed that this does not mean that the Contracting 
States enjoy an unlimited discretion to subject citizens within their jurisdiction to 
secret surveillance. The ECHR recognizes the danger of restrictive laws undermining 
or even destroying democracy on the ground of defending it. The ECHR has stated 
that the Contracting States may not, in the name of the struggle against espionage 
and terrorism, adopt whatever measures they deem appropriate”93. The ECHR also 
held that “the protection afforded by article 8 of the Convention would be 
unacceptably weakened if the use of modern scientific techniques in the criminal-
justice system were allowed at any cost and without carefully balancing the potential 
benefits of the extensive use of such techniques against important private life 
interests”94. Finally, the ECHR has also recognises that “the law must be sufficiently 
clear in its terms to give citizens an adequate indication as to the circumstances in 
and the conditions on which public authorities are empowered to resort to this secret 
and potentially dangerous interference with the right to respect for private life”95.  
 
In summary, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has been applying the 
proportionality test in different cases and has recognised different elements for 
privacy and data protection rights. In balancing private and public interests, the 
ECHR has considered, on the one hand, the dangers of the extensive use of 
biometric systems against individuals’ rights, but on the other hand the potential 
benefits, such as national security and public safety. The ECHR recognises that 
biometric systems infringe privacy and data protection rights. But, the 
implementation is necessary in a democratic society and has to be in accordance 
with the law. Every measure, policy or legislation that may affect privacy and data 
protection must be balanced by this proportionality test or reasonableness standard. 
This balance of public and private interests diminishes legal concerns about 
                                            
93
 Klass and Other v. Germany, (1978) 214 Eur Court HR (ser A) at 49. 
94
 Amann v. Switzelard (European Court of Human Rights, Grand Chamber, Application No 27798/95, 
16 February 2000) at paragraph 69. 
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 Valenzuela v. Spain (1998) Eur Court HR. 
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restrictions imposed in the context of defence and national security especially with 
biometric technology deployed to individuals, but more importantly the use of this 
proportionality test can be interpreted as being in itself sufficient to secure legitimate 
decisions96. 
  
7.4.4. Applying the Proportionality Test: in Public Policy. Recognising that the 
principle of proportionality is a legal test for managing specific disputes on privacy 
and data protection, balancing public and private interests, the principle of 
proportionality may also apply at the governmental policy level in the deployment 
and expansion of biometric surveillance in general and in TBIF in particular. In this 
respect the proportionality test can be used as a public policy tool but can also be 
used in more open public debates about the technology to support the justification of 
the deployment of biometric surveillance in TBIF. Nevertheless, there is a limit to this 
interpretation determined by the proposed function of the principle. The application of 
this principle can move beyond the courts of law to be used in the public arena for 
public purposes in debates about the use and deployment of biometric information in 
TBIF. The principle can test the justification, proportionality and balance between an 
individuals’ privacy and data protection rights and a state’s public interests.  
 
To apply the proportionality principle in the policy context, the following three 
requirements in a legal dispute must be fulfilled; these same requirements should 
apply in public policy for the introduction of any restriction of individuals’ privacy and 
data protection rights: 
 
Adequacy. The measure adopted by the government must be rationally related to 
publish policy aims and the interference should restrict the right or freedom in 
question as little as possible. In this case, the measure adopted is the public 
purposes, use and deployment of biometric information in TBIF while privacy and 
data protection are the associated rights in question.  
 
 
                                            
96
 Habermas, Jürgen, Between Facts and Norms (MIT Press, 1998), 259. 
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Necessity. The measure should be necessary for the legitimate aim for which the 
measure was introduced. For the purposes of this thesis, the measures introduced 
should relate to the prevention of illegal immigration and the prevention of crime and 
terrorism. 
 
Proportionality. This third essential requirement is the balancing of competing privacy 
and public interests. This analysis includes an assessment of balance between costs 
and benefits97; taking into consideration the following elements in order to identify 
whether a measure is disproportionate or reasonable98: 
 
A. An examination of whether relevant and sufficient reasons have been advanced 
in support of the measure being pursued99. 
 
B. An examination of whether there are any less restrictive alternatives and the 
justifications for no introducing less restrictions options. 
 
C. An examination or whether the interference is “in accordance with the law”100, 
which means is permitted in national law. 
 
The proportionality test can be applied to the specific example of biometric 
passports, as a biometric system deployed in the context of immigration control. 
Biometric passports are not the only security measures deployed to stop illegal 
immigrants and prevent terrorism101; there are also improved other passenger 
identification systems introduced to certify the identification of individuals entering at 
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 The Spanish Constitutional Court has stated that “Pondered or balanced because more benefits or 
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border controls102. According to Habermas, in cases where the proportionality test is 
applied in a strong rights regime, the structure of the court’s reasoning is, in itself 
sufficient to legitimise its decision103. However, the proportionality principle should be 
viewed as a tool for reinforcing privacy and data protection rights and not as simple 
balancing exercise between a legislative act and an argument of policy. Otherwise, 
the court may decide in favour of the legislators or the policy makers. The 
implementation of biometric systems in immigration control cannot, however, prevent 
all threats of terrorism. Interpol recognises that the documents used to issue a 
passport (usually fake birth certificates) may be forgeries enabling terrorists to travel 
with valid biometric passports104.  
 
7.5. Recommendations to Address Legal Framework for TBIF 
 
It is acknowledge that international organisations are developing international privacy 
and data protection frameworks, which are broad, brief, but not binding. These 
frameworks require domestic legislation to be enacted. The thesis considers that the 
best practice standardised TBIF model is the regional, but official EU data protection 
legal framework. The EU Directives are mandatory but leave member States a 
certain amount of leeway to enact their own laws and rules to be adopted. The 
research assessment on the four countries study revealed common strengths and 
asymmetries, but also identified procedural gaps. While the asymmetries between 
the four countries examined are not significant, the procedural gaps create 
significant challenges for a common and harmonised privacy and data protection 
framework for TBIF. The proportionality (reasonableness) principle balances public 
interests and individuals’ privacy and data protection rights, and this thesis confirms 
its value on assess biometric systems and TBIF, which must be strictly scrutinised, 
supervised and regulated in accordance with the law. However, to address the 
challenge of procedural gaps in the four countries study the thesis proposes some 
recommendations for a harmonised and uniform TBIF. 
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7.5.1. Options for addressing TBIF Challenges. Recognising that within an emerging 
international privacy and data protection framework and the gaps for TBIF, the main 
solution proposed acknowledges that amendments to privacy and data protection 
laws is the preferred regulatory pathway. Reinforcement of the existing privacy and 
data protection laws is preferred over creating new specialised legislation or a 
specific part on biometric information in existing legislation. The aim of these 
recommendations is to reduce legal challenges. It is possible; however, that data 
security and possible misuse of biometric information will remain as privacy risks. 
 
Three possible options may be proposed to address the identified TBIF challenges in 
immigration and criminal databases. The preferred option should provide practical 
and achievable solutions and provide a common and uniform legal framework for 
TBIF in order to achieve an adequate and proportional level of protection. The three 
proposed options are: first, reinforcement of privacy and data protection laws; 
secondly, the introduction of a specialised legislation; and, thirdly introduction of 
specific biometrics provisions by amendment existing legislation. 
 
Option One: Reinforcement of privacy and data protection laws.  
 
The first option proposes to reinforce existing privacy and data protection laws105. 
This option will require harmonisation by reinforcement of the existing privacy and 
data protection laws in seven areas: 
 
a) Registry of filing systems. To achieve transparency and accountability regarding 
biometric databases should be registered. The registration of biometric filing 
systems or processing of biometric information in the public sector should be 
under the jurisdiction of the Privacy Commissioner Agencies. Border control 
                                            
105
 This term is used generically to mean Common Law Acts in Parliament and in Civil Law the 
equivalent term is Law. For further details, see above note 60. 
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agencies and police forces should be included in the list of data controllers.  This 
type of registration is operating in Spain and Mexico106. 
 
b) Co-operation with other data protection agencies. Privacy Commissioner 
Agencies should perform their functions with clear and effective mechanisms for 
collaborating with overseas equivalent privacy or data protection agencies in 
order to ensure a continuity the legal level of individuals’ protection across 
borders. The individual rights to protection personal data should extend to 
individual’s right to access their information where the information is held 
overseas107. This right should include the capacity for an individual to make 
cross-border: enquiries108, objections, and complaints. This would create a 
proportional balance between citizens and government. 
 
c) Citizens Guidelines for TBIF. Privacy Commissioner Agencies, in collaboration 
with police and border control agencies, should develop citizens’ guidelines 
regarding individual rights in TBIF in the two contexts of immigration and criminal 
databases109.   
 
d) Access electronically to information.  In this computer age of electronic 
communication, individuals should have access to their personal information by 
means of electronic requests. This electronic access to the specific authorised 
data holder should include transborder authorities. In Mexico, a request for 
access to information is permitted by phone or any other electronic forms to 
applicants in country and overseas110. 
 
                                            
106
 As a further example The Slovak Republic the obligation to register filing system is operating under 
the Office of the Personal Protection   
http://www.dataprotection.gov.sk/buxus/generate_page.php?page_id=558 (19/03/2014) 
107
 It is important that individuals know who is the public entity that will answer the request is and in 
case this entity is the wrong one, this entity should assist to address the correct one. 
108
 It is important that individuals know how to do a request for accessing personal data. This request 
should be address without any formalities, it is suggested to keep it simple. 
109
 In addition, these entities should develop for the protection of minors specific public policy plans for 
TBIF in these two contexts which to include access on the minor behalf. 
110
 Ley Federal de Transparencia y Acceso a la Información Pública, DOF 11/06/2002 [Federal 
Transparency and Access to Governmental Public Information last amended on 08/06/12] (Mexico) 
http://www.diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/pdf/244.pdf (21/12/2012) 
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e) Codes of conduct for TBIF. Privacy Commissioner Agencies in collaboration with 
police and border control agencies should develop codes of conduct applying to 
border control data officers’ by encouraging more respect for individuals’ rights in 
relation to TBIF provisions. 
 
f) Transborder Data Protection Agreements. The regulation of transborder data 
protection should extend to other countries111 to which the data is transfered. 
Transfers to other countries should be managed through “information matching 
agreements”112. This is the case in New Zealand, which allows information 
matching programmes between agencies through written agreements. 
 
g) Definition of “personal data”. Currently the definition of “personal data” varies in 
legislation in different countries. In some countries privacy or data protection 
legislation, the term “personal data” means any general information about or 
relating to the individual who, is or can be identified, either from the data or from 
the data in conjunction with other information (that is in or is to come into the 
possession of the data controller)113. In this definition, biometric information is 
included. But in other legislation, the definition of privacy or data protection 
describes the specific type of information, such as physical, physiological, mental, 
economic, cultural, social, genomic identity, among others. In this case, the 
omission of biometric information as personal data is critical and it must be 
included by amendment.  
 
This series of amendment proposals for existing privacy and data protection laws is 
the preferred option to produce and achievable solution for a common and uniform 
legal framework for TBIF. This “reinforcement option” is informed by the research 
findings of the four countries study. It is the preferred model and is designed to 
achieve a best practice model for common TBIF. This “reinforcement option” 
                                            
111
 The transfer of personal data to another country may include transfer to another country for further 
processing and as such there must be guarantees of adequate levels of protection to ensure that the 
rights of individuals are safeguarded in these countries. 
112
 These information matching agreements set the specific terms and conditions governing 
disclosures of personal records, information or data. This specific terms and conditions ensure that 
the public entity make such disclosures of data and uses such disclosed data in accordance with the 
requirements of the privacy or data protection law. 
113
 Generally, the data controller is who controls the contents and use of personal data.  
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considers the identified asymmetries in the gap analysis. The adoption of the 
recommendations, set out above not only achieves a harmonised framework for 
TBIF, but also addresses the required level of operational effectiveness.  
 
Option two: Specialised Legislation.  
 
The second option recommendation is to draft specialised biometric data legislation. 
This option was undertaken in the states of New Jersey and Illinois, USA. In 2002, 
the state of New Jersey introduced the Biometric Identifier Privacy Act (A-2448)114 
and in 2008, the state of Illinois introduced the Biometric Information Privacy Act 
(740 ILCS 14/1) (2008)115. Both Acts are brief and introduce rights of action for cases 
of violations of individuals’ biometrics privacy through the courts116. However, it is not 
recommended that similar specialised legislation should be introduced117. First, the 
legislative processes in different countries cannot guarantee a uniform act would be 
introduced, without a common policy approach. This is politically unlikely and, in any 
case the legislative processes are protracted. Secondly, specialised legislation may 
require a specialised agency or authority with specific powers and functions. This 
new biometric privacy and data protection authority would be difficult to establish 
without guarantees of consistent staffing, levels of funding and powers of inspection. 
This new biometric privacy authority would represent increased bureaucracy at the 
time of political commitment to smaller government and with smaller spending on 
public funds. Thirdly, specialised legislation is problematic in federal jurisdictions, 
where state level legislatures may have power to legislate in privacy. It is possible 
that in this system local legislators have differences with other local legislators and 
federal legislators. 
 
 
                                            
114
 For full content of New Jersey legislation see Appendix K. Legislation of Biometric Identifier 
Privacy, New Jersey 
115
 For full content of Illinois legislation see Appendix L. Legislation of Biometric Information Privacy, 
Illinois 
116
 At the time of writing some academic articles were found, however, these articles only mention the 
existence of these legislation, but it is unclear how these legislation has been working. No cases were 
found. The only available information are websites of legal firms and blogs.   
117
 For further details, see section 7.3. National Privacy and Data Protection Legal Frameworks: The 
Four Countries Study 
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Option three: Amendment of existing legislation. 
 
A third option is to amend an existing Act to include a specific Part or Division on 
Biometrics. That was the approach taken in the Works Act-Statutes 1997 of Ontario, 
Canada118. This amendment is brief and generalised, and enacted the provisions of 
the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act to apply specifically to the 
Works Act 1997. This is a unique approach in one Province of Canada and is not 
recommended as a general approach to the regulation of biometrics. The thesis 
does not propose to include a specific section on biometrics in terms similar to the 
Works Act 1997.  
 
7.5.2. Practical and Achievable Solution: Option one. This thesis argues and 
concludes that the best model for achieving a harmonised, common and uniform 
TBIF legal framework is the first option. The recommendations of this first option will 
provide integrity and consistency in TBIF practices, both nationally and 
internationally. The other two options do not guarantee effectiveness and would not 
reduce the identified legal challenges. 
 
Most importantly, the legislative process in some countries is complicated and 
lengthy for introduction of the initiative for any formal enactment of a new law. For 
this reason, it is argued that option one, to reinforce privacy and data protection laws 
than drafting new specialisation, is recommended as the most practical and 
achievable option. In addition, reinforcing the administrative supervisory role of 
national Privacy Commissioners is equally more viable, practical and achievable 
solution for a common TBIF legal framework at a national and international level.  
  
7.5.3. Implementation of Option One in National Legislation. The implementation of 
the preferred option one can be achieved by amendment to privacy and data 
protection legislation. In three of the four countries studied it is recommended that 
the reinforcement option can be achieve by amendments of their privacy and data 
protection legislation. For Mexico, it is recommended that amendment consist in a 
                                            
118
 For full content of Ontario biometric information section, see Appendix M. Legislation of Ontario, 
Canada 
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new section on TBIF be inserted into the Mexican Federal Transparency and Access 
to Governmental Public Information119.  
 
The seven proposals set out above at 7.5.1 are not all essential elements for a 
complete package of reforms for implementation120. Option one can be achieved by 
translating the first three proposals into practice as the minimum level requirements 
for this initiative at a national level. These three proposals of the seven are critical 
also for the harmonisation of TBIF at the international level.  The final four proposals 
are desirable but not essential requirements121. The following three main areas must 
be implemented:  
 
a) The registration of biometric filing systems or processing of biometric information 
of the public sector, including border control agencies and police forces 
databases. 
 
This may be ambitious but will reinforce the role of the privacy and data protection 
agencies. Registration is required under the respective jurisdictions of national 
privacy and data protection agencies. Privacy and data protection agencies are the 
appropriate and capable agencies to monitor and supervise the management and 
operation of biometric databases122. In addition, reinforcement will enable scrutiny of 
                                            
119
 Mexican data protection regime is divided in two laws, one for the public sector through the 
Federal Transparency and Access to Governmental Public Information and another for the private 
sector. This thesis only focuses on the data protection for public sector. Ley Federal de Transparencia 
y Acceso a la Información Pública, DOF 11/06/2002 [Federal Transparency and Access to 
Governmental Public Information last amended on 08/06/12] (Mexico) 
http://www.diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/pdf/244.pdf (21/12/2012) 
120
 For further details, see section 7.5.1. Options for Addressing TBIF Challenges. 
121
 The four proposals not required are: d), e), f), and g). The proposal d) related to the access 
electronically to information is incorporated as part of proposals a) and c).  While the proposal e) 
about codes of conducts may continue working with the actual powers of Privacy and Data Protection 
Agencies to supervise in combination with the promotion of individuals’ rights in TBIF. The proposal f) 
the development for information matching agreements for transfer data to other countries may 
continue working with the current flow of information framework between national entities where 
Privacy Commissioners Agencies have powers to supervise. Finally, the proposal g) regarding the 
inclusion of biometric information in the definition of “personal data” can be left to Privacy or Data 
Protection Authorities interpretation by an individuals’ request, queries, complaints or advisory 
opinions. 
122
 As elsewhere argued in this thesis the reasons advance to be openly and public debated or at 
least these reason publicly available. Jasanoff, Sheila, Designs on Nature Science and Democracy in 
Europe and the United States, above n 4 and Habermas, Jürgen, “Sfera pubblica (Una voce di 
enciclopedia)”, above n 4. 
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the actual number of biometric databases, the authorities acting as data controllers 
and individual access electronically to personal information.  
 
b) Cross-border co-operation with other data protection agencies through 
agreements. 
 
Privacy and data protection agencies must work together to establish a harmonised 
and consistent framework for TBIF. International co-operation agreements must 
encourage practical co-operation and willingness to develop effective mechanisms 
for ensuring the legal continuity level of protection in TBIF. These cross-border co-
operation agreements must also include an assessment of performance of cross-
border priorities; identification of areas for further improvements; and, promotion of 
individual rights internationally within this cross-border agenda. 
 
c) Promotion of individuals’ rights for TBIF in a cross-border agenda. 
 
Privacy and data protection agencies have the obligation to review and promote 
privacy and data protection rights. Within this promotion role, privacy and data 
protection agencies should develop citizen guidelines on individual rights in TBIF. 
These guidelines should include rights to access electronically to their information; 
make electronic cross-border objections; enquires; and, complaints. The inclusion of 
these rights will increase not only trust between citizens and governments, but also 
will help to scrutinise biometric databases123.  
 
In summary, reinforcing these three main areas of supervisory powers of privacy and 
data protection agencies is practical and achievable for TBIF. In addition, this 
reinforcement approach empowers privacy and data protection agencies in an active 
and proactive involvement to establish a harmonised and consistent TBIF 
framework. The implementation of option one is consistent with the proportionality 
test and addresses the procedural gaps in the four countries study. However, it does 
not guarantee data security and avoidance of possible misuse of biometric 
information.  
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 Idem. 
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7.6. Conclusions 
 
This chapter identified a broad and non-mandatory TBIF framework which relies on 
practical lack of co-operation and a lack of willingness in privacy and data protection 
international agreements. In addition, the comparative research revealed legal 
similarities, asymmetries and procedural gaps in the current operational legal privacy 
and data protection legislation for TBIF. These legal asymmetries and procedural 
gaps in combination with the proportionality and reasonableness tests are used to 
develop three options as a recommendation for addressing a balanced, common and 
harmonised legal framework for TBIF in a general context.  
 
The chapter presented the principle of proportionality (reasonableness) in 
international courts and in the public policy arena with the aim of maintaining a 
proper balance between private and public interests. According to the cases in which 
the proportionality test was applied by the European Court of Human Rights, the 
implementation of biometric systems and TBIF for immigration control and crime 
prevention purposes directly affects privacy and data protection rights. 
  
Recognising the biometric industry’s indifference toward becoming self-regulated, 
combined with poor scrutiny and a lack of public debate has created a fragile 
environment for the protection of civil liberties, in privacy and data protection. These 
factors increase the risk of an adequate level of TBIF protection in the two contexts, 
of immigration control and crime prevention124. The proposed recommendations 
related to the reinforcement of privacy and data protection agencies is the only 
viable, practical and achievable solution for a proportionate and harmonised TBIF 
regime. 
 
The main recommendations offer practicality and achievability for overall 
effectiveness in legal protection in the TBIF environment, in which the amount of 
information collected, stored and exchanged is increasing globally.  
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 For further details, see Chapter 8. Conclusions 
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CHAPTER 8.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
8.1. Overview of Transborder Biometric Information Flow: the Area of Study 
 
Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) generally pose different legal 
challenges and, foremost among these challenges are privacy and data protection 
concerns related to collection, storage and exchange of personal information. 
Biometric databases are measures, which have been implemented by many 
countries for security reasons. This thesis has analysed privacy and data protection 
challenges to civil liberties in the specific context of ICT in relation to Transborder 
Biometric Information Flow (TBIF). The thesis analysed TBIF in two specific contexts 
of transborder exchanges, namely immigration information flow and information flow 
in criminal databases. This thesis did not analyse the technical aspects or 
performance of biometric systems nor political reasons for their introduction. Rather, 
this thesis focused on the legal challenges posed by TBIF and its impact on privacy 
and data protection rights and civil liberties in these two specific contexts. In this 
regard, the thesis has evaluated the current limited national and international 
regulation of the legal framework for the TBIF and assessed how far restrictions on 
privacy and data protection in these two specific contexts are justifiably proportional 
and reasonable1. 
 
The thesis outlined the ICT industry and its development of a range of biometric 
identification, verification and exchange systems for personal biometric information. 
The thesis proposes that the biometric industry itself and the responsible 
government agencies have failed to adequately address concerns about privacy and 
data protection. To address this gap a model is proposed to achieve a best practice 
harmonised common TBIF legal framework to reinforce the regulation of TBIF at a 
                                            
1
 See Chapter 1. Transborder Biometric Information Flows: Legal Challenges 
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national level. This will model provide integrity and consistency to information flow 
and common practices both nationally and internationally2. 
 
This concluding chapter draws together the findings and conclusions of the thesis. 
First this chapter sets out the significance of TBIF and the general lack of public 
debate about the rapid and continuing deployment of this biometric technology.  
Research was undertaken principally by website searches to develop a general map 
of the industry3. This research revealed an expanding industry in terms of its 
technical capacities and ingenuity but one that has been little concerned with 
regulatory issues and has done little towards establishing a satisfactory self-
regulation framework. Secondly, the thesis examined the emerging international 
regulatory framework and its limitations and identified the primary reliance of privacy 
and data protection regimes for TBIF at a national level. Thirdly, in TBIF in the two 
specific contexts of immigration information flow and information flow in criminal 
databases, the thesis revealed significant gaps and asymmetries in national 
collection, storage and exchange of personal information in national privacy or data 
protection laws and the emerging international regulation framework. Finally, the 
thesis presents three proposals for practical and achievable national approaches to 
address TBIF challenges within existing national privacy and data protection 
frameworks. Throughout the thesis, the arguments for privacy and data protection 
reinforcement are accompanied by political and social science arguments for greater 
transparency, scrutiny and public debate about the operation and impact of this 
technology. This theme of the necessity of informed public debate accompanying 
and keeping pace with rapid developments in ICT, was a central theme of this thesis. 
  
8.2. Significance of the study: the for Public Debate and Regulation 
 
The thesis argued that there are significant legal challenges involved with ICT but 
particularly problems with TBIF in the specific contexts of immigration information 
flow and information flow in criminal databases.  Whilst TBIF has been studied from 
                                            
2
 See section 7.5. Recommendations to Address Legal Framework for TBIF noting that other options 
were discussed. 
3
 Noting the absence of traditional referred publication in this area. 
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a technical perspective, there is a significant absence of any substantive and critical 
legal literature. The technical aspects of biometrics have been discussed in the 
publicly available literature but, this technical literature not been scrutinised by social 
scientists. This has led to a lack of interdisciplinary studies on the social and ethical 
dimensions and challenges of the new biometric systems4.    
 
From the outset of this thesis, and noted throughout, not only was the lack of legal 
literature apparent but also a lack of public debate about these technologies. This 
lack of public debate and scrutiny and the paucity of legal analysis is matched by a 
virtual silence of national legislators and policy makers in this area. Theorists 
emphasise the critical need for transparency, accountability and public debate. The 
rational-critical communication theory, represented by Habermas and Jasanoff5, has 
emerged in the social sciences and has helped to identify: a) the implicit theoretical 
assumptions for the deployment of biometric systems in immigration and criminal 
fields and b) the basis for the selection of an alternative theoretical foundation of 
assumptions of legal justifications for TBIF. 
 
In regulation, privacy law, by default, has been the major regulatory framework for 
developments in TBIF. Yet little has been done to evaluate and analyse whether the 
specific context and development of ICT requires any modification or enhancement 
of the existing privacy regulatory framework internationally or domestically. This 
thesis addressed the challenge of balancing TBIF and a proper level of legal 
protection. Throughout of this thesis, the theme of the relationship between 
developments in biometrics and governments has been highlighted and the 
importance of citizens’ need to know and debate about biometrics technology 
especially in regards to its deployment in immigration control and crime prevention 
contexts.  
 
 
                                            
4
 See Chapter 2. Biometrics Systems: What is Biometrics? 
5
 As elsewhere argued in this thesis the reasons advance to be openly and public debated or at least 
these reason publicly available. Jasanoff, Sheila, Designs on Nature Science and Democracy in 
Europe and the United States, (Princeton University Press, 2007) and Habermas, Jürgen, “Sfera 
pubblica (Una voce di enciclopedia)”, Cultura e Critica, (Einaudi, 1980). 
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8.3. Biometric industry: the Need for Self-Regulation 
 
This thesis involved a mapping, albeit basic, of the rapidly developing biometric 
industry. A major factor in the limited, if not non-existent public debate about this 
industry has been the limited availability of public literature about the industry. 
Accordingly, it was necessary to undertake a mapping exercise to obtain an 
understanding of the industry. A website search methodology was developed and 
used to produce an illustrative map of the biometric industry. This preliminary 
website search identified a small number of key industry players, products and 
partnerships.   
 
Although no surveys were conducted, the website methodology did reveal an 
industry with significant market concentration, key industry dominant companies and 
rapidly expanding uptake of these new biometric technologies. The concentrated 
biometric industry lacks, in the terms of Habermas and Jasanoff, “transparency, 
accountability and public debate”, whilst rapidly developing and generating millions 
of dollars of revenues. From the regulatory and legal standpoint, this expanding 
industry, whilst conscious of the national privacy practices at national levels had not 
developed any industry based guidelines or other regulatory standards towards 
establishing a self-regulated industry6.  
 
8.4. The emerging international regulatory framework  
 
This industry and its widespread introduction of biometric systems and the 
consequent expansion of TBIF has proceeded with little national public awareness, 
discourse or formal regulation. The industry has not attempted to establish self-
regulation standards. This industry is characterised by limited regulation or other 
intervention by national governments. At the national level, countries are relying 
exclusively on privacy and data protection laws to address the challenges and 
implications of TBIF in the two specific contexts of immigration information flow and 
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information flow in criminal databases. Significantly, at the international level, there is 
no formal treaty regarding TBIF.   
 
When biometric data, and for the purposes of this thesis, dealing with immigration 
information flow and information flow in criminal databases is exchanged across 
borders, rules developed and introduced by a range of official and semi-official 
international organisations apply. In the official category is the European Union (EU) 
and in the semi-official are organisations such as the international Civil Aviation 
Organisation (ICAO), the International Organization of Migration (IOM), the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC) and Interpol.  
 
In the immigration context, this thesis identified two leading international 
organisations setting standards for the introduction of biometric systems: the 
International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) and the International Organization of 
Migration (IOM). In addition, there are regional organisations moving towards 
biometric system standards as border control strategies, such as the European 
Union (EU) and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). In addition, for 
cross-border personal data transfer there are two main international organisations 
making recommendations; in the semi-official category are the non-binding 
recommendations of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation (OECD) and, in 
the official category, the binding recommendations of the European Union7. 
 
In criminal context, there has been greater development of collaboration in relation to 
TBIF and, in particular there have been more formal bilateral or multilateral treaties 
regarding cross-border crimes. This collaboration has resulted in countries 
increasing the linkage between their national biometric criminal databases to 
international databases. Interpol has become a key player in relation to establishing 
rules in the context of TBIF. This has been the result of national concerns about 
terrorism, cross-border crimes and illegal immigration8. 
                                            
7
 See Chapter 4. Biometric Systems in the Context of Transborder Immigration Flow  
8
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8.5. TBIF in Immigration Information Flow and Information Flow in Criminal 
Databases  
 
This thesis examined TBIF between immigration and criminal databases. The 
research involved using publicly available official reports and the limited published 
literature about TBIF in these contexts as well as conference presentations. The 
relevant legislation, principally on privacy and data protection was examined. The 
research included the organisation and conduct of semi-structured face-to-face 
interviews with academics and public officials in each of the four countries study 
jurisdictions9. The methodology developed and used in the semi-structured 
interviews was important. This research enabled the extent of the linkages of 
national databases and cross-border exchangeable biometric information in the 
immigration information flow and information flow in criminal databases contexts of 
the four jurisdictions to be fairly accurately established.  
 
8.5.1. Immigration Information Context. In the immigration information flow context, 
this thesis demonstrated that the actual deployment of biometric systems is a 
measure to enhance border security and increase efficiency along the borders in the 
processing of travellers, stopping illegal immigrants, helping fight cross-border 
crimes and preventing terrorism. Importantly, the research identified asymmetries 
and convergences within TBIF representing legal challenges for governments. 
Legislators have generally failed to adequately address concerns about privacy and 
data protection and ensure that reform efforts in privacy or data protection laws have 
kept pace with TBIF developments10. 
 
The actual dynamics of TBIF in immigration information has been characterised by 
an absence of public debate11 with attempts to combine not only national concerns 
but also international security interests. There are risks in centralised biometric 
                                            
9
 This component of the research project received approval from the University of Tasmania Human 
Research Ethics Committee. Approval Ethics Ref: H0012013 of 29/08/2011. 
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 See Chapter 4. Biometrics Systems in the Context of TransBorder Immigration Flow 
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 Jasanoff, Sheila, Designs on Nature Science and Democracy in Europe and the United States, 
above n 5 and Habermas, Jürgen, “Sfera pubblica (Una voce di enciclopedia)”, above n 5. 
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databases for immigration purposes and their linkage with international biometric 
criminal databases.  
 
The thesis noted the benefits of biometric systems and compared the actual ways in 
which the four countries collect immigration data. From the comparison, this thesis 
demonstrates the asymmetries on categories of data that are actually collected in 
relation to differences in the information collected and when that information is 
updated. The asymmetries revealed in the immigration context mirror those in the 
criminal records context. These asymmetries need to be, and can be addressed by 
the reinforcement of privacy or data protection laws12.  
 
8.5.2. Information in Criminal Databases Context. This thesis demonstrates the 
current operation of biometric criminal databases and the transition between the use 
of ordinary criminal databases and the implementation of biometric criminal 
databases at the national level. The thesis considers, at the international level, 
Interpol databases as an exemplar of best practices for an adequate uniform TBIF in 
crime prevention context through Interpol’s standardisation in methods and 
systems13. 
 
This thesis identifies two modes of TBIF in the information flow in criminal databases 
context, namely the exchange of specific criminal information and the linkage of 
biometric criminal databases. The thesis also identifies the asymmetries among 
national biometric criminal databases posing significant barriers for a uniform TBIF14 
at the international level. The lack of transparency, accountability and public 
discussion15 on processing and linking biometric databases is noted. The legal 
barriers to a harmonised TBIF are the asymmetries in collecting different criteria of 
biometric criminal information and targeting different people to be included. 
Therefore, these criminal record context asymmetries are similar to the legal 
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 For further details see Chapter 7. Transborder Biometric Privacy Regimes: National Solutions 
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 For further details, see Chapter 5. Biometric Criminal Databases: Current Transborder Information 
Flow 
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 For further details, see Chapter 6. TransBorder Biometric Information Flows: Legal Challenges 
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 Jasanoff, Sheila, Designs on Nature Science and Democracy in Europe and the United States, 
above n 5 and Habermas, Jürgen, “Sfera pubblica (Una voce di enciclopedia)”, above n 5. 
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challenges is the immigration context. These concerns need to be and can be 
addressed by the reinforcement of privacy or data protection laws16. 
 
8.5.3. Significant Common Legal Concerns: About TBIF. This thesis discussed legal 
concerns in both immigration information flow and information flow in criminal 
databases contexts. In the four jurisdictions, the thesis demonstrates significant 
common legal concerns about TBIF in relation to immigration control and crime 
prevention context. The TBIF in both contexts is neither uniform nor consistent with 
respect of the information collected, stored, processed and exchanged. In addition, 
this thesis reveals some common legal challenges in privacy and date protection, 
which have studied since the inception of privacy regulation in the1980s and have 
yet to be resolved. These challenges are who can access data, data reliability 
(integrity), data protection in third party countries, the classification of individuals, 
data storage restrictions, and its impact on privacy17. This thesis, however 
demonstrates some new legal challenges because of the subsequent automated use 
of information18; the lack of binding recommendations; the lack of transparency, 
accountability and public debate regarding the operation and management not only 
in introducing biometric databases but also in the specific area of TBIF. 
  
8.6. Recommendation to Address TBIF Legal Framework: A Privacy Approach 
 
Recognising that the end of the journey to an emerging and common international 
framework has yet to be reached, this thesis proposes and recommends that 
national privacy and data protection regimes can provide realistic and achievable 
avenues to address the challenges of TBIF in the immigration and criminal 
databases contexts. The thesis identified two types of challenges in the area of 
privacy and data protection concerns; one is in relation to the actual automatic 
processing of the collection, storage and exchange of personal information and the 
other is actual use of the data and its inherent impact on an individual’s privacy.  
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 For further details see Chapter 7. Transborder Biometric Privacy Regimes: National Solutions 
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 For further details, see Chapter 6. Transborder Biometric Information Flows: Legal Challenges 
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 As it was discussed in section 6.3.6. Subsequent Automated Use of Information the new standard 
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systems like immigration databases and criminal databases. 
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The thesis acknowledges that an international treaty for TBIF is highly unlikely. The 
main recommendation of this thesis; therefore is to reinforce legal protections in 
relation to TBIF, in the two specific contexts, by reinforcing existing privacy and data 
protection legislation at the national level. The effect of this recommendation will 
provide integrity and consistency in addressing challenges of TBIF in the two 
contexts and achieve consistency and common practices both nationally and 
internationally.  
 
The thesis discussed three possible options of amendment of existing legislation; 
introducing specialised legislation; or, reinforcing administrative supervisory role of 
national Privacy Commissioners, a role which is already included in national privacy 
or data protection legislation. This thesis argued that the first two options are not 
politically achievable, do not guarantee effectiveness and may not be introduced in 
all jurisdictions. In addition, it is unlikely that the legislative processes of different 
countries could be coordinated to achieve uniform consistency in legislative 
amendments. The legislative process is complicated and takes time for final 
approval. The third option is more practical and achievable and requires only the 
agreement of Privacy Commissioners, which can be achieved administratively 
without legislation. This third option is to reinforce privacy authorities’ supervisory 
powers in three main areas: the registration of biometric filing systems; cross-border 
co-operation agreements with other privacy or data protection agencies; and, 
promotion of individuals’ rights for TBIF in a cross-border agenda19. 
 
The utilisation of the principle of proportionality, from its Civil Law tradition approach, 
is a synthetic method to determine justifiable interference with human rights in the 
public interest. By applying proportionality (reasonableness) test, transparency, 
accountability and public scrutiny, the thesis argued that reinforcing privacy and data 
protection frameworks, by empowering privacy authorities is a proportional response 
possible to resolve legal challenges of TBIF.  
 
                                            
19
 For further details see Chapter 7. Transborder Biometric Privacy Regimes: National Solutions 
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8.7. Concluding Remark 
 
TBIF is not a fashion that may disappear with time. On the contrary, it is an 
established practice that will continue. In fact, the amount of biometric information 
collected, stored, retrieved and exchanged will progressively increase. Therefore, 
TBIF must be seen as an increasingly important part of a sensitive legal privacy and 
data protection regime that requires a high level response in national legal 
frameworks. Legislators and policy makers must establish specific rules for 
governing TBIF. Revised legal frameworks should be publicly available and written in 
a way that all citizens can understand the implications not only of the deployment of 
biometric systems, but also, of their right to access their own information, the 
subsequent use of their biometric information, updates made to their personal 
information and, critically, about transborder exchanges. This thesis, hopefully is a 
contribution to the development of such national and international frameworks. 
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APPENDICES 
 
APPENDIX A  
 
NATIONAL PROFILES TABLE 
 Australia Mexico New Zealand Spain 
Capital Canberra Mexico City Wellington Madrid 
Population 22,683,600
1
 112 336 538
2
 4,453,062
3
 46,815,916
4
 
Area (sq km) 7,692,024 1,964,375 268,680 505,988 
Major Language English Spanish English Spanish 
Currency Australian Dollar Mexican Peso 
New Zealand 
Dollar 
Euro 
Ethnic Groups 
European 92% 
Asian 7% 
Aboriginal and 
other 1% 
Mestizo
5
 60%, 
Indigenous 30%, 
European 9%, other 
1% 
European 69.8%, 
Maori 7.9%, 
Asian 5.7%, 
Pacific islander 
4.4%, other 
0.5%, mixed 
7.8%, unspecified 
3.8% 
composite of 
Mediterranean 
and Nordic types 
 
Government 
Type 
Parliamentary 
democracy 
Federal democracy 
Parliamentary 
democracy 
Parliamentary 
monarchy 
Administrative 
Divisions 
6 states and 2 
territories 
31 states and 1 
federal district 
16 regions and 1 
territory 
17 autonomous 
communities and 
2 autonomous 
cities 
Constitution 
1900 
Constitutional 
Monarchy  
1917 
Constitutional 
Republic 
1986 
Constitutional 
Monarchy 
1978 
Constitutional 
Monarchy 
Legal System Common Law Civil Law Common Law Civil Law 
Suffrage 
18 years of age; 
universal and 
compulsory 
18 years of age; 
universal and 
compulsory
6
 
18 years of age; 
universal 
18 years of age; 
universal 
Branches 
Executive, 
Legislative and 
Judicial 
Executive, 
Legislative and 
Judicial 
Executive, 
Legislative and 
Judicial 
Executive, 
Legislative and 
Judicial 
GDP
7
 3.4 3.9 3.0 -1.4 
 
                                            
1
 Australian Bureau Statistics, at the end of June 2012 
http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/mf/3101.0  (18/01/2013) 
2
 Instituto Nacional de Estadistica y Geografia (Mexico), results of the last national census in 2010 
http://www.inegi.org.mx/default.aspx  (18/01/2013) 
3
 Statistics New Zealand http://www.stats.govt.nz/  (11 October 2010) 
4
 Instituto Nacional de Estadistica (Spain), result of the last national census 
http://www.ine.es/censos2011_datos/cen11_datos_inicio.htm  (18/01/2013) 
5
 A traditional term used to denote people of combined indigenous and Spanish ancestries. 
6
 But not enforced. 
7
 GDP growth (annual %) data obtained from the World Bank  
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG/countries?display=default (18/01/2013)  
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APPENDIX B  
 
BIOMETRICS TYPOLOGY 
 
1. Physical Characteristics. In this section, the discussion revolves around the most 
common or popular physical biometric characteristics: the chemical composition of the body, 
thermal emissions, iris and retina patterns, fingerprints, palmprints, hand geometry, face and 
skin pores. 
 
The human body is made of different types of cells, tissues, muscles and organs, and every 
part of the human body can be measured1. The most popular measures for biometric 
systems are the following: 
  
a) Chemical composition of body. Individual odours have been exploited for long time. The 
best example of this is the use of dogs to track people. Biometric systems can measure 
the concentration of personal odour2. 
 
b) Thermal emissions. Biometric thermal emissions are images of parts of the body in the 
short, mid or long infrared wavelengths. The resulting images, however, are not rich in 
grey values3. 
 
c) Iris and retina patterns. The features of the eyes can be easily measured4. Since 1986, 
the iris has been used for identification. The development of an iris prototype unit by the 
American Defence Nuclear Agency began in the 1990s, but it was not until 1995 that the 
iris prototype became available as a commercial product5. Retina recognition seeks to 
identify a person by comparing images of the blood vessels in the back of the eye, also 
known as the choroidal vasculature6. Simon and Goldstain worked out blood vessel 
                                            
1
 Sokal, Robert and James, Rohlf, Introduction to Biostatistics, (W.H. Freeman and Company, 1973); 
Hopkins, Richard, “An introduction to biometrics and large scale civilian identification” (1999) 13(3) 
International Review of Law, Computers & Technology 337-363; Zhang, David, Automated biometrics: 
technologies and systems, (Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000); Wayman, James, et. al., Biometric 
Systems Technology Design and Performance Evaluation, (Springer, 2005); Boulgouris, Nikolaos V., 
et. al., Biometrics, Theory, Methods, and Applications, (IEEE and WILEY, 2010); Woodward, John D. 
Jr. et. al., Biometrics, Identity Assurance in the Information Age, (McGraw Hill Osborne, 2003); Bolle, 
Ruud M., et. al., Guide to Biometrics, (Springer, 2003). 
2
 Personal odour is susceptible to all types of influences, from diet and state of health to the use of 
soaps, perfumes and deodorants. It is not yet clear whether these factors can be normalized well 
enough to allow the reliable identification of individuals. Bolle, Ruud M., et. al., Guide to Biometrics, 
above n 1, pp. 58-59. 
3
 Infrared spectral resolution is measured by the numbers of bands, their width and their range within 
the electromagnetic spectrum. This works because skin is a better thermal conductor that air and thus 
contact with the ridges causes a noticeable drop in temperature on a heated surface. The technology 
claims that optical scanners can overcome dry and wet skin tissues and can sustain a higher static 
discharge. Ibidem, p. 33. 
4
 Zhang, David D., Automated Biometrics Technologies and Systems, above n 1, pp. 28-31; Wayman, 
James, et. al., Biometric Systems Technology Design and Performance Evaluation, above n 1; 
Boulgouris, Nikolaos V., et. al., Biometrics, Theory, Methods, and Applications, above n 1. 
5
 Woodward, John D. Jr. et. al., Biometrics, Identity Assurance in the Information Age, above n 1, p. 
71-130; Wayman, James, et. al., Biometric Systems Technology Design and Performance Evaluation, 
above n 1; Boulgouris, Nikolaos V., et. al., Biometrics, Theory, Methods, and Applications, above n 9.  
6
 Bolle, Ruud M. et. al., Guide to Biometrics, above n 1, p. 53. 
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pattern measurements and retina recognition has been developed commercially since 
the mid-1970s. 
 
d) Fingerprints. Fingerprint identification is the process of comparing given and known skin 
ridge impressions from fingers to determine if the impressions are from the same finger, 
thus identifying or verifying the owner of a given fingerprint. Fingerprint identification is 
the most widespread biometric systems. It has been widely used in personal 
identification for several centuries7, and still is largely used in law enforcement 
applications. However, recent combinations of factors favour the use of fingerprints for a 
much larger market of personal authentication8. In 1984, the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) began pushing to develop an automated fingerprint identification 
system. The Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS), the FBI’s 
large-scale ten fingerprints identification system, has since become operational9. 
 
e) Palmprints. Palmprints, as well as fingerprints, are still considered one of the most 
reliable means of distinguishing a man from his fellows because of their stability and 
uniqueness. The palm of the hand, flexure lines or finer lines, are used mainly to foretell 
the future, as well as to diagnose diseases. Palmprint recognition implements many of 
the same matching characteristics of fingerprint recognition10. 
 
f) Hand geometry. The geometric shape of the hand is not descriptive enough for 
identification11. Unlike fingerprints, the shape of the human hand is not unique. However, 
for purposes of verification, hand geometry data can be very useful and easier to collect. 
In 1974, the first commercial hand geometry systems became available. Therefore, in 
1980, the U.S. Army began testing hand geometry for use in banking. During the 1990s, 
major public use of hand geometry occurred at the Olympic Games where hand 
geometry systems were implemented to control and protect physical access to the 
Olympic Village in Atlanta12. 
 
                                            
7
 For further details, see Section 2.4.1. Definition Biometry or Biometrics?  
8
 The structural traits of the ridges in the centre fingerprint area basically classify fingerprint patterns. 
Familiar fingerprint patterns are divided into six main classes: arch, tented arch, right loop, left loop, 
whorl and twin loop. Some patterns are not included because they occupy a very small proportion and 
are known as special patterns. Zhang, David D., Automated Biometrics Technologies and Systems, 
above n 1, pp. 88; Wayman, James, et. al., Biometric Systems Technology Design and Performance 
Evaluation, above n 1; Boulgouris, Nikolaos V., et. al., Biometrics, Theory, Methods, and Applications, 
above n 1. 
9
 Woodward, John D. Jr. et. al., Biometrics, Identity Assurance in the Information Age, above n 1, p. 
71-130; Wayman, James, et. al., Biometric Systems Technology Design and Performance Evaluation, 
above n 1; Boulgouris, Nikolaos V., et. al, Biometrics, Theory, Methods, and Applications, above n 1. 
10
 There are usually three principal lines made by flexing the hand and wrist in the palm, which are 
named the heart line, the head line and the life line. Palm biometrics is represented by the information 
presented in a friction ridge impression. This information combines the ridge flow, ridge characteristics 
and ridge structure of the raised portion of the epidermis. The data represented by these impressions 
allow the identification or authentication of individuals by comparing them with a database.  Zhang, 
David D., Automated Biometrics Technologies and Systems, above n 1, pp. 111; Wayman, James, et. 
al., Biometric Systems Technology Design and Performance Evaluation, above n 1; Boulgouris, 
Nikolaos V., et. al., Biometrics, Theory, Methods, and Applications, above n 1, p. 58. 
11
 Zhang, David D., Automated Biometrics Technologies and Systems, above n 1, pp. 34. 
12
 Woodward, John D. Jr. et. al., Biometrics, Identity Assurance in the Information Age, above n 1, p. 
71-130; Wayman, James, et. al., Biometric Systems Technology Design and Performance Evaluation, 
above n 1; Boulgouris, Nikolaos V., et. al., Biometrics, Theory, Methods, and Applications, above n 1. 
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g) Face. Faces are rich in information about an individual’s identity; it provides information 
on race and sex, as does the distance between various facial features like the eyes, 
cheeks, nose, eyebrows, for example. The face can also tell about an individual’s mood 
and mental state. Among all the biometric identification systems, facial recognition has 
attracted much attention in recent years because of its potential as the most non-
intrusive13. Therefore, facial recognition has become one of the most researched. In the 
1960s, Bledsoe developed the first semi-automated facial recognition system under 
contract for the U.S. government14. However, it was not fully automated as it required a 
system administrator to locate useful features such as the eyes, ears, nose and mouth 
on photographs. By the 1970s, facial recognition took another step towards automation, 
but the problem was that measurements and locations had to be computed manually15. 
Then in 1988, the Lakewood Division of Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department 
began using a facial recognition system and deployed a suspect to conduct a database 
search of criminals whose features had been digitized. Furthermore, an Eigenface 
technique was developed for face recognition16. In the 2000s, face recognition was used 
at the Super Bowl in Tampa, Florida. The International Organization for Standardization 
(ISO) established the ISO/IECJTC1 subcommittee 37 (JTC1/SC37) to assist in the 
standardization of generic biometric technologies17. The ICAO employed face 
recognition technology as mandatory features for travel documents18. 
 
h) Pores of the skin. Sweat pores have been used to assist in forensic matching. Although 
most matching methods have emphasized minutia comparisons and used pores as 
ancillary comparison features, the ability to match prints based on pore information 
alone has been documented19. Considerable research has shown that pores do not 
disappear, move or spontaneously generate over time, which is the basis for them to be 
considered a biometric feature. 
 
2. Behavioural Characteristics. In this section, behavioural characteristics will be 
explained along with the most common or popular behavioural measures: handwritten 
signatures, voice, keystrokes and gait. 
 
Behavioural biometrics are learned or acquired over time and are dependent on one’s state 
of mind or even subject to deliberate alteration. There are two kinds of behaviours: innate 
                                            
13
 Face recognition systems contains two key steps, which are face detection and location together 
with features extraction and face recognition. The first step decides whether the input images or 
image sequences include faces, and if they do, figure out the position of the faces, then the segments 
each face from background. The second step looks for face features which distinguish individuals, 
and judges whether the individual in image is the given person or whether he or she is in database. 
Zhang, David D., Automated Biometrics Technologies and Systems, above n 1, p. 27 and 137; 
Wayman, James, et. al., Biometric Systems Technology Design and Performance Evaluation, above 
n 1; Boulgouris, Nikolaos V., et. al., Biometrics, Theory, Methods, and Applications, above n 1. 
14
 Woodward, John D. Jr. et. al., Biometrics, Identity Assurance in the Information Age, above n 1, 
Zhang, David D., Automated Biometrics Technologies and Systems, above n 1; Wayman, James, et. 
al., Biometric Systems Technology Design and Performance Evaluation, above n 1; Boulgouris, 
Nikolaos V., et. al., Biometrics, Theory, Methods, and Applications, above n 1.  
15
 Idem. 
16
 Idem. 
17
 Idem. 
18
 For further details, see Chapter 4. Biometric Systems in the Context of Transborder Immigration 
Flow  
19
 Zhang, David D., Automated Biometrics Technologies and Systems, above n 1, p. 31-34; Wayman, 
James, et. al., Biometric Systems Technology Design and Performance Evaluation, above n 1; 
Boulgouris, Nikolaos V., et. al., Biometrics, Theory, Methods, and Applications, above n 1. 
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and learned. The innate behaviour is determined by inherited pathways of nervous 
coordination. On the other hand, learned behaviour becomes more or less permanently 
altered as a result of the individual way of life, as well as social and cultural experiences20. 
 
The specialised literature highlights that the voice and handwritten signature are the most 
widespread behavioural characteristics. In addition, keystroke and gait are other important 
behavioural characteristics that are still in the testing and development stage. 
 
a) Handwritten signature. The handwritten signature is one of the most widespread ways of 
verifying an individual’s identity in daily operations. The design of a signature system is 
based on the fact that people do not write according to a standard type of penmanship 
and deviation from the norm is dependent on the individual. The signature was in service 
before the advent of computers and has seen wide usage in document authentication 
and transaction authorization in the form of checks and credit card receipts. In 1965, 
North American Aviation developed the first signature recognition system21. 
 
b) Voice. Voice is one of a person´s most distinguishing attributes. Voice is a convenient 
and natural tool for human communication. It is possible to identify people by merely 
hearing their voices. Even language does not matter; emotional state, health, aging and 
speaking habits (rhythm and intonation) do not affect the voice22. In 1976, the first 
prototype system for voice recognition was developed. The following year, Veripen Inc., 
of New York, was awarded a patent for a “personal identification apparatus”. This device 
made it possible to digitally capture of dynamic characteristics of an individual’s 
signature characteristics. Since 1980, the National Bureau of Standards (NBS) 
developed the NBS Speech Group to study and promote the use of speech processing 
techniques23. 
 
c) Keystrokes. Biometric keystroke is the identification of a person by their personal typing 
style. So far, keyboard characteristics are rich in cognitive qualities and hold promise as 
an individual identifier. When a computer user types on a computer keyboard, a digital 
signature is left in the form of keystroke latencies24. Zhang explains that: “[e]xperiment 
for keystroke characterization showed that a high degree of correlation could be obtained 
if the same person typed both the reference keystroke and the test ones”25. 
                                            
20
 Zhang, David D., Automated Biometrics Technologies and Systems, above n 1, p. 39. 
21
 The motion of a pen on paper, resulting from muscle contraction-relaxation, leaves a partial trace of 
the trajectory of the pen tip.  Ibidem, p. 203; Wayman, James, et. al., Biometric Systems Technology 
Design and Performance Evaluation, above n 1; Boulgouris, Nikolaos V., et. al., Biometrics, Theory, 
Methods, and Applications, above n 1. 
22
 The vocal tract is generally considered the speech production organ above the vocal folds, which 
consists of the laryngeal pharynx, oral pharynx, oral cavity, nasal pharynx and nasal cavity. The vocal 
tract modifies the spectral contents of an acoustic wave as it passes through the tract, thereby 
producing the voice. An acoustic wave is produced when the airflow from the lungs is carried by the 
trachea through the vocal folds. Boulgouris, Nikolaos V., et. al., Biometrics, Theory, Methods, and 
Applications, above n 1, pp. 48-49; Zhang, David D., Automated Biometrics Technologies and 
Systems, above n 1, p. 18-182; Wayman, James, et. al., Biometric Systems Technology Design and 
Performance Evaluation, above n 1. 
23
 Idem. 
24
 The common use keystroke measures are inter-key times and hold times. The inter-key times 
means inter-character time intervals measured as user types. Hold times represent the time duration 
between the moments every key button is hit to the moment it is released. Both features can be 
obtained by computer programming. Umpress, D. and Williams, G. “Identity Verification through 
Keyboard Characteristics” (1985) 23 International Journal of Man-Machine Studies 263-273. 
25
 Zhang, David D. Automated Biometrics Technologies and Systems, above n 1, pp. 229-230. 
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d) Gait. Using gait as a biometrics has recently attracted interest. People need to walk, so 
their gait is usually apparent and hard to disguise. It requires no subject contact. Gait 
biometrics involves its derivation by computer vision, for this only way it can satisfy its 
purpose. Some insight into gait as a biometrics can be drawn from psychology26. The 
strength of gait recognition lies in its applicability to recognizing people at distance in 
video images. Initial work has been carried out on identifying people by gait using motion 
capture equipment such as moving light displays or special markers27. 
 
                                            
26
  Ibidem, p.254; Wayman, James, et. al., Biometric Systems Technology Design and Performance 
Evaluation, above n 1; Boulgouris, Nikolaos V., et. al., Biometrics, Theory, Methods, and Applications, 
above n 1. 
27
 Bolle, Ruud M., et. al., Guide to Biometrics, above n 1, p. 55. 
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APPENDIX C.  
 
HOW BIOMETRIC SYSTEMS WORK 
 
1. Authentication (verification) biometric system. In order to understand the use of 
biometric systems, it is important to know how authentication biometric systems work. 
 
Specialised literature considers fingerprints, palmprints, voice or iris as the best physical 
characteristics for authentication biometric systems. Authors explain that biometric systems 
are used to verify are designed to ask the question “Am I the person I claimed to be? (Am I 
who I say I am?)” In special cases, many different types of measurements can be involved at 
the same time; these are the combined biometric systems1.  
 
In a verification system, it is not necessary to have a database since the objective of such a 
system is to verify a person’s identity, which means the registered pattern is displayed when 
a comparison is conducted2. Zhang and Hopkins explain the verification process in the 
following steps3: 
 
 The person being checked enters a password or swipes his/her identification card. 
 The system captures his/her biometrics feature(s). 
 The captured data is processed and compared with the one associated with the 
password or identification card. 
 The system gives a verification result.  
 The answer could be “Yes, s/he is” or “No, s/he is not.” 
 
2. Identification (recognition) biometric system. In order to understand the use of 
biometric systems, it is important to know how authentication biometric systems work. 
 
The literature considers face recognition the best feature for recognising people at a 
distance without their knowledge or cooperation4.  Authors explain that biometric systems 
that are used to identify are designed to ask the question “Who am I?” A biometric 
identification system works by comparing a scanned biometric against a database of 
                                            
1
 Sokal, Robert and James, Rohlf, Introduction to Biostatistics, (W.H. Freeman and Company, 1973); 
Hopkins, Richard, “An introduction to biometrics and large scale civilian identification” (1999) 13(3) 
International Review of Law, Computers & Technology 337-363; Zhang, David, Automated biometrics: 
technologies and systems, (Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000); Wayman, James, et. al., Biometric 
Systems Technology Design and Performance Evaluation, (Springer, 2005); Boulgouris, Nikolaos V., 
et. al., Biometrics, Theory, Methods, and Applications, (IEEE and WILEY, 2010); Woodward, John D. 
Jr. et. al., Biometrics, Identity Assurance in the Information Age, (McGraw Hill Osborne, 2003); Bolle, 
Ruud M., et. al., Guide to Biometrics, (Springer, 2003). 
2
 Zhang, David D., Automated Biometrics Technologies and Systems, above n 1. 
3
 Idem; Hopkins, Richard, “An introduction to biometrics and large scale civilian identification”, above 
n 1. 
4
 Wayman, James, et. al., Biometric Systems Technology Design and Performance Evaluation, above 
n 1; Boulgouris, Nikolaos V., et. al., Biometrics, Theory, Methods, and Applications, above n 1; Bolle, 
Rudd M., Guide to Biometrics, above n 1; Zhang, David D., Automated Biometrics Technologies and 
Systems, above n 1; Hopkins, Richard, “An introduction to biometrics and large scale civilian 
identification”, above n 1. 
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biometric information. A biometric-based identity system can ensure that a person has one 
and only one identity in the database5. 
 
In an identification system, a huge database is used to store hundreds of thousands of 
people’s digital biometric features6. According to Zhang and Hopkins, the identification 
process is as follows7: 
 
 The system gives a result whether the person being checked is registered or not.  
 The answer could be “Yes, s/he is” or “No, s/he is not.” 
 
Hopkins notes that when dealing with small numbers of people, unique identity can be 
established by manual processes. However, when dealing with millions of people, totally 
automated biometric systems must provide a fast and explicit “yes/no” answer to the 
question “Is this person already enrolled in this system?” Ideally, no human experts are 
required8. 
 
                                            
5
 Idem. 
6
 Zhang, David D., Automated Biometrics Technologies and Systems, above n 1, p. 11;  
7
 Idem; Hopkins, Richard, “An introduction to biometrics and large scale civilian identification”, above 
n 1. 
8
 Idem. 
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APPENDIX E.  
 
EURODAC INTRODUCTORY INFORMATION  
 
Eurodac is a transnational database containing the personal and biometric information of all 
asylum seekers and illegal immigrants found within the European Union (EU)1. Eurodac 
contains personal information like country of origin, sex, and date and place of apprehension 
or asylum application. It includes the fingerprints of asylum applicants and illegal immigrants 
over the age of 14, thus allowing authorities to determine whether individuals have already 
applied for asylum in another EU Member State or have transited illegally through another 
EU Member State. According to the European Commission, asylum data stored in member 
States’ national databases have already been instrumental in solving cases of terrorism and 
serious crimes committed in other member States.  
 
In 2009 and 2010, the European Commission presented a proposal to expand the use of 
Eurodac database for terrorism and serious crimes. However, the European Data Protection 
Supervisor (EDPS) argued that the need and proportionality of law enforcement access to 
EURODAC data has not been sufficiently demonstrated, shifting to the wholesale sharing of 
biometric information in EURODAC which requires more than just anecdotal evidence as 
justification2. The potential for error in matching fingerprints and the resulting implication of 
innocent asylum seekers in crimes they did not commit has been pointed at by the UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), who recommends strengthening provisions 
prohibiting the transfer of information about asylum seekers or refugees to third countries3.
                                            
1
 Council Regulation (EC) No 2725/2000 Concerning the Establishment of 'Eurodac' for the 
Comparison of Fingerprints for the Effective Application of the Dublin, [2000] OJ L 316/15. 
2
 European Data Protection Supervisor “Opinion to the European Parliament on the amended 
proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the establishment of 
'EURODAC' for the comparison of fingerprints for the effective application of Regulation (EU) No 
[…/…]”.https://www.privacyinternational.org/sites/privacyinternational.org/files/file-downloads/2012-
09-05_edps_opinion_on_eurodac.pdf (24/12/2012) 
3
 UNHCR “Comments to the European Parliament on the amended proposal for a Regulation of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on the establishment of 'EURODAC' for the comparison of 
fingerprints for the effective application of Regulation (EU) No […/…]” 
http://www.unhcr.org/50adf9749.pdf (24/12/2012) 
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APPENDIX F.  
 
SCHENGEN INFORMATION SYSTEM 
 
Note: The information provided in this appendix is a summary of the Schengen area and 
cooperation website1. 
  
In 1985, an agreement was signed at Schengen (a town in Luxemburg) for the purpose of 
creating a free movement area that extends throughout the territories of the contracting 
parties while at the same time maintains a high level of security for their citizens. More 
freedom in movement, however, implies rather higher risks than better security. In meeting 
these two a priori contradictory objectives, the Convention Implementing the Schengen 
Agreement introduced a series of compensatory measures, which include: 
 
 Stricter controls at external borders, 
 A common policy for granting visas, 
 Closer cooperation between police, judiciary and customs, 
 A common policy for asylum, 
 A common policy on narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, 
 A common policy on firearms and ammunition and  
 Setting up the Schengen Information System. 
 
The signatory States to the agreement have abolished all internal borders in lieu of a single 
external border. Here, common rules and procedures are applied with regard to visas for 
short stays, asylum requests and border controls. Simultaneously, to guarantee security 
within the Schengen area, cooperation and coordination between police services and judicial 
authorities have been stepped up.  
 
Schengen cooperation has been incorporated into the European Union (EU) legal framework 
with the Treaty of Amsterdam of 1997. However, all countries cooperating in Schengen are 
not parties of the Schengen area. This is either because they do not wish to eliminate their 
border controls or because they do not yet fulfil the required conditions for the application of 
the Schengen acquis. 
 
The first agreement between the five original group members was signed on 14 June 1985. 
A further convention was drafted and signed on 19 June 1990. When it took effect in 1995, it 
abolished checks at the internal borders of the signatory States and created a single external 
border where immigration checks for the Schengen area are carried out in accordance with 
identical procedures. Common rules regarding visas, the right of asylum and checks at 
external borders were adopted to allow the free movement of persons within the signatory 
States without disrupting law and order. 
 
Accordingly, in order to reconcile freedom and security, this freedom of movement was 
accompanied by so-called "compensatory" measures. These involved improving cooperation 
and coordination between the police and the judicial authorities in order to safeguard internal 
security and, specifically, to fight organised crime. With this in mind, the Schengen 
                                            
1
 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/justice_freedom_security/free_movement_of_persons_asylum
_immigration/l33020_en.htm (24/12/2012) 
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Information System (SIS) was set up. The SIS is a sophisticated database used by 
authorities of the Schengen member countries to exchange data on certain categories of 
people and goods. 
 
The SIS allows national border control and judicial authorities to obtain information on 
persons or objects. Member States supply information to the system through national 
networks (N-SIS) connected to a central system (C-SIS). This IT system is supplemented by 
a network known as SIRENE (Supplementary Information Request at the National Entry), 
which is the human interface of the SIS. 
 
The Schengen area gradually expanded to include nearly every Member State. Italy signed 
the agreements on 27 November 1990; Spain and Portugal joined on 25 June 1991; Greece 
followed on 6 November 1992, then Austria on 28 April 1995 and Denmark, Finland and 
Sweden on 19 December 1996. The Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, 
Malta, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia joined on 21 December 2007 and the associated 
country Switzerland on 12 December 2008. Bulgaria, Cyprus and Romania are not yet fully-
fledged members of the Schengen area; therefore, border controls between these countries 
and the Schengen area are in place until the EU Council decides that the conditions for 
abolishing internal border controls have been met. 
 
 The second-generation Schengen Information System (SIS II) 
 
As the SIS has been operational since 1995, work is in progress on a new system based on 
new technology with enhanced functionalities. This new system (SIS II) is currently 
undergoing extensive tests in cooperation with member States. 
 
The Council adopted two legislative instruments on 6 December 2001: Regulation (EC) No 
2424/2001 and Decision 2001/886/JHA, making the Commission responsible for developing 
SIS II and providing for the related expenditure to be covered by the general EU budget. 
These instruments were modified in 2006, extending the period of their validity to 31 
December 2008. 
 
The Commission published a communication [COM (2001) 720] on 18 December 2001, 
examining ways to create and develop SIS II. Following studies and discussions relating to 
the architecture and functionalities of the future system, the Commission presented three 
proposals for legislative instruments in 2005. Two of the instruments in this package 
(Regulation (EC) No. 1987/2006 on first pillar aspects of the establishment, operation and 
use of SIS II and Regulation (EC) No. 1986/2006 on access to SIS II by the services 
responsible for issuing vehicle registration certificates) were adopted on 20 December 2006. 
The third instrument (Decision 2007/533/JHA determining third pillar aspects of the 
establishment, operation and use of SIS II) was adopted on 12 June 2007. 
 
The Justice and Home Affairs Council of December 2006 endorsed the SISone4all project (a 
joint effort among member States coordinated by Portugal). SISone4all was a temporary 
solution, which enabled nine EU member States that joined the EU in 2004 to connect to the 
current SIS system (SIS1+) with some technical adjustments. The successful completion of 
SISone4all, in conjunction with positive Schengen evaluations, allowed for the lifting of 
internal border controls along land and sea borders with these new countries by the end of 
2007 and for air borders in March 2008. 
 
Lifting internal border controls paved the way for implementing alternative and less risky 
approaches for migrating from SIS I + to SIS II. Following requests made by member States 
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to allow more time to test the system and adopt a less risky strategy for migration from the 
old system to the new one, the Commission presented proposals for a regulation and a 
decision was made to define the tasks and responsibilities of the various parties involved in 
preparing for the migration to SIS II (including testing and any further development work 
needed during this phase). These proposals were adopted by the Council on 24 October 
2008. 
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APPENDIX G.  
 
PRÜM CONVENTION 
 
Note: The information provided in this appendix is a summary of the Schengen area DNA 
cooperation website1. 
 
In 2005, at Prüm (a town in Germany), seven European Union (EU) members States signed 
the Treaty of Prüm on stepping up cross-border cooperation, particularly in combating 
terrorism, cross-border crime and illegal immigration. The aim of this decision is to intensify 
cross-border police and judicial cooperation between (EU) member States in criminal 
matters so as to improve the exchanges of information between the authorities responsible 
for preventing and investigating criminal offences. The decision sets out provisions with 
regard to: 
 
1. Automated access to DNA profiles, dactyloscopic data and certain national vehicle 
registration data; 
2. Supply of data in relation to major events; 
3. Supply of information in order to prevent terrorist offences; 
4. Other measures for increasing cross-border police cooperation. 
 
 The Establishment of National Databases and Automated Access To Data 
 
EU member States are to establish national DNA analysis files for the purpose of 
investigating criminal offences. The reference data, consisting of the non-coded part of the 
DNA and a reference number that does not enable an individual to be identified, must be 
made available to other EU member States to carry out automated searches. These 
searches are performed via national contact points by comparing DNA profiles, but only in 
individual cases and on a hit/no-hit basis. If the search provides a match, the national 
contact point carrying out the search receives the reference data electronically. If no profile 
is found for the specific individual under investigation or against whom criminal proceedings 
have been brought, the requested EU member Sate may be obliged to establish a DNA 
profile for that individual. 
 
EU member States must also make available reference data from the national automated 
fingerprint identification systems (AFIS). For this purpose, reference data will consist only of 
dactyloscopic data and a reference number. Searches are carried out by comparing 
dactyloscopic data and, like DNA searches, only in individual cases on a hit/no-hit basis. 
Confirmation of the match is conducted by the national contact point of the requesting EU 
member State. Supplying further available personal data for matching DNA or dactyloscopic 
data and other information relevant to the reference data is governed by national law, 
including the Mutual Legal Assistance (MLA) in the requested EU member States. 
 
The national contact points are also given access to certain national vehicle registration data 
via automated online searches. These searches may only be conducted with a full chassis or 
registration number. 
                                            
1
 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/justice_freedom_security/police_customs_cooperation/jl0005_
en.htm (24/12/2012) 
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 Supply of Information to Fight Terrorism 
 
For the purpose of preventing terrorist activities, but only in individual cases and to the 
extent required by the conditions leading to the supposition that criminal offences will be 
committed, EU member States may provide the following data to each other via the national 
contact points: 
 
1. Surname and first names; 
2. Date and place of birth; 
3. A description of the conditions leading to the supposition that criminal offences will be 
committed. 
 
The country providing this data may impose certain binding conditions on the receiving 
country for the use of said data. 
 
 Other Measures for Enhancing Cross-Border Police Cooperation 
 
EU member States may effectuate joint patrols and other joint operations to prevent criminal 
offences and to maintain public order and security in a given EU member State’s territory. In 
such cases, designated officers and officials from the seconding country participate in the 
host country’s operations. The seconding officers may be conferred executive powers or 
may be allowed to exercise their executive powers, but only under the guidance and in the 
presence of the host officers. The competent authority of the host country is responsible for 
the control of the actions of the seconding officers. 
 
With regard to mass gatherings and other comparable major events, disasters and serious 
accidents, EU member States are to provide mutual assistance to each other. This 
assistance should consist of information exchanges, the coordination of police measures 
and the contribution of material and physical resources. 
 
An EU member State must provide assistance and protection to the other country’s officers 
on duty, equivalent to that provided to its own officers. 
 
 Provisions on Data Protection 
 
EU member States must guarantee that the personal data processed in accordance with this 
decision is protected by national laws. Only the competent authorities may process personal 
data. They must ensure the accuracy and current relevance of the data. Steps must be 
taken to rectify or delete incorrect data or data that was supplied when it should not have 
been. Personal data must be deleted if no longer needed for the purpose it was made 
available or if the storage restrictions, as provided by national law, has expired. 
 
The relevant authorities must take technical and organisational measures to protect personal 
data against destruction, loss, unauthorised access, alteration or disclosure. For the purpose 
of verifying the permissibility of the non-automated processing of personal data, this 
processing must be logged. Similarly, the automated processing of personal data must be 
recorded. The independent data protection authorities in EU member States are responsible 
for the legal examinations of personal data processing. 
 
Any individual has the right to information on the data that has been processed in relation to 
his or her person, including information on the origin of the data, the recipients of the data, 
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and the purpose and legal basis for processing the data. The individual may request 
corrections to or the deletion of inaccurate or unlawfully processed data. If the individual’s 
rights have been violated with regard to data protection, he or she may lodge a complaint 
with an independent court or tribunal and claim damages or other legal compensation. 
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APPENDIX H.  
 
NATIONAL IMMIGRATION POLICY 
 
Note: This information is a summary of the national immigration policy of the four countries 
study. 
 
Australia’s Immigration Policy: 
 
Australia has a programme of strict control over migration movements. The Department of 
Immigration and Citizenship (DIAC)1 is in charge of the arrival and settlement of migrants in 
Australia. The Australian immigration is managed by the Migration Act 1995 and associated 
regulations.  
 
For Australia, 2008, 2009 and 2013 were important years for reforming their migration legal 
framework. In January 2009, the government established a new Critical Skills List (CSL) and 
in April 20092, February 20113 and December 2012, they announced a series of reforms to 
the temporary skilled migration program 
 
The Australian migration programme has the following objectives4: 
  
1. To implement strategies to strengthen the economic, budgetary and social benefits from 
both permanent and temporary migration. 
2. To implement strategies to promote managed migration and strengthen international 
cooperative efforts against people smuggling, trafficking in persons and terrorism. 
3. To provide effective scrutiny at the border, including by examining passengers and crew 
and their movement information before their arrival in Australia, as well as examining and 
confirming their identity and authority to enter Australia upon arrival. 
4. To provide identification, verification and biometric matching capabilities across a range 
of business processes, through the collection of biodata and images, and its integration 
with alert systems. 
5. To implement strategies to promote compliance and prevent and deter non-compliance 
with immigration law. 
6. To locate people who are no longer permitted to stay in Australia and regularise their 
immigration status including, where necessary, their removal from Australia. 
7. To monitor business sponsors for compliance with sponsorship undertakings and, as 
appropriate, apply sanctions for those in breach and/or refer their cases to other relevant 
agencies. 
8. To continue to manage and process protection visas onshore. 
9. To facilitate the effective management of asylum seekers. 
 
The Australian Government determines the number of migrants Australia will accept at the 
beginning of each financial year. This includes the number of applications Australia will 
                                            
1
 The Department of Immigration and Citizenship (DIAC) http://www.immi.gov.au/  (20/12/2012) 
2
 Australia Government, Department of Immigration and Citizenship, Annual Report (2008-2009) 
3
 Australia Government, Department of Immigration and Citizenship, The People of Australia- 
Australia’s Multicultural Policy, (2011) 
4
 Australia Government, Department of Immigration and Citizenship, above n 90. 
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accept from applicants applying from overseas, as well as applicants applying from within 
Australia. 
 
The varieties of visa fall into two main categories: temporary and permanent. There are six 
main categories of permanent visas: skilled migration, family migration, business migration, 
employer-sponsored, refugee/humanitarian and special eligibility (former Australian 
residents). Temporary visas allow people to visit Australia for a limited time for the purposes 
of tourism, study, work, business, medical treatment or visiting relatives. However, these 
categories of permanent and temporary visas have approximately 140 visa subclasses with 
their own sets of eligibility criteria5. 
 
The significance of this for this thesis is that Australia has set itself the objective of 
implementing biometrics into their immigration policy. In addition to this, border clearance of 
airline staff using face recognition comparisons against enrolled templates was used first by 
QANTAS and the Australian Customs Service.  
 
In 2003, the Australian Customs Service inaugurated a pilot program at Sydney Kingsford 
Smith Airport, which consisted of enrolling QANTAS staff members on a computerised 
system that matches video images against respective templates in the project database. 
This programme is now called SmartGate6. SmartGate is a kiosk that checks whether 
Australian and New Zealand travellers are eligible for self-processing and the gate performs 
the identity check and clearance. SmartGate is available at Sydney, Adelaide, Brisbane, 
Cairns, Melbourne, Perth, Gold Coast and Darwin international airports7.   
 
In 2004, the Department of Immigration and Citizenship (DIAC) was authorised to research 
and test ways of incorporating biometric technologies into existing visa and entry 
arrangements, and to find a way of increasing the capacity to store biometric images. Two 
systems were developed and are now known as the Identity Services Repository (ISR)8. 
 
In 2008, the Australian National Audit Office examined the DIAC’s management of the 
introduction of biometric systems. The Auditor General pointed out that: 
 
“DIAC has relatively limited capability to use other biometric data, such as fingerprints 
for matching purposes. [T]here is a risk that DIAC is unable to benefit fully from 
interactions with domestic and overseas systems. The current relatively limited 
fingerprint matching capability leaves the department in a position where it is unable 
to benefit fully from the international developments tending towards a broader use of 
fingerprints”9. 
 
Furthermore, under the Migration Act 1995 access to, and disclosure of, identifying 
information does not extend to the third parties on which the DIAC discloses information. 
                                            
5
 The Department of Immigration and Citizenship (DIAC), section visas immigration and refugees 
http://www.immi.gov.au/immigration/ (20/12/2012) 
6
 International Organization for Migration, “International Terrorism and Migration”, above n 80; 
Australia Government, Australian National Audit Office, Audit Report No 24 (2007-2008) 
7
 Australian Customs and Border Protection Service, SmartGate 
http://www.customs.gov.au/site/page5552.asp   (20/12/2012) 
8
 Australia Government, Department of Immigration and Citizenship, Review of Personal Identifier 
Provisions Introduced In 2004 to Migration Act 1958, Final Report (2009) 16 
9
 Australia Government, Australian National Audit Office, Audit Report, above n 94. 
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“DIAC cannot ensure that there is/will be no inappropriate use or disclosure of identifying 
information by the agencies to which it discloses the information”10.  
 
Since October 2009, the DIAC “implemented the Five Country Conference (FCC) (Australia, 
the United Kingdom, the United States of America, Canada and New Zealand) Secure File 
Share Server. This provides a secure, electronic means of sharing biometric data”11. 
 
“In December 2009, the department commenced collection of biometrics (fingerprints 
and facial images) from consenting protection visa applicants onshore at the 
department's Sydney and Melbourne offices.  
In April 2010, the department signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with 
the Australian Government agency CrimTrac, which provides national information-
sharing solutions to law enforcement agencies. The MOU enables the department to 
store and match biometric data on CrimTrac's National Automated Fingerprint 
Identification System (NAFIS) which contains fingerprints and related information 
used for law enforcement purposes”12.  
 
In November 2012, changes to temporary work visas were made13. Furthermore, in July 
2013, the Australian Customs and Border Protection Service (ACBPS) released a Blueprint 
for Reform and Australian Federal Police (AFP) Strategic Partnership 2013-201814.  
 
Mexico’s Immigration Policy: 
 
The Ministry of Interior through the National Institute of Migration (INM)15 manages the 
arrival, departure and settlement of migrants in Mexico. The INM is also responsible for the 
control and enforcement of the migratory policy.  
 
Mexico has some of the most complex immigration dynamics in the world. Based on the 
criteria set by the Global Commission on International Migration (GCIM)16 and International 
                                            
10
 Idem 
11
 Australia Government, Department of Immigration and Citizenship, Annual Report (2010-2011) 
12
 Idem. 
13
  http://www.immi.gov.au/visas/temporary-visa/ (20/12/2012)  
14
 Australia Governments, Australian Customs and Border Protection Service, The Blueprint for 
Reform (2013-2018)  
15
 Mexico, National Institute of Migration (INM) 
http://www.inm.gob.mx/index.php/page/pagina_principal/en.html (20/12/2012) 
16
 The website points out that: “The GCIM was launched by the United Nations Secretary-General and 
a number of governments in 2003. It was comprised of 19 Commissioners, was independent and was 
given the mandate to provide the framework for the formulation of a coherent, comprehensive and 
global response to the issue of international migration. In its Report, presented to UN Secretary-
General Kofi Annan, UN Members States and other stakeholders on 5 October 2005, the Global 
Commission on International Migration says the international community has failed to realize the full 
potential of migration and has not risen to the many opportunities and challenges it presents. The 
Commission stresses the need for greater coherence, cooperation and capacity to achieve a more 
effective governance of international migration”. The Global Commission on International Migration 
closed in 2005.  http://www.gcim.org/ (20/12/2012) 
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Organization for Migration (IOM), Mexico is classified as an origin17, transit18 and 
destination19 country.  
 
The flow of undocumented people from Mexico, Central and South America across the 
northern border to the United States continues while Mexico’s southern border is 
increasingly used by citizens from Central and South America as their way into the United 
States.   
 
“Some 200,000 Central Americans attempt to irregularly enter the US via Mexico’s 
southern border. Although 70 per cent of them are detained by Mexican migration 
authorities and returned to their countries of origin, an estimated 60,000–70,000 
eventually reach the US or remain in Mexico”20. 
 
In July 2010, the Mexican immigration legal framework changed and took effect in May 
2010. Mexico’s General Population Law21 sets out the rights and obligations of foreigners, as 
well as the different categories associated with immigration. However, the legislation did not 
respect the human rights of foreigners as recognised by the international legal framework. 
Even with this amendment, major issues continued in force, such as huge discretionary 
powers granted to immigration agents, gaps in immigration policy oversight from the 
legislature and judiciary and the omission of human rights for immigrants.  
 
Perhaps, two cases prompted this legislative reform. In August 2010, seventy-two Central 
American migrants were murdered by drug cartels in the state of Tamaulipas in northern 
Mexico22 and in December 2010, fifty Central American migrants disappeared in the state of 
Oaxaca in southern Mexico23. Central American governments pressured Mexican 
government not only to investigate the crimes, but also to recognise immigrants’ human 
rights.  
 
Thus, specific legislation –the Migration Law- was enacted on May 25, 2011 and came into 
force the following day24. A new Refugees and Complementary Protection Law25 was 
approved in January 2011, as well as an amended General Population Law, all of which 
constitute Mexico’s immigration legal framework.  
 
                                            
17
 Origin countries: citizens migrate out because they are unable to benefit from safety, security or 
sustainable livelihoods in their own countries. 
18
 Transit countries: people who are moving across their territory, on their way to another country or 
continent.  
19
 Destination countries: migrants who have moved in a regular and irregular manner. 
20
 IOM, Migration Initiatives Appeal 2010 (2010) 
http://publications.iom.int/bookstore/free/Migration_Initiatives_2010.pdf (20/12/2012) 
21
 Ley General de Población, DOF 07/01/1974 [General Population Law, last amendment 09/04/12] 
(Mexico) http://www.diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/pdf/140.pdf (20/12/2012) 
22
 Editorial, “Migrantes, 72 muertos de fosa en Tamaulipas” El Universal (Mexico), 25 August  2010 
http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/notas/704017.html (20/12/2012) 
23
 Editorial, “Intensifican búsqueda de migrantes desaparecidos” La Gente (Mexico online), 24 
December 2010 http://www.rlp.com.ni/noticias/90585/intensifican-busqueda-de-migrantes-
desaparecidos-en-mexico (20/12/2012) 
24
 Ley de Migración, DOF 25/052011 [Migration Law] (Mexico) 
http://www.diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/pdf/LMigra.pdf (20/12/2012) 
25
 Ley sobre Refugiados y Protección Complementaria, DOF 27/01/2011 [Refugees and 
Complementary Protection Law] (Mexico) http://www.diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/pdf/LRPC.pdf 
(20/12/2012) 
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A programme called the Security and Prosperity Partnership (SPP) was adopted by Mexico, 
Canada and the United States. Its spheres of action involved the movement of people and it 
discussed a number of issues not covered by the North American Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA), like border security and antiterrorism measures, energy sector integration, 
environmental protection, emergency preparedness and safety standards, among others26. 
The principle of shared responsibility for immigration among sending and receiving countries 
was at the heart of ongoing reflection in Mexico27. However, in 2009, the SPP was 
abandoned by the U.S. government and NAFTA was renegotiated. At the same time, the 
U.S. government implemented the Global Online Enrolment System (GOES)28. 
 
For the purposes of this thesis, the sphere of action of this policy developed in a trilateral 
alliance between Canada, the United States and Mexico is very important. In the area of 
immigration, the programme specifications ranged from shared technology for registering 
passengers in North America, shared access to databases, special clearance for pre-cleared 
border residents, coordinated visas policies, exchange of intelligence information on certain 
persons and fast-track lanes to militarising Mexico’s northern border, among others. 
 
The new immigration policy for Mexico’s southern and northern borders now focuses on 
proposals for an integrated immigration policy. The proposal is made up of four strategic 
lines developed by the Mexican National Institute of Migration and the Secretary of Foreign 
Affairs, with the cooperation of IOM29: 
 
 The facilitation of documented migration flows whose temporary or final destination is 
the State along Mexico’s border. The main objectives are to facilitate the 
documentation and entry of temporary workers and local visitors, tourists and 
business travellers across the border, fostering the use of migration documents and 
the dissemination of their benefits. 
 
 The protection of the rights of immigrants entering through Mexico’s border. The 
specific objectives of this type of protection include intensifying personnel training; 
supervising migrant rights during their holding, lodging and repatriation; timely 
treatment of cases of migrant rights violations; legal protection of migrants who are 
victims of trafficking or smuggling; better coordination of the authorities 
corresponding to migrant rights and stronger protection of the rights of refugees, 
asylum seekers and stateless individuals. 
 
                                            
26
 The SPP was opened on March 23, 2005, when the leaders of the United States, Canada and 
Mexico met in Waco, Texas. 
27
 Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America (SPP) http://www.spp-psp.gc.ca/eic/site/spp-
psp.nsf/eng/home (20/12/2012)  
28
 https://goes-app.cbp.dhs.gov/main/goes (20/12/2012) This includes the FAST Driver Programme 
between the United States and Canada or the United States and Mexico. FAST is the trusted traveller 
programme for commercial truck drivers along Canadian and Mexican land borders. FAST allows for 
the expedited release of approved commercial truck drivers making fully-qualified FAST trips between 
the United States and either Canada or Mexico.  
http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/travel/trusted_traveler/fast/ (20/12/2012) 
29
 OECD, Recent changes in Migration Movements and Policies: Country Notes (2010), p. 198; see 
also IOM, Migration initiatives 2012 (2012), p. 61 
http://www.iom.int/jahia/webdav/site/myjahiasite/shared/shared/mainsite/published_docs/books/Migrat
ion-Initiatives-Appeal.pdf#australia (20/12/2012)  
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 Contribution to border security. The main actions are to reinforce immigration control 
and the verification of a foreigner’s legal stay in Mexico; to fight trafficking and people 
smuggling in coordination with other institutions, especially where women and minors 
are involved; to provide better information exchange between the institutions involved 
in combating criminal activities and to take measures to stop corruption among 
immigration authorities. 
 
 The permanent updating of immigration flow management and legislation in order 
better to handle the changing dynamics of immigration on the border. The objectives 
include the modernisation of the infrastructure for registering and controlling 
migration flows; the implementation of specific mechanisms for collecting and 
analysing information for decision-making; the evaluation of programmes, projects 
and actions to obtain appropriate feedback; and the adaptation of legislation in the 
light of the changing dynamics of migration in the region. 
 
There are two main classifications of migratory criteria to legally enter Mexico: as a visitor 
and as a resident (temporary or permanent)30. As a visitor, there are seven subclasses of 
visa:  visitor as tourist, in transit, visitor as businesspeople or investors, visitor for the 
adoption of minors, visitor as a cross-border worker, visitor for humanitarian reasons and 
visitor as regional resident; whereas there are three subclasses of residents: temporary 
resident as a student, temporary resident and permanent resident.  
 
Neither Mexico’s General Population Law nor Migration Law consider the implementation of 
biometric systems. However, the implementation of biometric systems is established in the 
Manual of Criteria and Migratory Proceedings of the National Institute of Migration. This 
document is not updated because it has the old classifications of visas, but the rest of the 
document is still applicable to biometric systems in the following cases31. 
 
a) Foreign holders of a valid visa who want to change their status in Mexico as temporary 
residence or permanent residence; also it applies for that they wish to replace its 
migratory form by robbery, lost or partial destruction32 
b) Refugee (humanitarian and asylum reasons)33 
c) Temporary and definitive Asia Pacific Business Travel Card (ABTC)34 
 
These three biometric lists belong to the new immigration procedures deployed as a 
centralised information system called the Electronic System for Migration Procedures 
(SETRAM)35.   
                                            
30
 Ley de Migración, DOF 25/052011 [Migration Law] (Mexico), above n 115. 
31
 Acuerdo por el que se expide el Manual de Criterios y Trámites Migratorios del Instituto Nacional 
de Migración, DOF 29/01/2010, [Criteria and Migratory Proceedings Manual of the National Institute 
of Migration of the Minister of Interior of 21 September 2010] (Mexico) 
http://dof.gob.mx/nota_detalle.php?codigo=5129775&fecha=29/01/2010 (20/12/2012) 
32
 As a safeguard for foreigners’ the immigration shall issue them migratory forms with biometric 
elements of security in agreement with the administrative norms. 
33
 The National Institute of Migration will issue proof of the request of recognition of the condition of 
Refugee. This proof shall state that the request is under review and will also contain the applicant’s 
personal data and biometric information. The same shall apply to the dependants who accompany the 
applicant. 
34
 The ABTC temporary will be issued when the answer of a member economy is unresolved and the 
applicant wishes to enter the member economies that have already approved the request; the ABTC 
definitive will be issued when all member economies have been pronounced on the request of the 
Mexican authority approving or denying the expedition of the card. 
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The INM also launched the interconnection of the Integrated Migration Operations (SIOM by 
its Spanish acronym) with the INM’s Electronic Immigration Procedures (SETRAM by its 
Spanish acronym), the Consular Management Integrated System (ACIS by its Spanish 
acronym) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (SRE by its Spanish acronym). This 
interconnection allows Mexican consulates to automatically verify migration real-time alerts 
at the time of issuing visas, in order to assess the issuance of the type of visa requested. 
The INM also informs the SRE of the permits granted to foreigners to obtain their visas at the 
corresponding consulates36. 
 
New Zealand’s Immigration Policy: 
 
The Department of Labour manages migration flows and border security. However, the 
Department of Internal Affairs (Citizenship Branch), Electoral Enrolment Centre and 
Department of Internal Affairs (Births, Deaths and Marriages) are authorised to provide 
better services to perspective immigrants37. Immigration is fundamental to New Zealand’s 
economy. The Immigration Act 2009 came into effect in November 2010. The new 
immigration policy has three main objectives: economic transformation, strong national 
identity and security, and opportunity for families38.  
 
The new Act allows for the following types of visas: residence class visas and temporary 
entry class visas. There are two residence class visas: resident visa and permanent 
residence visa. There are four temporary entry class visas: temporary visas, limited visas, 
interim visas and transit visas. However, there are a variety of temporary visas. The new Act 
has modernised New Zealand’s immigration laws, but “it does not make major changes to 
the criteria under which people apply to travel to and stay in New Zealand”39. 
 
In 2009, the SmartGate was implemented at Auckland International Airport for arriving 
passengers from Australia and New Zealand. It is also operational for departing passengers 
from Australia and New Zealand at the Auckland, Wellington and Christchurch international 
airports40. 
 
The 2009 Immigration Act allows for the collection of biometric information from foreign 
nationals and New Zealand citizens on arrival in New Zealand for immediate use and 
storage for future use: photographs of all or part of a person’s head or shoulders, fingerprints 
and iris scans. However, for New Zealand citizens, the biometric data will be matched 
against the information in their New Zealand passport. Once the person’s identity and 
citizenship is confirmed, the information is disposed of and is not stored. 
 
                                                                                                                                       
35
 Mexican Government, National Institute of Migration, Action Lines in Sector Programs 
Accountability, Transparency and Fighting Corruption committed in 2009 Final Report (2008-2012) 
http://www.inm.gob.mx/static/transparencia/PND/Formatos_A_y_B.pdf (20/12/2012) 
36
 Instituto Nacional de Migración, “Consolida INM simplificación de trámites migratorios”, (Press 
Release, 7 September 2011) http://www.inm.gob.mx/index.php/blog/show/Consolida-INM-
simplificaci%C3%B3n-de-tr%C3%A1mites-migratorios.html (22/12/2012) 
37
 New Zealand immigration area of responsibility http://www.dol.govt.nz/about/responsibilities/ 
(22/12/2012) 
38
 New Zealand Government, Immigration Act Review (April 2006) 
39
 Immigration Act 2009 (New Zealand), see also the following website: 
http://www.immigration.govt.nz/migra/general/generalinformation/immigrationact/  (20/12/2012)  
40
 New Zealand, Customs Service website 
http://www.customs.govt.nz/features/bordersector/transtasmantravel/Pages/default.aspx (20/12/2012) 
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In 2012, New Zealand started to introduce a new online immigration system to process visas 
applications called Immigration Global Management System (IGMS)41. 
  
Spain’s Migration Policy: 
 
Spain is classified as a transit and destination country. The Minister of Labour and Migration 
by the Secretary of Migration and Immigration manage the arrival and settlement of 
migrants42. 
 
From 2000 to 2009, Spain has amended its legal framework on migration. The most recent 
amendments were carried out in 2007 and 2009: The 2/2009 Organic Law which reforms the 
Organic Law 4/2000 on Rights and Liberties for Foreigners in Spain and their Social 
Integration43 and Royal Decree 1161/2009 which reforms Royal Decree 240/2007 on the 
Arrival, Free Flow and Residence for European Citizens in Spain, Members of the European 
Union and Schengen Agreement44. The second reform marks the beginning of a new stage 
in Spanish policy that is the result of the change not only of the political party in power’s 
perspective on this matter, but also of the dispositions established in the Treaty of 
Amsterdam and the agreements adopted at the Tampere and Seville Summits aiming at the 
formulation of a common policy in flow control and the allocation of rights of immigrant-based 
communities.  
 
These reforms were part of a comprehensive and coordinated approach in handling 
migration in Spain, which provides a broad view of all the aspects and not only from a single 
perspective like that of control flow, the integration of foreign residents or the development of 
countries of origin. 
 
The Spanish population has increased because European Union nationals do not need to 
apply for a residence permit45. Current legislation on immigration promotes the integration of 
immigrants already living in Spain and strengthens the controls and sanctions in the field of 
undocumented immigration and the illegal employment of foreigners. The Organic Law 
4/2000 on the Rights and Liberties for Foreigners in Spain and their Social Integration sets 
two main visa categories: Stays and Residence. The first one has seven different types of 
visas and the second has two classifications: temporary and permanent residence46. Even 
though this legislation has been amended, the visa categories are applicable. 
                                            
41
 New Zealand, New IT System for Immigration New Zealand  
http://www.immigration.govt.nz/migrant/general/generalinformation/newitsystems/ (20/12/2012) 
42
 Spain, General Minister for Migration and Immigration http://extranjeros.mtin.es/es/Organizacion/ 
(20/12/2012) 
43
 Ley Orgánica 2/2009, de 11 de diciembre, de reforma de la Ley Orgánica 4/2000, de 11 de enero, 
sobre derechos y libertades de los extranjeros en España y su integración social,BOE-A-2009-19949 
[Organic Law 2/2009 amending Organic Law 4/200 on the Rights and Liberties for Foreigners in 
Spain and their Social Integration] (Spain), http://www.boe.es/buscar/doc.php?id=BOE-A-2009-19949    
(20/12/2012)  
44
 Real Decreto 1161/2009, de 10 de julio, por el que se modifica el Real Decreto 240/2007, de 16 de 
febrero, sobre entrada, libre circulación y residencia en España de ciudadanos de los Estados 
miembros de la Unión Europea y de otros Estados parte en el Acuerdo sobre el Espacio Económico 
Europeo, BOE-A-2007-4184, [Royal Decree on the Entry, Free Movement and Residence in Spain of 
Citizens of the Member States of the European Union and Other States Party to the Agreement on 
the European Economic Area] (Spain) http://www.boe.es/buscar/doc.php?id=BOE-A-2007-4184    
(20/12/2012) 
45
 However, they should hold a Foreign ID Card issued by the European Union agreements. 
46
 Ley Orgánica 4/2000, de 11 de enero, sobre derechos y libertades de los extranjeros en España y 
su integración social, BOE-A-2000-544 [Organic Law 4/2000 on the Rights and Liberties for 
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The Spanish migration policy is focused on undocumented immigration and the integration of 
immigrants legally residing in Spain. To implement this policy, controls are carried out both 
when immigrants enter the country and when they take up residence. Carriers are now 
responsible for verifying the legality of the documents shown to them under pain of 
sanctions. They are also required to inform the authorities of any unused return tickets. 
Lastly, municipalities are required to keep their registers up-to-date so as to ensure that the 
data are consistent with residence permit data47. 
 
 
  
                                                                                                                                       
Foreigners in Spain and their Social Integration] (Spain) http://www.boe.es/buscar/act.php?id=BOE-A-
2000-544 (20/12/2012) 
47
 OECD, Recent Changes in Migration Movements and Policies: Country Notes (2010), above n 117 
and see also IOM, Migration Initiatives 2012 (2012), above n 117. 
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APPENDIX I.  
FOUR COUNTRIES PRIVACY REGIME (COMPARATIVE TABLE) 
 
Comparative Privacy and Data Protection Laws 
Country Title 
Definitions 
Personal Data 
Australia Privacy Act 1988 
Personal information means information or an opinion (including information or an opinion forming part of a 
database), whether true or not, and whether recorded in a material form or not, about an individual whose identity is 
apparent, or can reasonably be ascertained, form the information or opinion. 
 
Sensitive information means: (a) information or an opinion about an individual’s: (i) racial or ethnic origin; or (ii) 
political opinion: or (iii) membership of a political association; or (iv) religious beliefs or affiliations; or (v) 
philosophical beliefs; r (vi) membership of a professional or trade association; or (vii) membership of a trade union; 
or (viii) sexual preferences or practices; or (ix) criminal record; (b) health information about an individual; or (c) 
genetic information about an individual that is not otherwise health information. 
Mexico 
Federal Transparency 
and Access to 
Governmental Public 
Information Act 
Personal data any information concerning an identified or identifiable a natural person (individual) 
 
Personal data system: Systematized personal data in the possession of a disclosing party 
New 
Zealand 
Privacy Act 1993 
Personal information means information about an identifiable individual; and includes information relating to a 
death that is maintained by the Registrar-General pursuant to the Births, Deaths, Marriages, and Relationships 
Registration Act 1995, or any former Act 
 
Unique identifier means an identifier- (a) that is assigned to an individual by an agency for the purposes of the 
operations of the agency; and (b) that uniquely identifies that individual in relation to that agency;- but, for the 
avoidance of doubt, does not include an individual’s name used to identify that individual 
Spain 
Organic Law15/1999 of 
13 December on the 
Protection of Personal 
Data 
Personal data: any information concerning identified or identifiable natural persons. 
 
Processing of data: operations and technical processes, whether or not by automatic means, which allow the 
collection, recording, storage, adaptation, modification, blocking and cancellation, as well as assignments of data 
resulting from communications, consultations, interconnections and transfers. 
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Country Functions of Commissioners 
Australia 
To investigate an act or practice of an agency 
To approve privacy codes 
To investigate an act or practice of an organisation 
To perform functions, and exercise powers, conferred on an adjudicator by an approved privacy code 
To review the operation of approved privacy codes 
To review the determination of an adjudicator in relation to a complaint 
To examine a proposed enactment that would require or authorise acts or practices of an agency or organisation. 
To undertake research into, and to monitor developments in, data processing and computer technology (including data-matching and 
data-linkage)  
To promote an understanding and acceptance of the Information Privacy Principles 
To prepare, and to publish guidelines for the avoidance of acts or practices or an agency or an organisation 
To provide advice to a Minister 
To provide advice to an adjudicator 
To maintain, and to publish annually, a record of the matters set out in records maintained by record-keepers 
To conduct audits of records of personal information 
To examine a proposal for data matching or data linkage that may involve an  interference with the privacy of individuals 
For the purpose of promoting the protection of individual privacy, to undertake educational programs on the Commissioner’s own behalf 
or in co-operation with other persons or authorities acting on behalf of the Commissioner 
To issue guidelines 
To monitor and report on the adequacy of equipment and user safeguards 
May, and if requested to do so, shall make reports and recommendations to the Minister in relation to any matter that concerns the need 
for or the desirability of legislative or administrative action in the interest of the privacy of individuals  
Mexico 
To interpret this Act in the administrative sphere in terms of Article 6.  
To hear and issue a ruling on the writs of review filed by applicants;   
To design and review the criteria for classification, declassification and custody of privileged and confidential information;   
To act as coadjutant of the National Archives in the preparation and application of criteria for listing and keeping of documents, and for 
the organization of department and agency files.   
To  supervise, and in case of  non-performance, issue  recommendations to the departments and agencies for the enforcement of the 
provisions of Article 7 herein;   
To provide counselling to private entities about their requests for access to information;   
To provide technical support to departments and agencies in the formulation and implementation of their information programs in terms of 
Article 29, section VI, herein;   
To design the forms for the requests for access to information, as well as the forms for access to and correction of personal data. 
To set forth the general guidelines and policies for the handling, maintenance, safety and protection of the personal data kept by 
departments and agencies;   
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Under the terms of Article 56, last paragraph herein, to inform the internal control body of each department and agency of the alleged 
infringement of this Act and its Regulations.  The resolution issued to the effect by internal control bodies shall be final and conclusive 
and shall be notified to the Institute for publication in its annual report;   
To formulate the guidelines consigned in Article 38 herein.   
To promote and, if applicable, carry out the training of government officials in the access to information and personal data protection.   
To disseminate among government officials and private entities the benefits of public handling of information, as well as their 
responsibility in the sensible use and preservation thereof;     
To prepare and publish studies and research to disseminate the knowledge on the subject matter of this Act;   
To cooperate in connection with this Act with the other disclosing parties, states, municipalities and their bodies, giving access to 
information through the execution of agreements or the implementation of programs;   
To prepare its Internal Regulations, as well as any other operating directives;   
To designate the government officials to be in charge of the Institute;   
To prepare its annual budget plan to be submitted to the Department of Finance and Public Credit for inclusion in the Federal Budget, 
and  
Any other attributions conferred thereto by this Act, its Regulations or any other applicable provision. 
New Zealand 
To promote, by education and publicity, an understanding and acceptance of the information privacy principles and of the object of those 
principles 
to conduct an audit of personal information maintained by an agency 
To monitor the use of unique identifiers and to report to the Prime Minster 
To maintain and to publish directories of personal information 
To monitor compliance with the public register privacy principles 
To examine any proposed legislation that makes provision for collection or/and disclosure of personal information 
For the purpose of promoting the protection of individual privacy, to undertake educational programmes  
To make public statements into, and monitor developments in , data processing and computer technology 
To examine any proposed legislation or proposed policy of the government 
To report to the Prime Minister 
To publish reports relating generally to the exercise of the Commissioner’s functions 
Spain 
To ensure compliance with the legislation on data protection and ensure its application, in particular as regards the rights of information, 
access, rectification, objection and cancellation of data.  
To issue the authorisations provided for in the Law or in its regulatory provisions.  
To issue, where applicable, and without prejudice to the remittances of other bodies, the instructions needed to bring processing 
operations into line with the principles of this Law.  
To consider the applications and complaints from the data subjects.  
To provide information to persons on their rights as regards the processing of personal data.  
To require controllers and processors, after having heard them, to take the necessary measures to align the processing operations with 
this Law and, where applicable, to order the cessation of the processing operation, when the operation does not comply with the 
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provisions of the Law.  
To impose the penalties set forth in Title VII of this Law.  
To provide regular information on the draft general provisions set forth in this Law.  
To obtain from the data controllers any assistance and information it deems necessary for the exercise of its functions.  
To make known the existence of personal data files, to which end it shall regularly publish a list of such files with any additional 
information the Director of the Agency may deem necessary. 
The decisions of the Spanish Agency of Data Protection shall be made public once they are notified to interested parties. The publication 
will be made preferably through media or telecommunications. 
 Regulations may establish the terms under which it carries out the dissemination of those resolutions. 
 The provisions of the preceding paragraphs shall not apply to decisions relating to the registration of a data controller in the General 
Registry of Data Protection or those for which registration is resolved in the same type of code is governed by Article 32 of this Act. 
  
297 
 
Country Principles 
Australia 
Manner and purpose of collection of personal information 
Solicitation of personal information from individual concerned 
Solicitation of personal information generally 
Storage and security of personal information 
Information relating to records kept by record-keeper 
Access to records containing personal information 
Alteration of records containing personal information 
Record-keeper to check accuracy etc. of personal information before use 
Personal information to be used only for relevant purposes 
Limits on use of personal information 
Limits on disclosure of personal information 
Mexico 
To implement the procedures required to receive and resolve the requests for accessing and correcting data, to train government officials and 
provide information on their policies in connection with the protection of mentioned data  under terms of the guidelines issued by the Institute or 
the equivalent bodies consigned in Article 61 herein;  to handle the personal data as long as deemed adequate, appropriate and moderated in 
connection with the purposes for which they were obtained; to make a  document available to private entities, at the time of obtaining personal 
data, stating the purposes for its treatment, under the terms of the guidelines issued by the Institute or the equivalent body stipulated in Article 
61; to do their best so that the personal data are accurate and updated; to substitute, correct or complete, on a mandatory basis, personal data 
that are inaccurate in full or in part, or incomplete, as soon as the disclosing parties are aware of this situation; to implement the required 
measures to warrant the safety of personal data and prevent their alteration, loss, transfer or unauthorized access. 
New 
Zealand 
Purpose of collection of personal information 
Source of personal information 
Collection of information from subject 
Manner of collection of personal information 
Storage and security of personal information 
Access to personal information 
Correction of personal information 
Accuracy, etc, of personal information to be checked before use 
Agency not to keep personal information for longer than necessary 
Limits on use of personal information 
Limits on disclosure of personal information 
Unique identifiers 
Spain 
Quality of the data 
Right of information in the collection of data 
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Consent of the data subject 
Data with special protection 
Data on health 
Data security 
Duty of secrecy 
Communication of data 
Access to data on behalf of third parties 
Right of access 
Right of rectification or cancellation 
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APPENDIX J.  
 
INTERVIEW QUESTIONS AND INTERVIEWEES 
 
Note: This semi-structured face-to-face interviews with academics and public officials in the 
four countries study are part of the empirical methodology employed in the study and were 
introduced through all the body of the thesis and has been cross referenced in the body of 
this thesis. This component of the research project received approval from the University of 
Tasmania Human Research Ethics Committee. Approval Ethics Ref: H0012013 of 
29/08/2011 
 
1. Existing biometric systems (databases)  
1.1. What biometric systems are being used in your country? 
Please look at the attached chart. I have identified a number of biometric systems 
operating in your country.  
1.2. Do you know of other databases in your country? 
1.3. Has the use of biometric systems increased in your country? 
  
2. Policies for development of databases. 
2.1. What policies accompanied the introduction of biometrics in your country?  
2.2. Are these policies publicly available? 
2.3. What were the reasons and purposes for introducing biometric systems in your 
country?   
2.4. Are you aware of any plans for the expansion of biometric databases? 
 
3. Data protection and exchange information 
3.1. What are the specific rules or standards on data protection for biometric information 
collection in your country? 
3.2. Is the biometric data that you collect exchangeable with any other national or 
international organisation and, if so under what conditions? 
3.3. Does your organisation have special rules for the exchange of information based on 
security reasons, particularly terrorism? 
 
4. Access to personal information. 
4.1. How can a person find out whether biometric data is held by a national authority and 
how can this information be verified and/or corrected? 
4.2. Was any consultation process undertaken before the implementation of biometric 
systems? 
4.3. Do you have any guide for exercising the right of access to information on 
databases and explaining the procedure for such a request? 
4.4. Do you believe that your organisation provides sufficient public information about 
biometric systems? 
 
5. Future directions. 
5.1. What are the socio political and ethical issues in relation to biometric systems? 
5.2. Are any new mechanisms for governance of biometric systems proposed in your 
country? 
5.3. In what other areas do you think that biometric systems, as a mechanism of 
surveillance, will be used in the future? 
5.4. Is biometric technology spreading in your society? 
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The following people were interviewed: 
 
Australia: 
 Jeremy Johnson, Director National Biometric and Child Protection Services, 
CrimTrac Agency (Canberra, 18 October 2011) 
 Alex Webling, Policy Director, Biometrics and Identity, Attorney General's 
Department (Canberra, 20 October 2011) 
 Charlotte Epstein, Professor, University of Sydney (Sydney, 28 October 2011)  
 Katina Michael, Associate Professor, University of Wollongong (Sydney, 21 February 
2012) 
 
Mexico: 
 Lina Ornelas, General Director of Self-Regulation, Instituto Federal de Acceso a la 
Información y Protección de Datos [Federal Access Information and Data Protection 
Institute] (Mexico City, 15 November 2011) 
 Alejandro del Conde, Secretary of Data Protection, Instituto Federal de Acceso a la 
Información y Protección de Datos [Federal Access Information and Data Protection 
Institute] (Mexico City, 16 November 2011) 
 Ernesto Villanueva Villanueva, Professor, Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas de la 
Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México [Legal Research Centre of the National 
Autonomous University of Mexico] (Mexico City, 23 November 2011)  
 Issa Luna Pla, Professor, Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas de la Universidad 
Nacional Autónoma de México [Legal Research Centre of the National Autonomous 
University of Mexico] (Mexico City, 23 November 2011) 
 Alberto Arellano Méndez, Researcher, Instituto Nacional de Medicina Genomica 
[National Institute of Genomic Medicine] (Mexico City, 23 November 2011) 
 
New Zealand: 
 David Philp, General Manager-Passport, Department of Internal Affairs (Wellington, 
25 October 2011) 
 
Spain: 
 Francisco Villanueva Díez, Deputy General Director of Information Systems and 
Communications for Security Matters, Spanish Minister of Interior (Madrid, 8 
November 2011) 
 Pilar Nicolás Jiménez, Professor, University of Deusto (Bilbao, 10 November 2011)  
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APPENDIX K.  
 
LEGISLATION OF BIOMETRIC IDENTIFIER NEW JERSEY 
 
In 2002, the State of New Jersey introduced the Biometric Identifier Privacy Act: 
Be It Enacted by the Senate and General Assembly of the State of New Jersey: 
1. This act shall be known and may be cited as the "Biometric Identifier Privacy Act. 
2.  As used in this act: 
"Biometric identifier" means a retina or iris scan, fingerprint, voiceprint, or record of a hand or 
a face geometry. 
"Governmental entity" means the State, any agency, authority, or employee thereof, or any 
political subdivision of the State, including but not limited to any county, municipality, or 
school district, or any agency, authority, or employee thereof. 
3. a. Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, no person shall obtain a 
biometric identifier of an individual, for the purpose of commercial advantage, without 
authorization of the individual. 
b. A person who possesses a biometric identifier of an individual shall not sell, lease, or 
otherwise disclose the biometric identifier to another person unless: 
(1) The individual consents to the sale, lease or disclosure; 
(2) The sale, lease or disclosure completes a financial transaction requested or authorized 
by the individual; 
(3) The sale, lease or disclosure is required or permitted by federal or State law; or 
(4) The sale, lease or disclosure is made by or to a law enforcement agency for a law 
enforcement purpose. 
c. A person who possesses a biometric identifier of an individual shall store, transmit, and 
protect from disclosure the biometric identifier using reasonable care and in a manner that is 
the same as or more protective than the manner in which the person stores, transmits, and 
protects other confidential information. 
d. A person aggrieved by a violation of this section may bring an action in the Superior Court 
to enjoin further violation and to recover for the actual damage sustained by reasons of such 
violation, including costs and reasonable attorneys fees.  
e. Any person who violates any provision of this section shall be liable for a civil penalty of 
not more than $25,000 for each violation. Any such penalty shall be enforced and collected 
in accordance with "The Penalty Enforcement Law of 1999," P.L.1999, c.274 (C.2A:58-10 et 
seq.). Any action to collect or enforce any such penalty shall be brought in the Superior 
Court by the Attorney General or county prosecutor.  
4. a. A governmental entity that possesses a biometric identifier of an individual shall not 
sell, lease, or otherwise disclose the biometric identifier to another person unless: 
(1) the individual consents to the sale, lease or disclosure; 
(2) the sale, lease or disclosure is required or permitted by a federal or State law; or 
(3) the sale, lease or disclosure is made by or to a law enforcement agency for a law 
enforcement purpose.  
b. A governmental entity that possesses a biometric identifier of an individual shall store, 
transmit, and protect from disclosure the biometric identifier using reasonable care and in a 
manner that is the same as or more protective than the manner in which the governmental 
entity stores, transmits, and protects other confidential information. 
c. A governmental entity that possesses a biometric identifier of an individual shall establish 
a reasonable procedure under which an individual is entitled to have the governmental entity 
correct information about the individual that is possessed by the governmental entity and 
that is incorrect. The procedure shall not unduly burden an individual using the procedure. 
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d. A person aggrieved by a violation of this section may bring an action in the Superior 
Court, to enjoin further violation and to recover the actual damage sustained by reasons of 
such violation, including costs and reasonable attorneys fees.  
e. Information compiled pursuant to this section shall not be subject to disclosure pursuant to 
P.L.1963, c. 73 (C.47:1A-1 et seq.) as amended and supplemented. 
5. This act shall take effect immediately. 
STATEMENT 
This bill, the "Biometric Identifier Privacy Act," provides guidelines for the use and 
distribution of biometric identifiers and establishes civil penalties for the misuse of the 
information.  
A biometric identifier is a retina or iris scan, fingerprint, voiceprint, or record of a hand or a 
face geometry. Biometrics technology is a non-invasive method of using computer 
technology to provide automatic identification or identity verification or authentication of 
individuals. The technology acquires an image of a physical feature which is then applied to 
the algorithm to produce a "template." This "template" is then encrypted for data 
transmission and storage. This stored "template" can then be stored and compared against 
the live "template" when necessary. This technology is being used for criminal identification 
as well as in airport security systems, border clearances and for transaction verifications in 
internet businesses. It is the sponsor's intent to protect the users of this technology by 
insuring that this data is not obtained, disclosed, misused or released without an individual's 
authorization.  
Under the provisions of the bill a person cannot obtain another individual's biometric 
identifier information, for the purpose of commercial advantage, without authorization from 
that individual. The bill prohibits a person who possesses a biometric identifier of another 
individual from selling, leasing, or otherwise disclosing this information unless: the individual 
consents to the sale, lease or disclosure; the sale, lease or disclosure completes a financial 
transaction requested or authorized by the individual; the sale, lease or disclosure is 
required or permitted by federal or State law; or the sale, lease or disclosure is made by or to 
a law enforcement agency for a law enforcement purpose. A person who possesses a 
biometric identifier of an individual would be required to store, transmit, and protect from 
disclosure the biometric identifier using reasonable care and in a manner that is the same as 
or more protective than the manner in which that person stores, transmits, and protects other 
confidential information. The bill provides that any person who violates the provisions of the 
act would be liable for a civil penalty of not more than $25,000 for each violation. The 
Attorney General or county prosecutor would bring the action to collect or enforce the 
penalty in Superior Court. Furthermore, the bill provides that any person who has been 
aggrieved by a violation of the act may bring an action in the Superior Court, to enjoin further 
violation and to recover the actual damage sustained by reasons of such violation, including 
costs and reasonable attorneys fees.  
In addition, the bill prohibits any governmental entity which possesses a biometric identifier 
of an individual from selling, leasing, or otherwise disclosing the biometric identifier to 
another person unless: the individual consents to the sale, lease or disclosure; the sale, 
lease or disclosure is required or permitted by a federal or State law; or the sale, lease or 
disclosure is made by or to a law enforcement agency for a law enforcement purpose. A 
governmental entity that possesses a biometric identifier of an individual would be required 
to store, transmit, and protect from disclosure the biometric identifier using reasonable care 
and in a manner that is the same as or more protective than the manner in which the 
governmental entity stores, transmits, and protects its other confidential information. The bill 
also requires the governmental entity to establish a reasonable procedure under which an 
individual is entitled to have the governmental entity correct information about the individual 
that is possessed by the governmental entity and that is incorrect. The procedure cannot be 
unduly burdensome. 
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APPENDIX L.  
 
 
LEGISLATION OF BIOMETRIC INFORMATION ILLINOIS. 
 
 
In 2008, the State of Illinois introduced the Biometric Information Privacy Act: 
(740 ILCS 14/1)  
Sec. 1. Short title. This Act may be cited as the Biometric Information Privacy Act.  
(Source: P.A. 95-994, eff. 10-3-08.)  
(740 ILCS 14/5)  
Sec. 5. Legislative findings; intent. The General Assembly finds all of the following: 
(a) The use of biometrics is growing in the business and security screening sectors and 
appears to promise streamlined financial transactions and security screenings. 
(b) Major national corporations have selected the City of Chicago and other locations in this 
State as pilot testing sites for new applications of biometric-facilitated financial transactions, 
including finger-scan technologies at grocery stores, gas stations, and school cafeterias. 
(c) Biometrics are unlike other unique identifiers that are used to access finances or other 
sensitive information. For example, social security numbers, when compromised, can be 
changed. Biometrics, however, are biologically unique to the individual; therefore, once 
compromised, the individual has no recourse, is at heightened risk for identity theft, and is 
likely to withdraw from biometric-facilitated transactions. 
(d) An overwhelming majority of members of the public are weary of the use of biometrics 
when such information is tied to finances and other personal information. 
(e) Despite limited State law regulating the collection, use, safeguarding, and storage of 
biometrics, many members of the public are deterred from partaking in biometric identifier-
facilitated transactions. 
(f) The full ramifications of biometric technology are not fully known. 
(g) The public welfare, security, and safety will be served by regulating the collection, use, 
safeguarding, handling, storage, retention, and destruction of biometric identifiers and 
information.  
(Source: P.A. 95-994, eff. 10-3-08.)  
(740 ILCS 14/10)  
Sec. 10. Definitions. In this Act: 
"Biometric identifier" means a retina or iris scan, fingerprint, voiceprint, or scan of hand or 
face geometry. Biometric identifiers do not include writing samples, written signatures, 
photographs, human biological samples used for valid scientific testing or screening, 
demographic data, tattoo descriptions, or physical descriptions such as height, weight, hair 
color, or eye color. Biometric identifiers do not include donated organs, tissues, or parts as 
defined in the Illinois Anatomical Gift Act or blood or serum stored on behalf of recipients or 
potential recipients of living or cadaveric transplants and obtained or stored by a federally 
designated organ procurement agency. Biometric identifiers do not include biological 
materials regulated under the Genetic Information Privacy Act. Biometric identifiers do not 
include information captured from a patient in a health care setting or information collected, 
used, or stored for health care treatment, payment, or operations under the federal Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996. Biometric identifiers do not include an 
X-ray, roentgen process, computed tomography, MRI, PET scan, mammography, or other 
image or film of the human anatomy used to diagnose, prognose, or treat an illness or other 
medical condition or to further validate scientific testing or screening. 
  
304 
 
"Biometric information" means any information, regardless of how it is captured, converted, 
stored, or shared, based on an individual's biometric identifier used to identify an individual. 
Biometric information does not include information derived from items or procedures 
excluded under the definition of biometric identifiers. 
"Confidential and sensitive information" means personal information that can be used to 
uniquely identify an individual or an individual's account or property. Examples of confidential 
and sensitive information include, but are not limited to, a genetic marker, genetic testing 
information, a unique identifier number to locate an account or property, an account number, 
a PIN number, a pass code, a driver's license number, or a social security number. 
"Private entity" means any individual, partnership, corporation, limited liability company, 
association, or other group, however organized. A private entity does not include a State or 
local government agency. A private entity does not include any court of Illinois, a clerk of the 
court, or a judge or justice thereof. 
"Written release" means informed written consent or, in the context of employment, a 
release executed by an employee as a condition of employment.  
(Source: P.A. 95-994, eff. 10-3-08.)  
(740 ILCS 14/15)  
Sec. 15. Retention; collection; disclosure; destruction.  
(a) A private entity in possession of biometric identifiers or biometric information must 
develop a written policy, made available to the public, establishing a retention schedule and 
guidelines for permanently destroying biometric identifiers and biometric information when 
the initial purpose for collecting or obtaining such identifiers or information has been satisfied 
or within 3 years of the individual's last interaction with the private entity, whichever occurs 
first. Absent a valid warrant or subpoena issued by a court of competent jurisdiction, a 
private entity in possession of biometric identifiers or biometric information must comply with 
its established retention schedule and destruction guidelines. 
(b) No private entity may collect, capture, purchase, receive through trade, or otherwise 
obtain a person's or a customer's biometric identifier or biometric information, unless it first: 
(1) informs the subject or the subject's legally authorized representative in writing that a 
biometric identifier or biometric information is being collected or stored;  
(2) informs the subject or the subject's legally authorized representative in writing of the 
specific purpose and length of term for which a biometric identifier or biometric information is 
being collected, stored, and used; and  
(3) receives a written release executed by the subject of the biometric identifier or biometric 
information or the subject's legally authorized representative.   
(c) No private entity in possession of a biometric identifier or biometric information may sell, 
lease, trade, or otherwise profit from a person's or a customer's biometric identifier or 
biometric information. 
(d) No private entity in possession of a biometric identifier or biometric information may 
disclose, redisclose, or otherwise disseminate a person's or a customer's biometric identifier 
or biometric information unless: 
(1) the subject of the biometric identifier or biometric information or the subject's legally 
authorized representative consents to the disclosure or redisclosure;  
(2) the disclosure or redisclosure completes a financial transaction requested or authorized 
by the subject of the biometric identifier or the biometric information or the subject's legally 
authorized representative;  
(3) the disclosure or redisclosure is required by State or federal law or municipal ordinance; 
or  
(4) the disclosure is required pursuant to a valid warrant or subpoena issued by a court of 
competent jurisdiction.   
(e) A private entity in possession of a biometric identifier or biometric information shall: 
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(1) store, transmit, and protect from disclosure all biometric identifiers and biometric 
information using the reasonable standard of care within the private entity's industry; and   
(2) store, transmit, and protect from disclosure all biometric identifiers and biometric 
information in a manner that is the same as or more protective than the manner in which the 
private entity stores, transmits, and protects other confidential and sensitive information.   
 (Source: P.A. 95-994, eff. 10-3-08.)  
(740 ILCS 14/20)  
Sec. 20. Right of action. Any person aggrieved by a violation of this Act shall have a right of 
action in a State circuit court or as a supplemental claim in federal district court against an 
offending party. A prevailing party may recover for each violation: 
(1) against a private entity that negligently  violates a provision of this Act, liquidated 
damages of $1,000 or actual damages, whichever is greater;  
(2) against a private entity that intentionally or  recklessly violates a provision of this Act, 
liquidated damages of $5,000 or actual damages, whichever is greater;  
(3) reasonable attorneys' fees and costs, including expert witness fees and other litigation 
expenses; and  
(4) other relief, including an injunction, as the State or federal court may deem appropriate.  
 (Source: P.A. 95-994, eff. 10-3-08.)  
(740 ILCS 14/25)  
Sec. 25. Construction.  
(a) Nothing in this Act shall be construed to impact the admission or discovery of biometric 
identifiers and biometric information in any action of any kind in any court, or before any 
tribunal, board, agency, or person. 
(b) Nothing in this Act shall be construed to conflict with the X-Ray Retention Act, the federal 
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 and the rules promulgated under 
either Act. 
(c) Nothing in this Act shall be deemed to apply in any manner to a financial institution or an 
affiliate of a financial institution that is subject to Title V of the federal Gramm-Leach-Bliley 
Act of 1999 and the rules promulgated thereunder. 
(d) Nothing in this Act shall be construed to conflict with the Private Detective, Private Alarm, 
Private Security, Fingerprint Vendor, and Locksmith Act of 2004 and the rules promulgated 
there under. 
(e) Nothing in this Act shall be construed to apply to a contractor, subcontractor, or agent of 
a State agency or local unit of government when working for that State agency or local unit 
of government.  
(Source: P.A. 95-994, eff. 10-3-08.)  
(740 ILCS 14/30)  
Sec. 30. (Repealed).  
(Source: P.A. 95-994, eff. 10-3-08. Repealed internally, eff. 1-1-09.)  
(740 ILCS 14/99)  
Sec. 99. Effective date. This Act takes effect upon becoming law.  
(Source: P.A. 95-994, eff. 10-3-08.)  
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APPENDIX M.  
 
LEGISLATION OF ONTARIO, CANADA 
 
Works Act-Statutes of Ontario 1997, Canada 
 
Ontario Works Act-Statutes of Ontario 1997, c 25 
Biometric information 
75.  (1) Where this Act or the regulations authorize a person to collect or use personal 
information, biometric information may be collected or used only for the following purposes: 
1. To ensure that an individual is registered only once as an applicant, recipient, spouse or 
dependent adult. 
2. To authenticate the identity of an individual who claims to be entitled to assistance. 
3. To enable an individual to receive and give receipt for assistance provided through a 
financial institution or other authorized provider. 
4. To enable an applicant, recipient, spouse or dependent adult to access personal 
information. 
5. To enable an individual to make a declaration electronically by voice or other means for 
any purposes authorized under this Act. 
6. To match data in accordance with an agreement made under section 71 or 72 for the 
purpose of ensuring eligibility for assistance or benefits. 1997, c. 25, Sched. A, s. 75 (1); 
1999, c. 6, s. 50 (7); 2005, c. 5, s. 54 (7). 
(2)  Biometric information may be collected under this Act only from the individual to whom it 
relates, in accordance with an agreement referred to in paragraph 6 of subsection (1) or in 
accordance with section 73.  
(3)  Biometric information shall not be disclosed to a third party except in accordance with,  
(a) a court order or a warrant;  
(b) an agreement under section 71 or 72 that is made for the purpose of ensuring eligibility 
for a social benefit program, including a social benefit program under the Income Tax 
Act, the Taxation Act, 2007 or the Income Tax Act (Canada); or 
(c) section 73.  
(4)  Biometric information to be collected from the individual to whom it relates shall be 
collected openly and directly from the individual.  
(5)  An administrator shall ensure that biometric information can be accessed and used only 
by those persons who need the information in order to perform their duties under this Act 
and that it is not used as a unique file identifier or common personal file identifier, except as 
authorized under subsection (1).  
(6)  An administrator shall ensure that biometric information collected under this Act is 
encrypted forthwith after collection, that the original biometric information is destroyed after 
encryption and that the encrypted biometric information is stored or transmitted only in 
encrypted form and destroyed in the prescribed manner.  
(7)  Neither the Director nor an administrator shall implement a system that can reconstruct 
or retain the original biometric sample from encrypted biometric information or that can 
compare it to a copy or reproduction of biometric information not obtained directly from the 
individual.  
(8)  The only personal information that may be retained together with biometric information 
concerning an individual is the individual’s name, address, date of birth and sex.  
(9)  For the purpose of section 67 of the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy 
Act and section 53 of the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, 
subsection (3) is a confidentiality provision that prevails over those Acts. 
